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This recent developments outline discusses, and provides context to understand, the significance of the
most important judicial decisions and administrative rulings and regulations promulgated by the
Internal Revenue Service and Treasury Department during the most recent twelve months - and
sometimes a little farther back in time if we find the item particularly humorous or outrageous. Most
Treasury Regulations, however, are so complex that they cannot be discussed in detail and, anyway, only
a devout masochist would read them all the way through; just the basic topic and fundamental principles
are highlighted Amendments to the Internal Revenue Code generally are not discussed except to the
extent that (1) they are of major significance, (2) they have led to administrative rulings and regulations,
(3) they have affected previously issued rulings and regulations otherwise covered by the outline, or (4)
they provide my co-author the opportunity mock our elected representatives. The outline focuses
primarily on topics of broad general interest [to the two of us, at least] - income tax accounting rules,
determination of gross income, allowable deductions, treatment of capital gains and losses, corporate
and partnership taxation, exempt organizations, and procedure and penalties. It deals summarily with
qualified pension and profit sharing plans, and generally does not deal with international taxation or
specialized industries, such as banking, insurance, and financial services. Please read this outline at
your own risk; my co-author and I take no responsibility for any misinformation in it, whether
occasioned by our advancing ages or our increasing indifference as to whether we get any particular
item right.
I. ACCOUNTING
A. Accounting Methods
1. Notice 2002-75, 2002-47 I.R.B. 884 (11/25/02). This notice is a proposed
revenue procedure that would provide exclusive rules for individuals filing tax returns on a fiscal year to
obtain automatic approval to change to a calendar year. It would supersede Rev. Proc. 66-50, 1966-2 C.B.
1260.
2. Kinder and gentler accounting method change procedures.
a. Really kind taxpayer-favorable § 481 adjustments. Rev. Proc. 2002-
19, 2002-13 I.R.B. 696 (1/1/02). This revenue procedure modifies Rev. Proc. 97-27, 1997-1 C.B. 680,
and Rev. Proc. 2002-9, 2002-3 I.R.B. 327 (1/22/02). It revises the revised rules for obtaining the IRS's
consent to changes in accounting methods. The most significant changes to Rev. Proc. 97-27 and Rev.
Proc. 2002-9 are: (1) allowing a taxpayer to change its method of accounting prospectively, without
audit protection, when the method to be changed is an issue pending for a taxable year under examination
or an issue under consideration by either an appeals office or a federal court; and (2) taking negative, i.e.,
taxpayer-favorable, § 481(a) adjustments into account entirely in the year of change. This revenue
procedure was amplified and clarified by Rev. Proc. 2002-54, 2002-35 I.R.B. 432 (8/14/02).
b. And the IRS clarifies the application of the one-year adjustment
period to pending and recently-approved applications. Rev. Proc. 2002-54, 2002-35 I.R.B. 432
(8/14/02), clarifying and modifying Rev. Proc. 2002-19, 2002-13 I.R.B. 696. This revenue procedure
* This outline was prepared jointly with Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Clarence TeSelle Professor of Law, University of
Florida College of Law, Gainesville, Florida.
makes the change from the four-year to the one-year adjustment period [for negative adjustments under §
481 (a)] available to those applications pending on 3/14/02 with respect to years ending before 12/31/01
to defer the year of change to the first year ending on or after 12/31/01, and allows similar relief for those
with approved applications who elect to defer the year of change on or before 12/13/02.
c. And just a little more for taxpayers in the name of simplicity. REG-
142605-02, Administration Simplification of Section 481(a) Adjustment Periods in Various Regulations,
68 F.R. 25310 (5/12/03). Proposed amendments to regulations under §§ 263A and 448 to allow taxpayers
changing a method of accounting to take any § 481(a) adjustments over the same number of taxable years
that is provided in the general guidance provided under Rev. Proc. 92-27, 1997-1 C.B. 680 (as modified
and amplified by Rev. Proc. 2002-19, 2002-13 I.R.B. 696, and modified by Rev. Proc. 2002-54, 2002-35
I.R.B. 432) for accounting method changes [four years for positive adjustments and one year for negative
adjustments].
3. Taxpayer's change in its cost recovery period is not a change of accounting
method. Brookshire Brothers Holding, Inc. v. Commissioner, 320 F.3d 507, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-629,
2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,214 (5th Cir. 1/29/03), affg T.C. Memo. 2001-150 (6/22/01). The taxpayer filed
amended returns changing its cost recovery period for convenience stores from 31.5 and 39 years to 15
years, as permitted by a Specialized Program Coordinated Issue Paper. The IRS asserted that the change
required consent under § 446(e). The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's (Judge Nims) holding that
Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(e)(2)(ii)(b) [providing that a change of useful life is not an accounting method
change] applied to changing the § 168 ACRS cost recovery period. Although it did not need to do so to
decide the case, the Court of Appeals went a step further and reasoned that even if the switch in cost
recovery periods was a change in accounting methods, for the Commissioner to have challenged the
switch in cost recovery periods, he would have had to do so for the first year in which the switch had
been made, before the statute of limitations had expired on that year.
4. Another case holding that a reclassification of MACRS property is not a
change of accounting method. Green Forest Manufacturing Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-75
(3/14/03). The Tax Court (Judge Nims) followed Brookshire Brothers Holding, Inc. v. Commissioner,
320 F.3d 507, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-629, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,214 (5th Cir. 1/2903), aff'g T.C. Memo.
2001-150 (6/22/01), in holding that reclassification of MACRS property used outside the U.S., which
resulted in a changed recovery period and method, was not a change of accounting method. The court
declined to follow Rev. Proc. 96-3 1, §2.01, 1996-1 C.B. 714, providing that a change from not allowing
depreciation to allowing depreciation is a change of accounting method, because the guidance did not
contain any reasoning and thus was not entitled to deference under United States v. Mead Corp., 533
U.S. 218 (2001).
Note that the relief provided by Rev. Proc. 96-31, updated by Rev.
Proc. 2002-9 and Rev. Proc. 2002-19, permits a deduction for all prior allowable depreciation that was
erroneously not taken by the taxpayer with respect to an asset owned by the taxpayer. This relief is available
to taxpayers who file a Form 3115 for change of accounting method with their income tax return for the
year of sale, or, preferably, at an earlier date.
B. Inventories
1. Rev. Proc. 2003-51, 2003-29 I.R.B. 121 (6/25/03). This revenue procedure
provides three basic methods for valuing inventory items acquired when a taxpayer purchases the assets
of a business for a lump sum or a corporation acquires the stock of another corporation and makes a §
338 election: (1) the Replacement Cost Method, (2) the Comparative Sales Method, and (3) the Income
Method. However,"[v]aluing inventory is an inherently factual determination *** [and] the three
valuation methods outlined above serve only as guidelines for determining the fair market value of
inventories."
C. Installment Method
D. Year of Receipt or Deduction
1. They may be losers on the diamond, but not at the Tax Court. Tampa Bay
Devil Rays, Ltd. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-248 (9/30/02). The Tampa Bay Devil Rays
collected advanced season ticket payments for the 1998 baseball season, their first "major league"
season, in 1995 and 1996. In those years the Devil Rays were conducting minor league baseball activities
- many sports fans think the Devil Rays still are conducting only minor league baseball activities - and
deducted the expenses, but did not include the advance season ticket receipts. Judge Swift rejected the
Commissioner's argument that under Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 (1963), the Devil Rays
were required to include the prepayments, and applied Artnell Co. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1970-
85, on remand from 400 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1968), because, since the receipts would have had to be
refunded if the Devil Rays did not play the season, the facts of the case fit within the narrow Artnell
exception to the Schlude principle.
2. "Hello, I'm from the IRS, and I'm here to help you." - And this time it
really is true. Rev. Proc. 71-21 deferral of prepaid income rules loosened. Notice 2002-79, 2002-50
I.R.B. 964 (12/16/02). This notice is a proposed revenue procedure to modify and supersede Rev. Proc.
71-21, 1971-2 C.B. 549. The proposed revenue procedure would expand the availability of deferred
reporting of advance receipts that are not accrued for financial accounting. First, certain income from
other than services would be eligible: (1) sales of goods not covered by Reg. § 1.451-5(b)(1)(ii); (2) rents
for the use of property in connection with the provision of services, e.g., hotel rooms, recreational
facilities, cable converter boxes; (3) royalties for intellectual property; (4) warranties of services or items
in the three preceding categories; (5) subscriptions not subject to §455; and (6) memberships not subject
to § 456. Second, payments would be eligible even if performance might extend beyond the next
succeeding year, although deferral could not extend beyond the next succeeding year. The revenue
procedure will not apply to rents generally, insurance premiums, or payments with respect to financial
instruments. However, the Notice states that the Treasury Department will propose amendments to Reg. §
1.61-8(b) to permit deferral of prepaid rents under the principles of the proposed revenue procedure.
3. But no deferral for advance rents. REG-151043-02, Rents and Royalties, 67
F.R. 77450 (12/18/02). The Treasury Department has published a proposed amendment to Reg. § 1.61-
8(b) that expressly require current inclusion of advance rent receipts, regardless of the period covered or
the taxpayers method of accounting, except as otherwise provided in § 467 or in other published
guidance.
4. Another taxpayer friendly accounting method ruling. Rev. Rul. 2003-3,
2003-2 I.R.B. 252 (1/13/03). A state or local income or franchise tax refund resulting from NOL
carrybacks is includible by an accrual method taxpayer in the earlier of the year in which the taxpayer
receives payment or notice that the refund claim has been approved. Rev. Ruls. 65-190, 1965-2 C.B. 150,
and 69-372, 1969-2 C.B. 104, which held that the refund is accrued in the year of the loss, are revoked.
The IRS reasoned that review and approval of the refund claims by state authorities is not merely
ministerial, but substantive. [This follows the holding in Doyle, Dane, Bernbach, Inc. v. Commissioner,
79 T.C. 101 (1982), nonacq., 1988-2 C.B. 1, acq., 2003-2 I.R.B. 251 (1/12/03).] Automatic change of
accounting method is available.
5. This year or next year? Only the IRS knew, and now they are telling us.
Rev. Rul. 2003-10, 2003-3 I.R.B. 288 (1/21/03). This ruling addresses the accrual under the all events
test of § 451 of income from goods sold when an accrual method taxpayer's customer disputes its
liability under certain circumstances: (1) If the taxpayer overbills a customer due to a clerical mistake in
an invoice and the customer discovers the error and, in the following taxable year, disputes its liability
for the overbilled amount, then the taxpayer accrues gross income in the taxable year of sale for the
correct amount; (2) A taxpayer does not accrue gross income in the taxable year of sale if, during the
taxable year of sale, the customer disputes its liability to the taxpayer because the taxpayer shipped
incorrect goods; (3) A taxpayer accrues gross income in the taxable year of sale if the taxpayer ships
excess quantities of goods and in the next year the customer agrees to pay for the excess quantities of
goods.
The IRS has requested comments on the application of § 451 to a
situation in which a taxpayer ships defective products to a customer that discovers the defect in the next
taxable year and disputes its liability: (1) Does the taxpayer have a fixed right to income under § 451 in the
taxable year of sale? (Compare Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 26 (1988), with Celluloid
Co. v. Commissioner, 9 B.T.A. 989 (1927), acq. VII-1 C.B. 6); (2) Does the taxable year concept require the
taxpayer to accrue income in the taxable year of sale because the dispute did not arise until the next taxable
year?
6. Taxpayer got the deduction, but not § 1341 relief. Cinergy Corp. v. United
States, 55 Fed. Cl. 489, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-1229 (3/10/03). The Court of Claims held that § 1341 did
not apply to repayments to customers of utility charges [additional charges to cover deferred taxes] that
were determined by regulatory authorities in subsequent years to have been excessive. The court
accepted the IRS's view [see Rev. Rul. 58-226, 1958-1 CB 318; Rev. Rul. 67-48, 1967-1 CB 50] that
when the taxpayer's right to an income item was absolute in the year of inclusion but was undermined by
subsequently arising facts, § 1341 does not apply. Section 1341 applies only when the taxpayer had
merely an "apparent" right to the income item. Thus, although the repayments were deductible, no rate
arbitrage relief was available.
II. BUSINESS INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS
A. Income
1. Maybe the Raiders would have won the Super Bowl if had been played in
the Ninth Circuit's courtroom. Milenbach v. Commissioner, 318 F.3d 924, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-818
(9th Cir. 2/6/03), rev 'g in part and affg in part 106 T.C. 184 (1996). The taxpayer was a partner in the
Oakland/Los Angeles/ Oakland Raiders. The partnership received a $6.7 million nonrecourse loan from
the Los Angeles Coliseum Commission as part of a package of inducements to move the Raiders from
Oakland to Los Angeles. The loan was repayable only out of net rents received by the Raiders from
leases by the Raiders of luxury skyboxes in the Los Angeles Coliseum and was secured only by the suites
to be constructed. At the time the loan was made, there were no such skyboxes in the Coliseum. The
Raiders partnership was required by the agreement to construct the skyboxes "as soon as practicable as
determined by the partnership in its reasonable discretion, having in mind considerations deemed
important or significant to the partnership." In fact, the skyboxes were never constructed, and the Tax
Court found that there was no evidence that the Coliseum Commission intended to enforce the
requirement that they be constructed. Reasoning that this standard for determining when the skyboxes
were to be constructed "gave the Raiders great latitude in timing the construction," which amounted to
"unlimited discretion," the Tax Court found that the obligation to construct the skyboxes to be illusory.
Thus, because the Raiders' obligation to repay the loan was conditional, the Raiders were required to
include the funds in gross income upon receipt. On another related issue, the Tax Court held that $10
million received by the partnership as the first disbursement on a $115 million nonrecourse loan from the
City of Irwindale, made as a part of a package to lure the Raiders to move from the Los Angeles
Coliseum, was a true loan even though the loan agreement relieved the Raiders from any obligation to
repay the $10 million if the City of Irwindale failed to advance the remaining funds or to perform certain
other acts toward construction of a stadium as required by the loan agreement. At the time the funds were
received, they were not under the Raiders' complete dominion and control. The Raiders' obligation to
repay was not conditional on their own actions, but could be cancelled by a condition subsequent that
was within the lender's control. When the obligation was cancelled in the following year, however, the
Raiders realized $10 million of discharge of indebtedness income.
* With respect to the L.A. Coliseum Commission loan, the Ninth
Circuit (Judge Tashima) reversed, finding that "the Raider's broad discretion in the timing of the
construction of the suites did not make the contract illusory. Under California law, an obligation under a
contract is not illusory if the obligated party's discretion must be exercised with reasonableness or good
faith. ... Here the Raiders were required to exercise their discretion reasonably and nothing in the
[agreement] indicates that construction of the suites was optional."
* The taxpayer's victory might just be one of timing. The Ninth
Circuit's opinion points out that when the Los Angles Coliseum obligation was extinguished [in 1990] the
partnership realized COD income. [We wonder, did the Commissioner ask for a waiver of the statute of
limitations on that year?]
* As far as the Irwindale loan was concerned, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the holding that COD was realized by the Raiders in 1988 as "clearly erroneous," because the Tax
Court had relied solely on the grounds that a state statute passed in 1988 prevented performance by the City
under the plan as proposed. The court of appeals reasoned that under California law the debt might not have
been discharged until a subsequent year and remanded the case for a "practical assessment of the facts and
circumstances relating to the likelihood of payment." According to the Ninth Circuit, the debt was not
discharged until "when, as a practical matter, it became clear that Irwindale would not be able to fund the
entire loan and that the stadium would not be built."
• The Commissioner did receive a consolation prize from the Ninth
Circuit when the court of appeals affirmed the Tax Court's decision that damages received by the
partnership in a suit against the City of Oakland for inverse condemnation of the Raiders team were taxable
as damages in lieu of lost profits; although settlement agreement stated that its purpose was to resolve a
claim involving "restoration of lost franchise value," the taxpayer's damages study indicated that claim was
based on lost profits.
2. Fuel cost over-recoveries are not includible in income. Cinergy Corp. v.
United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 489, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-1229 (3/10/03). Fuel cost over-recoveries (and
interest earned thereon) received by a public utility company under a fixed fuel factor scheme instituted
by state regulatory authorities [for the benefit of customers, by avoiding large fluctuations in monthly
bills] were not includible in gross income under the claim of right doctrine because taxpayer did not have
complete dominion, but was obligated to repay or credit the customers accounts. The court followed
Houston Industries, Inc. v. United States, 125 F.3d 1442 (Fed. Cir. 1997), which also involved fuel
surcharges, and distinguished Iowa Southern Utilities Co. v. United States, 841 F.2d 1108 (Fed. Cir.
1988), involving a construction surcharge, on the grounds that in that case - as opposed to this case -
there was no "unequivocal contractual, statutory, or regulatory duty to repay."
3. Tax-free subsidies for environmentalist landowners. Rev. Rul. 2003-59,
2003-24 I.R.B. 1014 (6/16/03). All or a portion of cost share payments received under the Conservation
Reserve Program - a USDA program under which landowners receive 50 percent of the cost of
establishing certain practices for soil and water conservation, wetland establishment and restoration, and
reforestation - is eligible for exclusion under § 126.
4. Congress might have changed one of the holdings of Gitlitz,' but the
Treasury put another one in the regulations. T.D. 9080, Reduction of Tax Attributes Due to Discharge
of Indebtedness, 68 FR 42590 (7/21/03). The Treasury has promulgated Temp. Reg. §§ 1.108-7T and
1.1017-IT(b)(4), dealing with reduction in tax attributes under §§ 108(b) and 1017 when COD income is
excluded from income under § 108(a)(1)(A)-(C). Examples (and the preamble) indicate that the tax
liability for the year of discharge first must be determined without any reduction in attributes in order to
identify the amounts, if any, of the tax attributes that will be reduced. "This ordering rule affords the
taxpayer the use of certain of its tax attributes described in section 108(b)(2), including any losses carried
forward to the taxable year of discharge, for purposes of determining its tax for the taxable year of
discharge, before subjecting those attributes to reduction." Basis reductions under § 1017 occur at the
beginning of the taxable year following the year in which the discharge occurred. If a § 381 transaction
ends a taxable year in which the distributing or transferor corporation excluded COD income under §
108(a), the basis of the property acquired by the acquiring corporation reflects the reduction under §
1017.
B. Deductible Expenses versus Capitalization
INDOPCO aftermath: "Deductions are exceptions to the norm of capitalization."
(Blackmun, J.)
1. Kudos from taxpayers; pans from professors. Treasury abandons the future
benefits test of INDOPCO - Long live the separate and distinct asset test. Or, do the proposed
regulations go beyond the separate and distinct asset test and interpret INDOPCO in a more
efficient way? REG-125638-01, Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67
F.R. 77701 (12/19/02). The Treasury Department has published the proposed INDOPCO regulations
[Prop. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4] that will deal comprehensively with the capitalization of expenditures that
relate to intangible assets and "future benefits." They are intended to provide bright-line rules to make
the standards based approach to capitalization articulated by the Supreme Court in INDOPCO more
administrable.
a. Capitalization is an exception to the norm of deductibility. Under the
proposed regulations, only expenditures incurred to (1) acquire, create, or enhance an intangible asset,
(2) facilitate the acquisition, creation, or enhancement of an intangible asset, (3) "facilitate ... a
restructuring or reorganization of a business entity or a transaction involving the acquisition of capital,
including a stock issuance, borrowing, or recapitalization," or (4) which are otherwise identified by the
IRS in prospectively effective published guidance, must be capitalized." The term "separate and distinct
intangible asset" is limited to "a property interest of ascertainable and measurable value in money's
worth that is subject to protection under applicable state or federal law and the possession and control of
which is intrinsically capable of being sold, transferred, or pledged (ignoring any restrictions imposed on
assignability)." The only category of expenses not related to a separate and distinct asset subject to
capitalization under the proposed regulations is costs to "facilitate ... a restructuring or reorganization of
a business entity or a transaction involving the acquisition of capital, including a stock issuance,
borrowing, or recapitalization." This category includes only fact patterns analogous to the narrow fact
pattern in INDOPCO and a number of cases involving similar issues that followed INDOPCO.
Transaction costs incurred by a corporation to defend against a hostile takeover are not required to be
' Gitlitz v. Commissioner, 531 U.S. 206 (2001). See, Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, which
reverses the result of Gitlitz by providing that excluded cancellation of indebtedness income of S corporations does
not result a § 1366 adjustment to the basis of stock owned by the shareholders.
capitalized, because they do not facilitate an acquisition. However, expenses incurred to recapitalize or to
thwart a hostile acquisition by merging with a white knight must be capitalized
* The proposed regulations provide two very important exceptions
to the rule requiring capitalization of transaction costs.
First, under a "simplifying convention" that is in fact a major substantive rule,
the regulations provide that compensation paid to employees and the employer's associated overhead are
never capitalized. This provision rejects the Tax Court decisions to the contrary and follows the two
recent court of appeals decisions reversing the Tax Court [Norwest Corp. v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 89(1999), rev'd sub nom., Wells Fargo & Co. v. Commissioner, 224 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2000); PNC
Bancorp, Inc. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 349 (1998), rev'd, 212 F3d 822 (3d Cir. 2000); Lychuk v.
Commissioner, 116 T.C. 374 (2001)], and adopts a rule for dealing with intangible assets that is very
different from the treatment of transaction costs with respect to tangible assets, which always must be
capitalized under either or both of §§ 263(a) or 263A.
Second, the proposed regulations provide an exception that permits de minimis
transaction costs - defined as costs that do not exceed $5,000 per transaction (not per payee) - to be
currently deducted. Because this rule is coupled with an elective average cost pooling method, the de
minimis rule is subject to substantial manipulation and can result in current deductions for very
significant transaction costs.
* The preamble explains that the IRS and Treasury Department
might in the future identify expenditures that are not listed in the regulations, but for which capitalization is
nonetheless appropriate. Capitalization of non-listed expenditures will be required, however, only if (and
after) they have been identified in published guidance. Unless an expenditure relating to an intangible asset
is listed in the regulations or in such subsequently published guidance, capitalization will not be required
and a current deduction will be allowed. Thus, under the proposed regulations, capitalization thus will
become an exception to the norm of deducting expenditures.
b . The "whether and which" test shall too pass. The proposed
regulations abandon the "whether and which" standard in Rev. Rul 99-23, 1999-1 C.B. 998, for
determining the line between expenditures subject to § 195 and those that are inherently capital as costs
of the acquisition of the business itself. Instead, under a "bright-line rule" expenses incurred in the
process of pursuing the acquisition of a trade or business (whether the acquisition is structured as an
acquisition of stock or of assets and whether the taxpayer is the acquirer or the target in the acquisition)
must be capitalized only if they are "inherently facilitative" of the acquisition or if they relate to activities
performed after the earlier of the date a letter of intent (or similar communication) is issued or, if the
taxpayer is a corporation, the date the board of directors approves the acquisition proposal. The proposed
regulations specifically identify expenditures that are "inherently facilitative," such as, amounts relating
to determining the value of the target, drafting transactional documents, or conveying property between
the parties. Under this bright-line rule, expenditures that do not facilitate the acquisition are not
capitalized as costs of the business, and, instead, are subject to § 195.c. Depreciation on intangibles with unascertainable useful lives. The
proposed regulations would permit amortization of the basis of intangibles that do not have readily
ascertainable useful lives and for which a specific amortization or depreciation period is not specified in
the Code or regulations, and for which amortization or depreciation is not proscribed. [Prop. Reg. §
1.167(a)-3(b).] Unless the IRS provides a different amortization period by published guidance, the "safe-
harbor" amortization period is fifteen years, using a straight-line method with no salvage value. Thus, for
example, an amount paid to obtain a trade association membership of indefinite duration would be
amortizable over fifteen years. The amortization rule does not apply to intangible assets acquired from
another party or to self-created financial interests, but these intangibles may be amortizable under § 197
or under other provisions of the Code or regulations. Intangibles that have readily ascertainable useful
lives are amortized over those lives. Capitalized costs of a corporate restructuring, reorganization or
acquisition of equity capital are not amortizable.
d. The 12-month rule for prepaid expenses. The proposed regulations
require that prepaid expenses be capitalized; but expenditures to create or enhance intangible rights or
benefits that do not extend for more than twelve months after the expenditure is incurred are not required
to be capitalized. Prepaid expenses covering a period of more than twelve months would continue to be
capitalized in full and deducted ratably over the period benefited. When determining the duration of a
right, renewal periods must be taken into account if the facts and circumstances indicate a reasonable
expectancy of renewal. For accrual method taxpayers, however, the scope of the ability to deduct
prepayments under the "12-month rule" in the proposed regulations is limited by the economic
performance requirement of § 461 (h), which under the proposed regulations trumps the "12-month rule."
e. Not so fast, [say] Fernandez (and Keyso)! IRS officials stated on
5/14/03 that parts of the proposed INDOPCO regulations are being reconsidered [to be even more
taxpayer friendly]. 2003 TNT 94-2.
2. Go ahead and deduct the cost of asbestos removal - at least as long as you
don't change the building's use. Cinergy Corp. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 489, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-
1229 (3/10/03). The Court of Federal Claims allowed a § 162 deduction for the cost of removing and
encapsulating deteriorating fireproofing material that contained asbestos fibers. The fireproofing material
did not create a problem for years, but as it deteriorated the danger of the asbestos circulating in the
offices increased. The work prevented the asbestos from crumbling or circulating. In allowing the
deduction, the court applied the test applied by the Sixth Circuit in United Dairy Farmers, Inc. v. United
States, 267 F.3d 510 (6th Cir.2001), and found all of the elements to be met.
[T]hree elements must be satisfied for a valid deduction under § 162 for environmental
cleanup costs: first, the taxpayer contaminated the property in its ordinary course of
business; second, the taxpayer cleaned up the contamination to restore the property to its
pre-contamination state; third, the cleanup did not allow the taxpayer to put the property
to a new use.
The court distinguished United Dairy Farmers, Inc., in which the taxpayer acquired the property after it
had been contaminated, and Dominion Resources, Inc. v. Unites States, 219 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2000), in
which the environmental remediation adapted the property for a different use.
0 Note, however, the possibility of deductibility of cleanup costs
under § 198 if the site is certified by the state.
3. Would you like to fly on a jet without its engines? Fedex Corporation v.
United States 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-1940 (W.D. Tenn. 4/7/03). The district court denied the taxpayer's
motion for summary judgment that expenditures for its off-wing engine maintenance program were
deductible repairs under Reg. § 1.162-4. The court found that there was a genuine issue of fact regarding
whether the appropriate unit of property for measuring whether the expenditures added value or
materially prolonged life was (1) the entire aircraft, as argued by Fedex, or (2) the jet engines and
auxiliary power units, as argued by the government. The court concluded that there is no "entire vehicle'
rule of law requiring that repairs be measured against the entire vehicle rather than against components.
C. Reasonable Compensation
1. The Commissioner at least has to give it the "good old college try" if he
expects to win. Devine Brothers, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2003-15 (1/16/03). Judge Cohen
upheld the taxpayer corporation's compensation deduction in full. The taxpayer made a prima facia case
for reasonableness. The salary was within the range paid to similarly situated executives. The
Commissioner provided no evidence to the contrary and failed to explain how he calculated the
disallowed portion. Under either a traditional multi-factor test or the Exacto Spring [196 F.3d 833 (7th
Cir. 1999)] hypothetical investor test, the result was the same.
2. Haffner's Service Stations Inc. v. Commissioner, 326 F.3d 1, 2003-1 U.S.T.C.
50,333 (1st Cir. 3/31/03). Corporation's payments to two officers [treasurer and assistant treasurer, who
were also wife and husband] were not reasonable compensation. The corporation was founded by
treasurer's parents and was run by one of their five children. Judge Boudin selected a multifactor test
over the Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner, 196 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 1999), single factor independent
investor test based on the facts and circumstances of this case: Return on equity, while high, was
declining in recent years, and the roles played by the two officers was relatively modest.
3. An old-fashioned multi-factor reasonable comp analysis. Brewer Quali!y
Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2003-200 (7/10/03). In an case appealable to the Fifth Circuit,
the Tax Court (Judge Chabot) applied a traditional multi-factor analysis, based on the factors enumerated
in Ownesby & Kritikos, Inc. v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1987), to determine the portion of
bonus payments to the president of a corporation, all of the stock of which was owned by the president
and his wife, that was reasonable compensation. Judge Chabot observed that the "independent investor
test" is a "lens through which the entire analysis should be viewed," citing Dexsil Corp. v.
Commissioner, 147 F.3d 96, 100-101 (2d Cir.1998), and that "[d]iscerning the intent behind the
payments also presents a factual question to be resolved within the bounds of the individual case."
4. T.D. 9083, Golden Parachute Payments, 58 F.R. 45745 (8/14/03). Final
regulations under § 280G, relating to payments contingent on ownership changes. Effective date is
8/4/03, for payments contingent on ownership changes occurring after 12/31/03. See also, Rev. Proc.
2003-68, 2003-34 I.R.B. (8/1/03) for modified stock option valuation guidance for golden parachute
rules.
D. Miscellaneous Expenses
1. Only half the cost of Mint Juleps & country ham with beaten biscuits is
deductible. Churchill Downs v. Commissioner, 307 F.3d 423, 90 A.F.T.R.2d 2002-6615, 2002-2
U.S.T.C. 50,691 (6th Cir. 10/8/02), affg 115 T.C. 279 (9/26/00). The Sixth Circuit (Judge Siler) upheld
the Tax Court's decision (Judge Laro) that § 274(n) limited to 50% of the cost Churchill Downs'
deduction for the expenses of entertainment [the Kentucky Derby sport of Kings Gala, press receptions,
hospitality tents, winners parties, etc.] in connection with the Kentucky Derby, the Breeders' Cup, and
other major horse races. Although Churchill Downs was in the "entertainment business" the expenses for
the functions were not part of its entertainment product, which was horse racing. Nor were the costs of
entertainment available to the public [§ 274(n)(2), (e)(7) exception] or sold to customers [§ 274(n)(2),
(e)(8) exception] deductible because the functions were by invitation only and not open to the public.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the expenses were "entertainment" under Reg. § 1.274-2(b)(1)(ii)
because:
[T]he purpose of the galas and dinners was not to make Churchill Downs' product
directly available to its customers or to provide them with specific information about it,
but rather to create an aura of glamor in connection with the upcoming races and
generally to arouse public interest in them. In this regard, the dinners, brunches, and
receptions at issue most closely resemble the example [in Reg. § 1.274-2(b)(2)(ii)] of a
fashion show held for the wives of appliance retailers, and are best characterized not as a
product introduction event used to conduct the taxpayer's business, but as pure
advertising or public relations expenses.
9 The Court of Appeals then rejected the taxpayer's argument that
its business was "entertainment" generally
Although Churchill Downs argues, as any business that depends on advertising may, that
it made money as a result of these publicity events, this does not change their nature as
something distinct from what was actually sold. The Commissioner puts it succinctly:
"taxpayers were in the horse racing business, not the business of throwing parties."
Accordingly, it is inappropriate to characterize these non-race events as Churchill
Downs' "product."
2. A serially issued captive insurance company instruction manual.
a. Subsidiary insurance company. Rev. Rul. 2002-89, 2002-52 I.R.B. 984(12/30/02). This ruling promulgates a safe harbor and a rocky shoal for deducting insurance premiums to
licensed domestic captive insurance subsidiaries. In a situation in which 90 percent of the insurance
subsidiary's premiums, on both a gross and net basis, are derived from its parent, the IRS concludes that
there is no "risk shifting and risk distribution," and thus no "insurance" or deductible insurance
premiums. On the other hand, in a situation in which less that 50 percent of the insurance subsidiary's
premiums, on both a gross and net basis, are derived from its parent and the remainder are derived from
unrelated insureds, and all transactions between the related taxpayer and insurance company meet an
arm's length standard, the IRS concludes that there is "risk shifting and risk distribution," and thus there
is "insurance" and deductible insurance premiums.
b. Sibling insurance company. Rul. 2002-90, 2002-52 I.R.B. 985
(12/30/02). This ruling blesses the deduction of insurance premiums paid to a sibling licensed domestic
insurance company, even though it insures no risks outside the group, where all parties conduct
themselves in a manner consistent with insurance arrangements between unrelated parties. The ruling
postulates twelve operating subsidiaries, each of which represents between five and fifteen percent of the
risks insured by the insurance company member. The ruling follows Humana Inc. v. Commissioner, 881
F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1989) and Kiddie Industries, Inc. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 42 (1997), and
distinguishes Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Commissioner, 62 F.3d 835 (6th Cir. 1995).
C. Group captive. Rev. Rul. 2002-91, 2002-52 I.R.B. 991 (12/30/02). A
small group of unrelated businesses involved in a highly concentrated industry facing significant liability
hazards, and required by law to maintain adequate liability insurance coverage, formed "group captive"
insurance coverage that provided insurance only to its owners - its only activity. The group captive was
adequately capitalized, operated separately from its owners, none of which owned more than fifteen
percent or had more than fifteen percent of the vote. No owner's individual risk insured by the group
captive exceeded fifteen percent of the total insured risk insured. Premiums were actuarially determined
using recognized actuarial techniques, and were based, in part, on commercial rates, and claims were
investigated before payment. There was a real possibility that an insured owner would sustain losses in
excess of the premiums paid, and no insured owner would be reimbursed for excess premiums paid. On
these facts, the IRS ruled that the contracts issued by the group captive to its owners were insurance and
the premiums were deductible under § 162. The group captive was taxed as an insurance company.
3. Without a debt, there's no interest. Indeck Energy Services, Inc. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-101 (4/11/03). Indeck Energy Services, Inc. ("Indeck") fired Polsky in
1990 and in January 1991 an arbitrator ordered Indeck to pay Polsky $15,030,000 to repurchase his
shares of Indeck stock. Indeck appealed, and the case was settled in 1994 pursuant to the following
agreement
Indeck *** agrees to purchase *** the thirty (30) shares of *** stock *** for a price
computed as follows ("Purchase Price"): (i) * * * $501,000 per share, for a total of* * *
$15,030,000; plus (ii) an amount determined by Ten Percent (10%) per annum on the
amount in (i) from January 31, 1991 through April 13, 1994 for a total of * * *
$4,809,600; plus (iii) an amount determined by interest on the amount in (i) at * * * [the
Federal funds rate] between April 14, 1994 and May 9, 1994, for a total of * * *
$47,321.85. The total Purchase Price of * * * $19,886,921.85 shall be paid ** * at the
Closing.
Polsky treated the full $19,886,921.85 as the amount realized on the stock. Indeck treated $15,030,000 as
the price of the stock and deducted the remaining $4,856,922 as interest. The Tax Court (Judge Gale)
held that no portion of the $19,886,921 constituted interest on two alternative grounds: First, the
evidence, including Indeck's failure to issue Polsky a Form 1099 for interest, indicated that the parties
intended the entire amount to be the stock purchase price. Second, until the settlement agreement was
signed, there was no indebtedness within the meaning of § 163(a) on which interest could accrue - " it
was not paid with respect to an existing, legally enforceable obligation for the payment of a principal
sum, nor was the amount of the obligation fixed as of the date the purported interest began to accrue."
The court distinguished Halle v. Commissioner, 83 F.3d 649 (4th Cir.1996), rev'g on other grounds
Kingstowne v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.1994-630, and Dunlap v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1377 (1980),
rev'd. on other grounds, 670 F.2d 785 (8th Cir.1982), on the ground that in both of those cases, "there
was agreement between the purported debtor and creditor as to the amount of the obligation and its due
date, as of the time the purported interest began to accrue." In contrast, "Indeck's obligation, and its due
date, were disputed during the period that the bulk of the claimed interest purportedly accrued."
4. Every buck counts. T.D. 9064, Substantiation of Incidental Expenses, 68 F.R.
39011 (7/1/03). Reg. § 1.274-5(j)(3) authorizes the Commissioner to permit taxpayers traveling away
from home to use a specified amount for incidental expenses in lieu of substantiating (under § 274(d))
the actual cost of incidental expenses. Applicable to expenses paid or incurred after 9/30/02.
5. Issuers of so-called "feline PRIDES" investment units may deduct interest
on the debt component. Rev. Rul. 2003-97, 2003-34 I.R.B. 380 (8/25/03). This ruling deals with
whether, under very detailed facts, a corporation that issues units, each consisting of instruments in the
form of a 5-year note and a 3-year forward contract to purchase a quantity of the corporation's common
stock, may deduct the "interest" accruing on the note under § 163(a), or whether the deduction is
disallowed by 163(l). The ruling held that the instrument was a debt instrument, even though the
components were severable when issued. The instrument was not a disqualified debt instrument under §
163(l)(2) [indebtedness of a corporation that is payable in equity of the issuer or a related party], because
absent specific evidence of bad faith with respect to the debtor's performance of its obligations -the
transaction was not reasonably expected to give the debtor an option to pay the notes in, or convert them
into, its stock. Accordingly, the interest was deductible. The ruling will not be applied adversely to any
unit issued on or before 8/22/03 if certain circumstances are met.
E. Depreciation & Amortization
1. The Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002 provides for additional
first-year depreciation of 30 percent for certain property that was acquired after 9/10/01 (and before
9/11/04) and placed in service before 1/1/05. Qualifying property consists of (1) § 168 property with a
recovery period of 20 years or less, (2) computer software other than computer software covered by §
197, (3) water utility property, and (4) leasehold improvement property. For passenger automobiles, the §
280F(a)(l)(A)(i) limitation is to be increased by $4,600. This provision also applies to improvements to
used property.
0 Depreciation claimed pursuant to this provision may be used for
alternative minimum tax purposes even though the 200 percent declining balance depreciation tables are
used for the basis remaining after the additional first-year depreciation is taken.
a. Rev. Proc. 2002-33, 2002-20 I.R.B. 963 (4/29/02). This revenue
procedure provides procedures for claiming the additional 30 percent first-year depreciation provided by
§ 168(k) [and § 1400L(B)]. It also explains how a taxpayer may elect not to deduct the additional first-
year depreciation for qualified property.
b. Fifty-percent bonus depreciation. Section 168 (k)(4), added by the
2003 Act, allows a deduction of fifty percent of the adjusted basis of qualified property (in lieu of the
prior 30 percent) placed in service after 5/5/03 and before 1/1/05.
• Section 168(k)(2)(F) provides that the 50 percent (and 30 percent)
first year allowance is also allowable as a deduction for purposes of the alternative minimum tax.
* Bonus depreciation is extended to passenger automobiles by
increasing the § 280F(a)(1)(A)(i) limit by $4,600 for passenger automobiles that are qualified property
placed that are in service after 9/10/01 and before 5/6/03, and by $7,650 for passenger automobiles that are
qualified property placed that are in service after 5/5/03 and before 1/1/05.
2. Increased § 179 expensing for small business - with an increased phase-out
amount. The 2003 Act increased the amount deductible under §179 to $100,000 for property placed in
service in taxable years beginning in 2003, 2004, and 2005. In addition, for those years, the dollar-for-
dollar phase-out of the amount begins when the cost of property placed in service exceeds $400,000
(adjusted for inflation in 2004 and 2005). The 2003 Act also amended § 179(d) to treat off-the-shelf
computer software placed in service in taxable years beginning in 2003 through 2005 as qualifying
property.
0 The 2003 Act amended § 179(c)(2) to allow elections to expense
assets under § 179 with respect to taxable years beginning in 2003 through 2005 to be revoked (by an
amended return) without the consent of the Commissioner.
3. The Service agrees that the rotable spare parts pool used in a maintenance
service business is depreciable property, not inventory. Rev. Rul. 2003-37, 2003-15 I.R.B. 717
(3/24/03). The Service will follow Hewlett Packard, Inc. v. United States, 71 F.3d 398 (Fed. Cir. 1995),
and Honeywell, Inc. v. Commissioner, T. C. Memo. 1992-453, aff'd, 27 F.3d 571 (8th Cir. 1994), and will
treat rotable spare parts as depreciable assets provided they are used in the taxpayer's maintenance
service business and are not held for sale. The ruling seeks comments on the maximum amount of rotable
spare parts sales that should be permitted from a rotable spare parts pool that is treated as a depreciable
asset.
4. The "exhaustion, wear and tear" prerequisite for depreciation is an
undemanding standard. And, cost recovery periods are not accounting methods. O'Shaughnessy v.
Commissioner, 332 F.3d 1125, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-2559, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,522 (8th Cir. 6/13/03),
affig 89 A.F.T.R.2d2002-658, 2002-1 U.S.T.C. 50,235 (D. Minn. 9/29/2001). The S corporation in
which the taxpayer was a shareholder manufactured glass using a "float process" that involved the use of
a molten tin "bath " that lost volume and purity in the manufacturing process, requiring periodic
replenishment. The amount of tin added each year equaled the amount of tin consumed in glass
production during the year. The corporation deducted the cost of adding tin to the bath and depreciated
the cost of the original volume of tin. Applying Rev. Rul. 75-491, 1975-2 C.B. 19, which was directly on
point, the IRS disallowed the depreciation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's refusal to
apply the revenue ruling, because it was not binding and because it predated the ACRS depreciation
system, and held that the original volume of tin was depreciable because over time it would have been
completely exhausted by volume and purity losses. On another issue, the Court of Appeals reversed the
district court and held that reallocation of certain plant assets from one asset category to another for the
purposes of MACRS depreciation did not constitute a change in accounting method, following
Brookshire Brothers Holding, Inc. v. Commissioner, 320 F.3d 507, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-629, 2003-1
U.S.T.C. 50,214 (5th Cir. 1/29/03).
5. More tangible personal property that the local zoning board and building
inspector think is real estate. Cost segregation studies to take advantage of this phenomenon. Rev.
Rul 2003-54, 2003-23 I.R.B. (5/8/03). This ruling provides guidance on how the common gasoline pump
canopies and their supporting concrete footings - used by 90 percent of gasoline stations - are to be
classified for depreciation purposes. Gasoline pump canopies are not inherently permanent structures; for
depreciation purposes they are classified as tangible personal property includible in asset class 57.0 of
Rev. Proc. 87-56, 1987-2 C.B. 674. The supporting concrete footings are inherently permanent structures
classified as land improvements includible in asset class 57.1 of Rev. Proc. 87-56.
* Note the recent trend of obtaining a "cost segregation study" to
determine the amount and nature of tangible personal property in either an existing or a newly-constructed
building. These studies are based on the holding in Hospital Corporation ofAmerica v. Commissioner, 109
T.C. 21 (1997), on appeal to the Sixth Circuit. This is different from component depreciation, which
involved separate useful lives for different parts of the real estate. These studies determine whether there is
tangible personal property that is part of the building, for purposes of depreciating this tangible personal
property separately from the real estate.
6. Section 197 amortization applies to noncompete agreements ancillary to
stock redemptions. Frontier Chevrolet Co. v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 289 (5/14/01), aff'd, 329 F.3d
1131, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-2338, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,490 (9th Cir. 5/28/03).
* The Tax Court (Judge Ruwe) held that § 197 applied to a covenant
not to compete entered into when a corporation redeemed the stock of its 75-percent owner. The covenant
not to compete had to be amortized over 15 years under § 197, even through it was for only a 5-year term
because the redemption constituted the acquisition of an interest in a trade or business. [The holding is
consistent with Reg. § 1.197-2(b)(9), which was not applicable because the case arose prior to its effective
date.]
* The Ninth Circuit (Judge Trott) agreed with the Tax Court that
taxpayer's redemption was an indirect acquisition of an interest in a trade or business because "the
substance of the transaction was to effect a change of controlling corporate stock ownership," so taxpayer
had to amortize the covenant under § 197.
* Query whether the redemption of a controlling amount of stock
would be required for the acquisition of an interest in a trade or business to occur?
7. Notice 2003-45, 2003-29 I.R.B. 86 (6/26/03). This notice provides for an
automatic extension of time until 12/31/03 to amend returns to use the mid-year convention - as opposed
to the mid-quarter convention - for property placed in service during 2001 for entities whose third and
fourth quarters included 9/11/01 (as permitted by Notice 2001-70, 2001-2 C.B. 437, and Notice 2001-74,
2001-2 C.B. 551). The Treasury and IRS intend to amend the regulations under § 168 to incorporate the
guidance provided in this notice, which may be relied upon meanwhile.
a. Similarly, Rev. Proc. 2003-50, 2003-29 I.R.B. 119 (6/26/03), provides an
extension until 12/31/03 for taxpayers to claim (or not claim) the additional 30-percent first-year
depreciation under § 168(k) or change their selection of § 179 property for the taxable year that included
9/11/01.
8. Changes in use change MACRS depreciation. REG-138499-02, Changes in
Use Under Section 168(i)(5), 68 F.R. 43047 (7/21/03). The Treasury has published comprehensive
proposed regulations to provide rules for determining MACRS depreciation under § 168 when the
taxpayer changes the use of the property. Changes in use include: (1) a conversion of personal use
property to a business or income-producing use, (2) conversion from business or income-producing to
personal use, or (3) a change in use that results in a different recovery period, depreciation method, or
both. The regulations will be effective when finalized. Any reasonable method will be acceptable for
changes after 12/31/86 and before final regulations are published.
0 However, current Reg. § 1.167(g)-I limits the depreciable basis of
property converted from personal to business use to its fair market value at the time of the conversion.
F. Credits
1. Leveraging the New Markets Credit. Rev. Rul. 2003-20, 2003-7 I.R.B. 465
(2/18/03). For purposes of determining the § 45D new markets tax credit (39% of the investment over
seven years), the amount of the qualified equity investment made by a partnership [LLC] includes cash
from a nonrecourse loan to the partnership that the partnership invests as equity in a qualified community
development entity.
2. Big brother may be watching your mouth, but he won't give your dentist a
tax credit for it. Fan v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 32 (6/24/01). Dr. Fan, who had some hearing-impaired
patients, purchased an intraoral camera system [consisting of a camera and monitor, video presentations
and educational materials] for use in his dental practice [which was an eligible small business as defined
in § 44(b). The system was useful with respect to all of his patients, but because Dr. Fan considered the
system to be a more effective and efficient way to communicate with hearing-impaired patients, he
claimed the § 44 disabled access credit for the cost of the system. The Tax Court upheld the
Commissioner's disallowance of the credit on the grounds that the system was not an "eligible access
expenditure" as defined in § 44(c). Dr Fan was already ADA compliant; and the system was not
marketed as, acquired, or used specifically as an auxiliary aid or service to ensure effective
communication to comply with the applicable requirements of the ADA.
a. But he will give your optometrist a tax credit if he purchases an
automatic refractor to accommodate disabled patients. Hubbard v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-
245 (8/14/03). The Tax Court allowed taxpayer a $5,000 tax credit under § 44 because his optometry
practice is an eligible small business which falls within the definition of a public accommodation and he
must make reasonable modifications to provide services to disabled individuals. The court noted that in
the year before taxpayer purchased the automatic refractor, he had to refer about 30 disabled patients to
other optometrists. Judge Swift distinguished Fan on the ground that in that case taxpayer was already in
compliance with ADA. He also noted that it was irrelevant that taxpayer used the refractor to treat
nondisabled patients.
3. Nothing in the statutory structure of the AMT warrants a de novo
calculation of taxable income. Ventas, Inc. v. United States, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5176 (Fed. Cl.
7/30/03). Section 280C requires that § 162 deductions be reduced by the amount of the § 51 targeted jobs
credit [now Work Opportunity Credit] claimed in computing regular income tax. For the year in question,
the taxpayer was subject to the AMT and did not reduce the wage deduction in computing AMTI,
because the credit is not allowed against the AMT. The court (Judge Wiese) held that in computing
AMTI and tentative AMT for purposes of § 38(c), any reduction in the amount of deductions required by§ 280C by virtue of a credit having been claimed with respect to the otherwise deductible expenditure
must be taken into account. Judge Wiese rejected the taxpayer's argument that the AMT was a separate
tax system, and that since the targeted jobs credit was not allowable under the AMT, the expense
deduction should not be disallowed. "Taxable income," which is the starting point for computing AMTI
under § 55, is taxable income under the regular income tax. Nothing in the statutory structure provided
the adjustment sought by the taxpayer or warranted a de novo calculation of taxable income.
* The Tax Court reached the same decision regarding the statutory
structure in Allen v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 1 (2002), although in that case the taxpayer was not subject to
the AMT and the issue was the application of the limitation of the general business credit in § 38(c).
* This case has implications beyond the Work Opportunity Credit
because the same statutory structures apply to Welfare to Work Credit, Orphan Drug Credit, and Increased
Research Activities Credit.
G. Natural Resources Deductions & Credits
1. To "produce" or to "transport" gas, that is the question. Saginaw Bay
Pipeline Co. v. United States, 338 F.3d 500, 2003-2 U.S.T.C. 50,592, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5613 (6th
Cir. 7/30/03), rev'g 124 F. Supp. 2d 465, 2001-2 U.S.T.C. 50,642, 88 A.F.T.R.2d 2001-6019 (E.D.
Mich. 8/23/01).
* The District Court (Judge O'Meara) held that the natural gas
gathering systems were used to transport gas [Class 46.0] - not in production [Asset Class 13.2] - and thus
are depreciable over 15 years rather than seven years because the taxpayer was engaged in the transportation
of natural gas, not in the production or processing of natural gas. The District Court described Duke Energy
Natural Gas Corp. v. Commissioner, 172 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 1999), as "wrongly decided."
* The Sixth Circuit (Judge Krupansky) found the Duke Energy
reasoning persuasive and reversed the District Court. The court held that the period of depreciation of
natural gas gathering systems should depend upon the use to which they were being put, and not upon the
producer or nonproducer status of the owner of the pipeline. Inasmuch as the pipelines in question were
used to transport impure "raw" or "wet" natural gas from the field wellheads to a cleansing and processing
facility, they qualify as "gathering pipelines" under Asset Class 13.2 or Rev Proc. 87-56, 1987-2 C.B. 674.
Natural gas gathering systems are depreciable over seven years rather than the 15 years for pipelines used to
transport gas under Asset Class 46.0.
a. Non-producer must use 15-year recovery period. Claion Gas Co. L.P.
v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 197 (10/25/02) (reviewed, 10-5). The Tax Court in a decision by Judge
Halpern upheld the government's notices of final partnership administrative adjustment in determining
that the recovery period for gathering pipeline systems owned and operated by a non-producer were
transportation property with a 15-year recovery period, and not natural gas production property with a 7-
year recovery period. The court adhered to its decision in Duke Energy Natural Gas Corp. v.
Commissioner, 109 T.C. 416 (1997), rev'd, 172 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 1999), and refused to follow the
Tenth Circuit's reversal. The majority held that Clajon's use of the pipeline system was relevant, and
inasmuch as Clajon was not a producer, the pipeline system could not have been part of the production
system.
* Judge Wells' dissent was based upon the Tenth Circuit's plain
language analysis in Duke Energy of Rev. Proc. 87-56, 1987-2 C.B. 674, which only requires that the assets
be "used" by natural gas producers to qualify for 7-year depreciation. The Tax Court majority requires that
the asset be both owned and used by a natural gas producer. Judge Wells notes that the Tax Court held in
Rauenhorst v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 157 (10/7/02), that "the Commissioner may not choose to litigate
against an official position the Commissioner has published without first revising or revoking that position."
* Judge Foley's dissent was based upon similar grounds, that the
asset meets the regulatory requirement even though Clajon was not a producer.
* Query whether the Sixth Circuit's reversal in Saginaw Bay
Pipeline, supra, will affect this case, which is appealable to the Fifth Circuit?
2. The Exxon Saga: After an initial setback in the Tax Court, Exxon has been
meeting with success in the Federal Circuit on the issue of taking percentage depletion on fixed contract
natural gas on representative market or field prices that are greatly in excess of the actual sale price for
the gas.
a. Tax Court: Taxpayer not permitted to follow the literal language of
the regulations. Exxon Corp. v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 721 (6/6/94). Taxpayer was not permitted to
follow the literal language of Reg. §1.613-3(a) and use "representative market or field prices" (RMFP) in
determining "gross income from the property" for purposes of computing percentage depletion under
§613A(b)(1)(B) ["fixed contract" exception]. Even though the regulation states that "the gross income
from the property shall be assumed to be equivalent to RMFP" with respect to natural gas transported
from the premises prior to sale, the purpose of that provision was to prevent integrated producers from
taking depletion deductions on transportation, refining, etc. -- and not to permit a taxpayer to take
depletion based upon a RMFP price five times the actual sales price of the natural gas to an Exxon
affiliate. The actual contract sales price was therefore reduced by royalties and transportation expenses to
determine "gross income from the property."
b. Same issue in Court of Federal Claims. Exxon Corp. v. United States,
33 Fed. Cl. 250, 95-1 USTC 50,245 (Fed. Cl. 4/11/95). On the same issue, the court held, that while the
amount upon which depletion can be taken is not necessarily limited by actual gross income [21 cents],
the RMFP calculated by Exxon [41 cents] was not a reasonable basis upon which depletion may be taken
and [based upon the burden of proof] the complaint was dismissed. But reversed ....
c. Federal Circuit holds that RMFP which exceeds actual gross
receipts is not precluded, nor is it per se "unreasonable." Exxon Corp. v. United States, 88 F.3d 968,
96-2 USTC 50,324 (Fed. Cir. 6/20/96), cert. denied (3/17/97), rev 'g and remanding 33 Fed. Cl. 250, 95-
1 USTC 50,245 (Fed. Cl. 1995). Court finds taxpayer entitled to calculate its depletion deduction based
upon an RMFP of 39 cents based upon the wellhead price that would be realized by nonintegrated
producers. The court further held that the Court of Federal Claims should not have limited the price by
making an independent assessment of the reasonableness of the price because the §611(a) language
"reasonable allowance ... in each case" refers to the different types of depletable resource, not to
individual taxpayers.
d. And you thought you couldn't deplete more than your gross income.
Of course you can, silly boy. Exxon Corp. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 581, 2000-1 U.S.T.C. 50,116,
84 A.F.T.R.2d 7235 (Fed. Cl. 12/2/99). Exxon sought a $172.6 million refund based on percentage
depletion for 1975, under §613A(b)(1)(B), allowing §613 percentage depletion for natural gas sold under
a fixed contract. The long-term contracts in issue were with Houston Lighting & Power Co. (HL&P) and
with Southwestern Electric and Power Co. (SWEPCO), The IRS assessed a deficiency for 1975 on the
grounds that Exxon was not entitled to use the RMFP under Reg. §1.613- 3(a) to compute percentage
depletion because the fixed-contract exception in §613A(b)(1)(B) did not permit use of the RMFP.
Exxon filed suit, and the Court of Claims initially denied the government's motion for summary
judgment, in which the government argued that Reg. §1.613-3(a) did not apply to post-1974 depletion
allowed under the fixed contract exception.
* On the government's motion for summary judgment, the court
(Senior Judge Gibson) held that: (1) Reg. §1.613-3(a), absent evidence that the regulation systematically
causes a material distortion of the "gross income from the property," was not facially invalid as applied to
percentage depletion deduction pursuant to the post-1974 fixed contract exception [even if the RMFP
exceeded the actual sales price, which it can under Exxon, Corp. v. United States, 88 F.3d 968 (Fed. Cir.
1996)], and (2) evidence raised genuine issues of material fact that the regulation produced a result that was
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the post-1974 statutory percentage depletion scheme. 40 Fed.
Cl. 73 (1998).
After trial, the court held:
0 First: Not all of the natural gas was eligible under Reg. §1.613A-
7(c)(5) and (d). Exxon failed to prove that its contract with HL&P qualified as a "fixed contract." The
HL&P excess royalty reimbursement and additional gas contract terms permitted Exxon, in part, to raise
prices after Feb. 1, 1975, by amounts tied to the market price for natural gas [which would allow it to
recover through price increases increased tax liabilities arising from the repeal of percentage depletion], and
the sales prices did in fact increase. Exxon did not prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that the price
increase did not "to any extent" permit it to recoup tax increases attributable to the repeal of percentage
depletion. The contract with SWEPCO, however, was qualified. Although the contract had a price
adjustment clause under which Exxon "could potentially have recovered a portion of its increased income
tax liabilities," the contract qualified as a "fixed contract" because the contract price did not in fact increase
after February 1, 1975.
* Second: For calculating Exxon's 1975 percentage depletion
allowance, the RMFP is $0.6831 per thousand cubic feet (Mcf) of natural gas that is eligible for percentage
depletion. (1) The Texas Gulf Coast/East Texas region, rather than the entire state, constituted a "market
area that was geographically 'representative"' of Exxon's 1975 production from the properties at issue. (2)
In determining whether that region was the relevant market area, Judge Gibson found that Exxon's 1975
"gas well gas production" - comprising 90.24 percent of the gas in issue - was comparable or superior to
gas produced and sold generally through the region; only 9.74 percent [casinghead gas] was not comparable
and must be excluded from the computation of Exxon's allowance. (3) After determining the appropriate
RMFP transaction sample and adjusting for the pre-sale costs of compression and dehydration, the court
held that the RMFP for purposes of Reg. §1.613-3(a) was $0.6831 per Mcf.
• Exxon had argued that every sale of raw gas at a delivery point
anywhere on the producer's leased property was a transaction in which the sale price was untainted by
transportation before the sale. The court held that Exxon failed to support that position, and that it was not
feasible to cure tainted transactions by subtracting the transportation cost from the gas sale price.
e. Affirmed in part, reversed in part. Literalism triumphs in the
Federal Circuit. Taxpayer celebrates a little bit more. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. United States,244 F.3d
1341, 2001-1 U.S.T.C. 50,348, 87 A.F.T.R.2d 1508 (Fed. Cir. 4/3/01). The Federal Circuit affirmed the
Court of Federal Claims holding that percentage depletion should be calculated with respect to a RMFP
that exceed the taxpayer's actual sale price. Judge Michel rejected the government's argument that Reg.
§ 1.613-3(a) here would lead to "absurd results," and would "thwart the obvious purpose" of the 1975 Act
by noting that Treasury considered, but declined to fix, the "perceived anomaly." He so held because "it
is not the province of this court to remedy anomalies in the tax laws that Congress and the [Treasury]
have refrained from correcting." The 1975 addition of §613A "may have changed pre-1975 law by
redefining what kinds of gas are eligible for percentage depletion, nothing in the regulation changes ...
the method of computing the AMOUNT of percentage depletion or eligible gas." (emphasis in original)
0 He also affirmed the trial court's holding that casinghead gas [gas
that was dissolved in oil at reservoir conditions but becomes gaseous at atmospheric pressure at the top - or
"casinghead - of an oil well] should be excluded from the computation of the RMFP because it was not
comparable to its gas well gas. Finally, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's holding that the HL&P
contract was not a "fixed price contract," holding as a matter of law that it was a fixed price contract,
thereby entitling Exxon to percentage depletion on the gas sold pursuant to that contract. Under the contract,
Exxon could not raise the price of gas unless HL&P exercised its rights under the additional gas clause.
That did not alter the fact that the price for the original quantity of gas was fixed from Exxon's perspective.
HL&P controlled whether the additional gas clause, and thus the price increase, would be invoked.
f. The District Court for the Northern District of Texas permits
percentage depletion, but not for the HL&P contract. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. United States, 2003-2
U.S.T.C. 50, (N.D. Tex. 2/6/03). In this refund action for the 1976 year, the court found that natural gas
sold under 18 fixed price, long-term contracts was eligible for percentage depletion based upon the
representative market or field price ("RMFP"). The court, however, found that two additional contracts
[with HL&P and SWEPCO] were not "fixed contracts" because taxpayer failed to meet its burden of
proving by clear and convincing evidence that the prices thereunder were not subject to adjustment to
reflect the increase in liabilities of Exxon for federal income tax after 1974 by reason of the [1975 Act]
repeal of percentage depletion.
H. Loss Transactions, Bad Debts and NOLs
1. Was he having major trouble with his car air conditioner? Wood v. United
States, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,193, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-502 (S.D. Fla. 12/17/02). The taxpayer forfeited
the proceeds from illegal smuggling of Freon into the U.S. in connection with a criminal plea bargain
relating to the smuggling and the related evasion of excise taxes. The district court upheld the denial of a
§ 165 loss deduction, on the grounds of frustration of public policy. The forfeitures were not a payment
of the excise taxes or a payment in lieu of deductible taxes.
I. At-Risk and Passive Activity Losses
1. Whose "participation" counts if the taxpayer isn't a natural person? The
Mattie K. Carter Trust v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 2d 536, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,418, 91 A.F.T.R.2d
2003-1946 (N.D. Tex. 4/11/03). The district court (Judge McBryde) held that in determining whether a
trust "materially participated" in an activity [in this case a ranching operation] the activities of all of the
trust's fiduciaries, employees, and agents should be considered, as urged by the taxpayer, and not just the
activities of the trustee, as argued by the government.
2. Now no borrowing from your partner will be at-risk. REG-209377-89, At-
Risk Limitations; Interest Other Than That of a Creditor, 68 F.R. 40583 (8/8/03). Section 465(b)(3)
provides that amounts borrowed for use in an activity do not increase the borrower's amount at risk in an
activity listed in § 465(c)(1) [(1) motion-picture films or videotapes; (2) farming; (3) leasing § 1245
property; (4) oil and gas resources and geothermal deposits] if the lender has an interest other than that of
a creditor in the activity or if the lender is related to a person (other than the borrower) who has a
disqualifying interest in the activity. Section 465(c)(3)(D) provides that § 465(b)(3) applies to activities
to which § 465 is extended by § 453(c)(3)(A) - all other business and profit seeking activities - only to
the extent provided in regulations; Alexander v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 467 (1990), aff'd by order sub
nom. Stell v. Commissioner, 999 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1993), held that until regulations were issued,
§465(b)(3) does not apply to activities other than those described in § 465(c)(1). Revisions to Prop. Reg.§ 1.465-8 and 1.465-20 would apply § 465(b)(3) to the activities described in § 465(c)(3)(A). The
regulation will be effective when finalized.
III. INVESTMENT GAIN
A. Capital Gain and Loss
1. "Putting" lipstick on the telltale collar. Rev. Rul. 2002-66, 2002-45 I.R.B.
812 (10/2/02). If the grantor of a qualified covered call option holds a put option on the same underlying
equity, the presence of the purchased put causes the stock and the qualified covered call option to
constitute part of a larger straddle within the meaning of § 1092(c)(4)(A). In such event, under § 1092(a),
the amount of losses that may be recognized is limited to the amount by which the losses exceed the
unrecognized gain in any offsetting positions in that straddle.
2. This collar just plain clean works. Rev. Rul. 2003-7, 2003-5 I.R.B. 363(1/16/03). The IRS rules that a shareholder has neither sold stock currently nor caused a constructive sale
of stock under § 1259 where he (1) receives a fixed amount of cash, (2) simultaneously enters into an
agreement to deliver on a future date a number of shares of common stock that varies significantly
depending on the value of the shares on the delivery date [but which does provide a "collar" on the
number of shares of stock to be delivered, in effect providing a "collar" on the ultimate sale price], (3)
pledges the maximum number of shares for which delivery could-be required, (4) has the unrestricted
right to deliver the pledged shares or to substitute cash or other shares on the delivery date, and (5) is not
economically compelled to deliver the pledged shares.
* There was not a sale of the pledged shares because the shareholder
was not required to relinquish the pledged shares but had an unrestricted right to reacquire them by
delivering cash or other shares. There was not a constructive sale under § 1259(c)(1)(C) because due to the
variation in the number of shares that might be delivered, the agreement was not a contract to deliver a
substantially fixed amount of property for purposes of § 1259(d)(1).
3. A little help for bears. Rev. Rul. 2003-31, 2003-13 I.R.B. 643 (3/31/03). This
revenue ruling dealt with two issues regarding short sales in margin accounts. First, changes to the terms
of a margin account through which a short sale was effectuated do not result in the short sale being
consummated for purposes of Reg. § 1.1233-1(a)(4). Second, if a taxpayer's pre-6/9/97, appreciated
financial position and short-against-the-box transactions are not taken into account for purposes of
applying § 1259 of the Internal Revenue Code to post-6/8/97 transactions, as provided by the transition
rule in § 1001(d)(2) of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, changes to the terms of the margin account
through which the short sale was effectuated will not result in transition rule ceasing to apply.
4. Capital gains rates reduced to 15 percent. Generally speaking, under the 2003
Act, gains from the sale of capital assets held for more than one year realized by taxpayers otherwise
subject to income tax rates of greater than 15 percent (formerly taxed at a 20-percent rate) are taxed at a
rate of 15 percent. For taxpayers otherwise subject to income tax rates of 10 or 15 percent, capital gains
(formerly taxed at an 8- or 10-percent rate) are taxed at 5 percent (with a special zero percent rate capital
gains rate for 10- and 15-percent bracket taxpayers in 2008).
* The 25- and 28-percent capital gains rates remain. Some or all
of any capital gains realized on the sale of depreciable real estate, however, may be taxed at a maximum rate
of 25 percent if realized by a taxpayer (otherwise in a tax bracket greater than 15 percent), and gains on the
sale of collectibles, e.g., art work, precious gems, gold bullion, antiques, etc., are subject to a maximum rate
of 28 percent.
* For taxable years that include 5/6/03, the rate on net long-term
capital gains is bifurcated pursuant to § 301(c) of the 2003 Act. For gains taken into account prior to 5/6/03,
net long-term capital gains are taxed under former law. Gains taken into account after 5/5/03 will be taxed at
the new rates.
5. You have to transfer some other business asset before you can sell goodwill.
Baker v. Commissioner, 338 F.3d 789, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5640, 2003-2 U.S.T.C. 50,604 (7th Cir.
8/4/03), aff'g 118 T.C. 452 (5/29/02). The taxpayer was a State Farm insurance agent, who sold policies
exclusively for State Farm as an independent contractor, operating his own agency, developing clients,
hiring employees, and paying expenses. Upon retirement, the taxpayer returned all of State Farm's
property to it, but transferred no identifiable assets of his own, and he received a "termination payment"
- the insurance policies he had written were assigned to a successor agent. The Seventh Circuit (Judge
Bauer) affirmed the Tax Court (Judge Panuthos) decision denying the taxpayer capital gain treatment
with respect to the termination payment. He transferred no assets that owned; the telephone number and
at-will employment relationships were not assets. He could not transfer goodwill, because he transferred
nothing to which goodwill could attach because (contractually) the customer list belonged to the
insurance company. The entire termination payment was ordinary income without regard to the potion of
it allocable to a covenant not to compete. As the court stated:
Fundamentally, in order to have the ability to sell something, one must own it. Because
Warren Baker did not own any property related to the policies, he could not sell
anything.
B. Section 121
1. A man's (woman's) home is his (her) tax free castle. T.D. 9030, Exclusion of
Gain From Sale or Exchange of a Principal Residence, 67 F.R. 78358 (12/24/02) [proposed in REG-
105235-99, Exclusion of Gain From Sale or Exchange of a Principal Residence, 65 F.R. 60136
(10/10/00).] The Treasury Department has promulgated final regulations [Reg. §§ 1.121-1 through 1.121 -
4] dealing with the § 121 exclusion of up to $250,000 ($500,000 for joint returns) of gain on the sale of
the taxpayer's principal residence if the taxpayer owned and used the property as his principal residence
for at least two years of the preceding five-year period.
* The final regulations follow the proposed regulations in providing
that whether a property qualifies as the taxpayer's principal residence depends upon all the facts and
circumstances. Generally the property used a majority of the time during the year will ordinarily be
considered the taxpayer's principal residence. The final regulations add a nonexclusive list of factors that are
relevant in identifying a property as a taxpayer's principal residence. The Treasury Department declined to
follow comments suggesting that the two-year use requirement should not require actual occupancy or that
the regulations provide a safe harbor definition of short temporary absences that would not affect the two-
year use requirement.
0 The final regulations extend the § 121 exclusion to the sale of
vacant land containing the dwelling unit, owned and used as part of the taxpayer's principal residence if (1)
the dwelling unit is sold within two years before or after the sale of the vacant land, (2) the land is adjacent
to the dwelling unit, and (3) the sale of the vacant land otherwise satisfies the requirements of § 121. The
dollar ceiling on the exclusion applies to the combined sales of the vacant land and dwelling unit. Separate
sales of the dwelling unit and adjacent vacant land do not violate the § 12 1(b)(3) restriction allowing only
one sale or exchange every two years, but both are taken into account in applying § 121(b)(3) to the sale or
exchange of any other principal residence.
* The proposed regulations provided that if a residence was used
partially for residential purposes and partially for business purposes only that part of the gain allocable to
the residential portion would be excludable under § 121. Because the Treasury Department decided that §
121 (d)(6) [excluding from the § 121 exclusion gain attributable to prior depreciation after 5/6/97] addresses
the mixed use question, the final regulations do not require an allocation if both the residential and non-
residential portions of the property are within the same dwelling unit. However, an allocation is required if
the non-residential portion is separate from the dwelling unit, and § 121 does not apply with respect to the
gain on the nonresidential portion. Basis and the amount realized are allocated between the business and
residential portions of the property using the same method the taxpayer used to allocate the basis for
purposes of depreciation. The term dwelling unit has the same meaning as in § 280A(f)(1), but does not
include appurtenant structures.
* The final regulations provide that if a residence is held by a trust,
a taxpayer is treated as the owner and the seller of the residence during the period that the taxpayer is treated
as the owner of the trust or portion of the trust that includes the residence under §§ 671 through 679. A
similar rule applies to disregarded entities.
0 The final regulations clarify that each unmarried taxpayer whojointly owns a principal residence is eligible to exclude from gross income up to $250,000 of gain
attributable to that taxpayer's interest in the property.
* The final regulations permit a taxpayer to exclude gain from the
sale of partial interests (other than interests remaining after the sale or exchange of a remainder interest) in a
principal residence if the interest sold includes an interest in the dwelling unit. However, the maximum
exclusion amount of $250,000 ($500,000 for joint returns) applies to the combined sales of partial interests.
For purposes of the one-sale-every-two-year rule, each sale or exchange of a partial interest is disregarded
with respect to other sales or exchanges of partial interests in the same principal residence, but is taken into
account with respect to any other principal residence.
* The final regulations provide that a taxpayer may make or revoke
an election under § 121(d)(8) [to apply the exclusion to a sale of a remainder interest] or § 121(f) [not to
apply the exclusion to a sale] at any time before the expiration of the period for filing an amended return.
* The final regulations provide that the bankruptcy estate of an
individual in a chapter 7 or 11 bankruptcy case may use the individual's § 121 exclusion if the individual
satisfies the requirements of § 121. Although this provision is effective 12/24/02 [the date of publication of
the regulations], the IRS will not challenge a position taken prior to the effective date
0 The IRS will not challenge a taxpayer's position that a sale before
the effective date of the regulations qualifies for the § 121 exclusion if the taxpayer has made a reasonable,
good faith effort to comply. Taxpayers may elect to apply the final regulations for any years for which the
statute of limitations has not expired.
a. Reduced exclusion ceiling on too many castle sales. T.D. 9031,
Reduced Maximum Exclusion of Gain From Sale or Exchange of Principal Residence, 67 F.R. 78367(12/24/02). Under § 121, a reduced maximum exclusion applies to a taxpayer who sells a principal
residence owned and used for less than two years or who has excluded gain on the sale or exchange of a
principal residence within the preceding two years, if the primary reason for the sale is a change in place
of employment, health, or unforeseen circumstances. Temp Reg. § 1.121-3T provides a list of suggestive
factors that may be relevant in determining the taxpayer's primary reason. No single fact or particular
combination of facts is determinative. For each of the three grounds for claiming a reduced maximum
exclusion, the temporary regulations provide a general definition and one or more safe harbors.
* The primary reason for a sale is deemed to be a change in place of
employment if the new place of employment is at least fifty miles farther from the residence sold than was
the former place of employment (or if the individual was unemployed, the distance between the new place
of employment and the residence sold or exchanged is at least fifty miles).
* A sale is due to health if the primary reason for the sale is (1) to
obtain, provide, or facilitate the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, or treatment of disease, illness, or injury, or (2)
to obtain or provide medical or personal care for disease, illness, or injury. A sale or exchange that is merely
beneficial to general health or well-being is not a sale or exchange due to health. Health is defined as the
health of a "qualified person," with a broad definition of qualified person that permits sale to provide care
for family members of the taxpayer.
* The safe harbor events for a sale due to unforeseen circumstances
include the involuntary conversion of the residence, a natural or man-made disaster or act of war or
terrorism resulting in a casualty to the residence, death, the cessation of employment as a result of which the
individual is eligible for unemployment compensation, a change in employment or self-employment status
that results in the taxpayer's inability to pay housing costs and reasonable basic living expenses for the
taxpayer's household, divorce or legal separation under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance, and
multiple births resulting from the same pregnancy. A taxpayer who does not qualify for a safe harbor may
satisfy a facts and circumstances test.
b. Notice 2002-60, 2002-36 I.R.B. 482 (8/22/02). Provides relief under the§ 121 (c) reduced maximum exclusion of gain provision for taxpayers who have not owned and used their
principal residence for two years prior to sale or exchange, but were affected by the 9/11/01 terrorist
attacks.
2. Peripatetic taxpayers sold the wrong house. Guinan v. United States, 2003-1
U.S.T.C. 50,475, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-2174 (D. Ariz. 4/9/03). Reg. § 1.121-1(b)(2) provides that the
property used by the taxpayer for a majority of the time during the year will be treated as the taxpayer's
principal residence. The taxpayers in Guinan owned three residences - a residence in Wisconsin, which
they sold, a residence in Georgia, and a residence in Arizona. During the five year period prior to selling
the Wisconsin residence, the taxpayers spent more time in the aggregate in the Wisconsin residence (847
days) than in either of the other two residences (563 days in the Georgia residence and 375 days in the
Arizona residence), but their combined use of the Georgia and Arizona residences exceeded their use of
the Wisconsin residence. The taxpayers spent the majority of their time in the Wisconsin residence only
in the first year of the five-year period. The other factors listed in Treas. Reg. § 1.121-1(b)(2) did not
support treating the Wisconsin residence as the taxpayers' principal residence - at various times the
taxpayers had registered to vote in Wisconsin, Georgia, and Arizona, they had Arizona and Georgia
driver's licenses, but not Wisconsin licenses, and they filed Arizona and Georgia state income tax
returns, but not Wisconsin returns. Thus, the Wisconsin residence was not the taxpayers' principal
residence and the § 121 exclusion was not available.
C. Section 1031
1 . The nonrecognition canteen turned out to be dry. Wiechens v. United States,
228 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 90 A.F.T.R.2d 2002-6705, 2002-2 U.S.T.C. 50,708 (D. Ariz. 9/16/02). The
taxpayer [through a partnership] exchanged Colorado River water rights, which under state law were real
property, for a fee simple interest in land. The water rights were for a limited quantity of water for a
duration of 50 years. ,On summary judgment, the court (Judge McNamee) held that the exchange did not
qualify for nonrecognition under § 1031 because the water rights and a fee simple interest in land were
not "like-kind," even under the broad standard of Reg. § 1.1031(a)-l(b). The court rejected the taxpayer's
argument that the 50-year water rights were analogous to the 30-year lease that qualified as like-kind with
a fee simple in real estate under Reg. § 1.1031(a)-i (c). Because the water rights were not perpetual, they
were not like-kind with a fee simple based on Rev. Rul. 55-749, 1955-2 C.B. 295 (dealing with perpetual
water rights).
2. Nonrecognition denied - Caught by a targeted anti-abuse rule. Rev. Rul.
2002-83, 2002-49 I.R.B. 927 (12/9/02). Individual A owned highly appreciated real property held for
investment (Property 1) and individual B, related to individual A within the meaning in § 267(b), owned
real property (Property 2), which was not appreciated. In a multiparty like-kind exchange A and B each
transferred their properties to a qualified intermediary. C, an unrelated purchaser of Property 1,
transferred cash to the qualified intermediary, who transferred Property 2 to A, Property I to C, and the
cash to B. The IRS ruled that pursuant to § 1031 (f), a taxpayer - A - who transfers relinquished property
to a qualified intermediary in exchange for replacement property formerly owned by a related party is not
entitled to nonrecognition treatment under § 1031(a) if, as part of the transaction, the related party
receives cash or other non-like-kind property for the replacement property. Based on the legislative
history [H.R. Rep. No. 101-247 at 1340 (1989)], the IRS reasoned that the purpose of §1031(f) is to deny
nonrecognition treatment for transactions in which related parties make like-kind exchanges of high basis
property for low basis property in anticipation of the sale of the low basis property. Accordingly, the IRS
applied § 1031(f)(4) because the multi-party exchange was "part of a transaction (or a series of
transactions) structured to avoid the purposes of § 103 1(f)(l)."
3. Safe-harbor deferred like kind exchanges for car rental companies. Rev.
Proc. 2003-39, 2003-22 I.R.B. 971 (6/2/03). This revenue procedure provides safe harbor rules allowing
under § 1031 with respect to programs involving ongoing exchanges of tangible personal property using
a single intermediary ("LKE Programs"). [For background information on this revenue procedure, see
Attorneys Request Guidance for Like-kind Exchange Programs, 2002 TNT 78-22 (4/1/02).]
D. Section 1035
1. Rev. Rul. 2003-76, 2003-33 I.R.B. 355 (8/18/03). An exchange of a portion of an
annuity contract into a new annuity contract effected by the owner assigning a portion of the cash
surrender value (60 percent) to a different insurance company was a tax-free exchange under § 1035. The
investment in the contract and basis are allocated according to the cash value immediately prior to the
exchange using the rules of § § 72 and 1031. Thus, the basis in the new contract equals 60 percent of the
basis in the contract immediately before the exchange. After the transaction, the basis in the old contract
equals 40 percent its original basis.
E. Section 1041
1. A welcome regulation is made final! Subchapter C principles govern which
spouse will be taxed on stock redemptions incident to a divorce - at least unless the spouses
mutually elect otherwise. T.D. 9035, Constructive Transfers and Transfers of Property to a Third Party
on Behalf of a Spouse, 68 F.R. 1534 (1/13/03). Because of the inconsistent standards applied by the
courts in dealing with redemptions of stock incident to a divorce, in REG-107151-00, Constructive
Transfers and Transfers of Property to a Third Party on Behalf of a Spouse, 66 F.R. 40659 (8/3/01), the
Treasury proposed regulations [Prop. Reg. § 1.1041-2] to provide greater certainty in determining which
spouse will be taxed on stock redemptions occurring during marriage or incident to divorce. Reg. §
1.1041-2 has been finalized and Reg. § 1.1041-1T(c) Q&A-9 no longer controls redemptions of stock
incident to a divorce. Reg. § 1.1041-2 applies only where the nonredeemed spouse owns stock of the
redeeming corporation either immediately before or immediately after the stock redemption. If a
corporation redeems stock of one spouse, and that redemption is treated as a constructive distribution to
the other spouse under Subchapter C principles - the primary and unconditional obligation standard
[Wall v. United States, 164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1947); Sullivan v. United States, 363 F.2d 724 (8th Cir.
1966)] - the redemption is treated as a distribution to the spouse who continues as a shareholder. Section
1041 applies to the deemed transfer of the stock by the redeemed spouse to the continuing shareholder
spouse. Section 1041 does not apply to the deemed transfer of stock from the nontransferor spouse to the
redeeming corporation. Any property actually received by the redeemed spouse from corporation is
treated as flowing through the continuing shareholder-spouse, and § 1041 applies to that transfer. In all
other cases, the form of the stock redemption will be respected; the redeemed spouse will be taxed on the
redemption and the continuing spouse has not tax consequences. The preamble to the proposed
regulations specifically state:
[I]f the rules of the proposed regulations had applied in the Ames case,' because the
husband did not have a primary and unconditional obligation to purchase the wife's
stock, the redemption would have been taxed in accordance with its form with the result
that the wife would have incurred the tax consequences of the redemption.
0 A special rule applies if an effective divorce or separation
instrument, or a written agreement between the spouses [executed before the due dates of their returns],
requires the spouses to file their federal income tax returns in a consistent manner that treats the stock as
Ames v. United States, 981 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1992), not applied by Tax Court, Ames v. Comnissioner,
102 T.C. 522 (1994) (reviewed, 7 judges dissenting).
being redeemed from the continuing shareholder spouse rather than from the spouse from whom it was
actually redeemed. In such a case spouses and former spouses will treat a redemption that otherwise would
be taxed according to its form as a redemption from the continuing shareholder spouse involving (1) a
deemed § 1041 transfer of the stock by the redeemed spouse to the continuing shareholder spouse, and (2) a
deemed § 1041 transfer by the continuing shareholder spouse to the redeemed spouse of the redemption
proceeds.
* The final regulations add a provision dealing with situations in
which the redemption results in a constructive dividend distribution to the nontransferor spouse under
Subchapter C principles, but the spouses nevertheless would like to agree that the redemption will be treated
as a redemption distribution to the transferor spouse. Reg. § 1.1041-2(c) allows the spouses to agree in the
divorce or separation instrument, or other valid written agreement, that the redemption will be taxable to the
transferor spouse notwithstanding that the redemption might otherwise result in a constructive dividend
distribution to the nontransferor spouse. Example 2 in § 1.1041-2(d) illustrates the application of this special
rule.
Under the final regulations, the spouses can elect the special rule by expressly providing,
in a divorce or separation instrument or other valid written agreement, that expressly
supersedes any other instrument or agreement concerning the purchase, sale, redemption,
or other disposition of the stock that is the subject of the redemption, their mutual intent
concerning [which spouse should receive redemption treatment].
These regulations are applicable to redemptions of stock on or after January 13, 2003
that are pursuant to instruments in effect after January 13, 2003. These regulations are
also applicable to redemptions before January 13, 2003 or that are pursuant to
instruments in effect before January 13, 2003 if the spouses or former spouses execute a
written agreement on or after August 3, 2001, that satisfies the requirements of § 1.1041 -
2(c)(1) or (2).
IV. COMPENSATION ISSUES
A. Fringe Benefits
1. IRS revokes Notice 2001-10 and will for future arrangements require
taxation under one of two mutually exclusive regimes. Notice 2002-8, 2002-4 I.R.B. 398 (1/4/02),
revoking Notice 2001-10, 2001-5 I.R.B. 459. When the Treasury and Service publish proposed
regulations providing comprehensive guidance regarding the tax treatment of split-dollar life insurance
arrangements, the regulations will provide the following in employment-related arrangements:
* If the employer is formally designated as owner of the life
insurance contract, then the employer will be treated as providing current life insurance protection and other
economic benefits to the employee. A transfer of the life insurance contract to the employee would be taxed
under § 83, but an employer would not be treated as having made a transfer of the cash surrender value for
purposes of § 83 "solely because the interest or other earnings credited to the cash surrender value of the
contract cause the cash surrender value to exceed the portion thereof payable to the employer." This has the
effect of leaving that issue unresolved, and would change the position in Notice 2001-10 that the employee
would be taxed under § 83 on the transfer of a beneficial interest in the cash surrender value.
* If the employee is formally designated as owner, the premiums
paid by the employer would be treated as a series of loans by the employer to the employee - if the
employee is required to repay the employer out of insurance proceeds or otherwise. The loans are subject to
taxation under the §§ 1271-1275 OID provisions and the § 7872 compensation-related below-market loan
provision. If the employee is not required to repay the employer, then the premiums paid would be treated as
compensation income to the employee when paid.
* The above rules will be effective for arrangements entered into
after the date of publication of final regulations. P.S. 58 rates may be used for provisions valuing current life
insurance protection entered into before 1/28/02 and for arrangements entered into before the date of
publication of final regulations.
a. Notice 2002-8 is carried into proposed regulations. REG-164754-01,
Split-Dollar Life Insurance Arrangements, 67 F.R. 45414 (7/9/02). These proposed regulations provide
guidance on the income, employment and gift taxation of split-dollar life insurance arrangements and
carry out the concepts of Notice 2002-8. These proposed regulations will be effective for split-dollar life
insurance arrangements entered after the date of publication of final regulations in the Federal Register.
b. Crackdown on split-dollar life insurance arrangements that are
designed to understate the value of benefits for income or gift tax purposes. Notice 2002-59, 2002-
36 I.R.B. 481 (8/16/02). The IRS held that neither the premium rates in Table 2001 nor the insurer's
lower published premium rates may be relied on to value the insured's current life insurance protection
for the "purpose of establishing the value of policy benefits to which another party may be entitled."
Under reverse split-dollar arrangements, one party with a right to current life insurance protection may
use various techniques to confer policy benefits other than current life insurance protection on another
party, but using such techniques to understate the value of other policy benefits "distorts the income,
employment, or gift tax consequences of the arrangement."
0 According to Tax Notes Today, 2002 TNT 161-4 (8/20/02), this
notice was issued after Treasury officials read a 7/28/02 story in the New York Times, which stated that
Jonathan Blattmachr had developed this technique based upon a 1996 private letter ruling [identified as
LTR 9636033].
c. Equity split-dollar proposed regulations. REG-164754-01, Split-
Dollar Life Insurance Arrangements, 68 F.R. 24898 (5/8/03). Supplement the 2002 proposed regulations
to provide guidance on the valuation of economic benefits under an equity split-dollar life insurance
arrangement. Under an equity split-dollar arrangement, the payments by the owner of the policy establish
a pool of assets in which the non-owner has rights of withdrawal, borrowing, surrender, assignment or
the like; in addition, this pool of assets may be also placed beyond the reach of the owner's creditors. The
proposed regulations provide that the non-owner "has current access to any portion of the policy cash
that is directly or indirectly accessible by the non-owner, inaccessible to the owner, or inaccessible to the
owner's general creditors." "Access" is thus to be broadly construed.
0 Thus, the non-owner is to be taxed on the value of current term
life insurance protection plus the amount of policy cash value to which he has "current access." There is
also a third component, "the value of any economic benefits.., provided to the non-owner."
d. Final split-dollar regulations are effective on 9/17/03. T.D. 9092,
Split-Dollar Life Insurance Arrangements, 68 F.R. 54336 (9/11/03). Comprehensive final regulations
under §§ 1.61-22, 1.83-3(e), 1.83-6(a)(5), 1.301-1(q), and Reg. § 1.7872-15, regarding the federal
income, gift, and employment taxation of split-dollar life insurance arrangements (as defined in § 1.61-
22(b)(1) or (2)). They adopt the proposed regulations with only minor changes. The effective date of the
final regulations is 9/17/03, the date of publication in the Federal Register, i.e., the regulations apply to
any split-dollar life insurance arrangement that is entered into after 9/17/03 and to any split-dollar life
insurance arrangement entered into on or before that date that is materially modified after that date.
(1) Rev. Rul. 2003-105, 2003-40 I.R.B. (9/12/03). Makes prior
guidance in this area obsolete. In the case of any split-dollar life insurance arrangement entered into on or
before 9/1/703, taxpayers may continue to rely on these revenue rulings to the extent described in Notice
2002-8, but only if the arrangement is not materially modified after that date.
2. Well, duh! Rev. Rul. 2002-58, 2002-38 I.R.B. 541 (9/23/02). Amounts
reimbursed under a self-insured medical expense reimbursement plan for medical expenses incurred by
an employee prior to the establishment of the plan are not excludable from the employee's gross income
under §105(b).
3. It's not a reimbursed medical expense if the employee is paid in any event
and the amount is retrospectively characterized if and when medical expenses are incurred. Rev.
Rul. 2002-80, 2002-49 I.R.B. 925 (12/9/02). An employer provided employee medical insurance under a
salary reduction program, but paid employees approximately the same amount as they would have
received if there had been no salary reduction. The amount equal to the salary reduction was labeled
"advance reimbursement" of the uninsured medical expenses. To the extent an employee submitted
claims for uninsured medical expenses during the year, the employer characterized the "advance
reimbursement" as excludable income under § 105(b), and did not withhold income tax or treat the
amount as wages for FICA; excess amounts were treated compensation includible in the employee's
gross income. The IRS ruled that no part of the "advance reimbursements" qualified for exclusion under
§ 105(b).
4. Another Tax Court loss for an airline pilot. Tuka v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 1
(1/06/03). The taxpayer claimed that disability payments, based on age, years of service, and salary,
received from an employer sponsored plan were tax exempt under § 104(a)(3). Judge Ruwe held that the
exclusion of disability benefits under § 104(a)(3) is available only if the contributions to the accident and
health plan were includible in the employee's gross income. Even if the plan had been funded by wage
savings to the employer resulting from collective bargaining with the union it would not have been an
employee contribution plan.
5. Amounts received from employer may be excluded as § 139 qualified
disaster relief; amounts received from a state agency are excluded as gifts. Rev. Rul. 2003-12, 2003-
3 I.R.B. 283 (1/21/03). Amounts received by an individual from an employer to reimburse the individual
for necessary medical, temporary housing, or transportation expenses incurred as a result of a flood are
not excludable as a gift under § 102, but are excluded from gross income as qualified disaster relief under§ 139 if the flood was a Presidentially declared disaster. Similar amounts received from a state agency
are excludable under the administrative general welfare exclusion; and similar amounts received from a
charity are excluded under § 102.
6. Health FSAs and HRAs with point of service electronic payment. Rev. Rul.
2003-43, 2003-21 I.R.B. 935 (5/27/03). An employer-sponsored health FSA [§ 125] or HRA [Notice
2002-45, 2002-28 I.R.B. 93] qualifies under § 105 where the plan provides electronic reimbursement of
medical expenses through the use of a debit card or stored-value card, or payment by a credit card, issued
to the employee and charged to the employer's account if: (1) use of the card is limited to the maximum
dollar amount of coverage available in the cardholder's health FSA or HRA, (2) the card is effective only
at authorized physicians, pharmacies, dentists, vision care offices, hospitals, and other medical care
providers, (3) the employee certifies that any expense paid with the card has not been reimbursed and
that the employee will not seek reimbursement under any other plan, (4) the employee agrees to acquire
and retain sufficient documentation, including invoices and receipts, for expenses paid with the card, and
(5) the employer maintains comprehensive procedures for substantiating claimed medical expenses after
the use of the card. But where the employer does not comprehensively substantiate that the expenses paid
with the card qualify as medical expenses - for example, only statistically samples expenditures to
verify that the expenditure was not for cosmetic procedures - the plan does not qualify.
B. Qualified Deferred Compensation Plans
1. EPCRS updated again. Rev. Proc. 2003-44, 2003-25 I.R.B. 1051 (6/4/03),
updating and superseding Rev, Proc. 2002-47, 2002-29 I.R.B. 133. This iteration of the Employee Plans
Compliance Resolution System will be generally effective 10/1/03.
2. Cash balance plan proposed regulations provide a green light for adoptions
of cash balance plans favoring younger employees, including permission to require quasi-geriatrics
to spin their [retirement accrual] wheels during "wear-away" periods. REG-209500-86 and REG-
164464-02, Reductions of Accruals and Allocations Because of the Attainment of any Age; Application
of Nondiscrimination Cross-Testing Rules to Cash Balance Plans, 67 F.R. 76123 (12/11/02). These
proposed regulations provide guidance on age discrimination requirements under §§ 41 1(b)(1)(H) and
41 l(b)(2), including the allocation of these requirements to cash balance pension plans.
A cash balance plan is a defined benefit plan under which an
employee has a hypothetical individual account that provides a benefit upon retirement based upon pay
credits and interest credits - a concept that closely resembles a defined contribution plan. Section
411 (b)(1)(H) provides that a defined benefit plan fails to comply with the age discrimination rules of §
411 (b) if benefit accrual is ceased or reduced on the attainment of any age, and § 411 (b)(2) provides that a
defined contribution plan similarly fails to comply unless the rate at which amounts are allocated to an
employee's account is not similarly ceased or reduced because of age.
* A cash balance qualifies, inter alia, only if "the participant
accrues the right to future interest credits (without regard to future service) at a reasonable rate of interest
that does not decrease because of the attainment of any age."
* The rules for conversion of traditional defined benefit plans to
cash balance plans require that either (1) the converted plan defines the benefit as the sum of the benefits
under the traditional defined benefit plan and the cash balance account, or (2) the converted plan must
establish each participant's opening account balance as an amount not less than the actuarial present value
of the participant's prior accrued benefit. The second alternative would permit a "wear-away" period during
which the participant will not accrue net benefits for some period after the conversion.
a. Treasury and IRS withdraw the proposed cash-balance plan
nondiscrimination regulations. Announcement 2003-22, 2003-17 I.R.B. 846 (4/7/03). The proposed
nondiscrimination regulations under § 401(a)(4) that would have required a modified form of cross-
testing, which were proposed at the same time as the proposed cash balance regulations, are withdrawn
because (as proposed) they would make it difficult "for plan sponsors converting long-standing
traditional pension plans to cash balance plans to provide different types of transitional relief to plan
participants." The withdrawn proposed regulations will be re-proposed.
b. Courts find that Xerox and IBM cash balance plans violate ERISA.
Berger v. Xerox Corporation Retirement Income Guarantee Plan, 2003 TNT 160-12 (7th Cir. 8/1/03)
(plan violates ERISA because method of determining an ex-employee's benefit if a lump sum under
$25,000 is chosen on leaving before retirement); Cooper v. IBM Personal Pension Plan, 2003 TNT 149-
38 (S.D. I11. 8/1/03) (plan violates ERISA § 240(b)(1)(G) [reduction of accrued benefit solely on
increases in age or service] and 240(b)(1)(H) [rate of benefit accrual decreases once a certain age is
attained]).
3. Here's how to deduct a redemption. Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 329
F.3d 751, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-2280, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,472 (9th Cir. 4/10/03). Boise Cascade's ESOP
held over 6.7 million shares of Boise Cascade convertible preferred stock. To fund distributions to
employees who had terminated their employment when they had vested account balances, Boise Cascade
redeemed a relatively small number of shares of the convertible preferred stock held by its ESOP. The
Court of Appeals upheld Boise Cascade's claim that the redemption failed all of the tests of § 302(b), and
thus was a dividend under § 301, and, as such, was deductible pursuant to § 404(k). Furthermore, §
162(k) did not apply to bar the deduction. Responding to what appears to have been a groundless
argument by the government, the court held that § 318 did not treat the plan beneficiaries as owners
[because the ESOP was a § 401(a) trust]. The court held that the ESOP was not a grantor trust of which
the beneficiaries were the owners.
C. Nonqualified Deferred Compensation, Section 83, and Stock Options
1. Just exactly what does "included" mean? Robinson v. United States, 52 Fed.
Cl. 725, 90 A.F.T.R.2d. 2002-5003 (6/24/02). The Court of Federal Claims followed Venture Funding,
Ltd. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 236 (1998), aff'd per curiam, 198 F.2d 248 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied,
530 U.S. 1205 (2000), to hold that §83(h) allows a deduction for the value of a compensatory transfer of
restricted stock to an employee only when the amount of the discount is actually "included" by the
employee, not when the amount is "includable" but not reported as income by the employee. Since the
employee was appealing from an unfavorable audit with respect to the income item attributable to the
year of the transfer [in which the employee-COO had made a § 83(b) election and reported the bargain
element as zero, giving notice to himself as a representative of the corporation, even though the taxpayers
owned all of the remaining stock of the S corporation - 90 percent], the fact of inclusion was not yet
established and the refund claim was not ripe. Taxpayers claimed that employee received restricted stock
worth $28 million for $2 million and made the § 83(b) zero election without advising them or anyone
else at the corporation at the time; taxpayers did not find out about the § 83(b) election until negotiating
the COO's termination three years later (when they sent the COO an amended Form W-2).
a. Reversed and Reg. § 1.83-6(a) invalidated. "Included" means
included under law, not included in fact. Robinson v. United States, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5349 (Fed.
Cir. 7/15/03). The Federal Circuit (Judge Bryson) reversed. The court reasoned that since a deduction
under § 162 for compensation paid is allowed whether or not the employee actually includes the amount
in income, the word "included" in § 83(h) refers only to whether the amount was properly includable by
the employee under § 61. In support of this proposition, the court quoted the legislative history of §
83(h): "The allowable deduction is the amount which the employee is required to recognize as income.
The deduction is to be allowed in the employer's accounting period which includes the close of the
taxable year in which the employee recognizes the income." S. Rep. No. 91-522, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
123 (1969) [emphasis added], focusing on the italicized language. The court also cited the Bluebook for
support.
Furthermore, the court refused to apply Reg. § 1.83-6(a), as
revised in 1995, which was the controlling regulation and which supported the Commissioner's position,
because, the court reasoned, the regulation was contrary to the plain meaning of the statute [even though
that plain meaning was not apparent to the Tax Court or the Sixth Circuit in Venture Funding, Ltd. v.
Commissioner, with which the Federal Circuit noted it disagreed] and flunked the first half of the Chevron
analysis.
2. Rev. Rul. 2003-98, 2003-34 I.R.B. 378 (7/25/03). This revenue ruling deals with
the corporation entitled to claim the deduction under § 83(h) when a nonstatutory stock option with no
ascertainable value granted to an employee of T is exercised or settled after T has been acquired by P. In
three situations, after the acquisition of the T stock, T survives as a subsidiary [for which there was no §
338 election made]. In all three cases, T was entitled to the deduction without regard to whether the
employee received cash from T to settle the option or the employee exchanged the T option for a P
option that was later exercised. In the fourth situation, T merged into P and the employee exchanged the
T option for a P option that was later exercised; in that case P was entitled to the deduction.
D. Individual Retirement Accounts
1. Bear market relief for pre-geriatrics. Rev. Rul. 2002-62, 2002-43 I.R.B. 710
(10/3/02). The IRS will allow a one-time change, without penalty, in IRA and retirement plan periodic
payment schedules for an individual receiving fixed IRA or retirement plan payments. This ruling
modifies the provisions of Q&A-12 of Notice 89-25, 1989-1 C.B. 662. This will help a taxpayer who
suffers an unexpected drop in the value of his or her retirement savings, who will be able to reduce the
amount of those fixed periodic payments without becoming subject to the § 72(t) penalty on withdrawals
before reaching the age of 59-1/2.
2. Guidance for waivers of the 60-day rollover period. Rev. Proc. 2003-16,
2003-4 I.R.B. 359 (1/8/03). The IRS has provided guidance in applying for a waiver of the 60-day
rollover period for IRAs and pension plan distributions, including when automatic waivers will be
granted.
3. T.D. 9056, Earnings Calculation for Returned or Recharacterized IRA
Contributions, 68 F.R. 23586 (5/5/03). Final regulations provide a new method to be used for calculating
the net income attributable to IRA contributions that are distributed as a returned contribution under §
408(d)(4) or recharacterized under § 408A(d)(6). Applicable to IRA contributions made on or after
1/1/04
V. PERSONAL INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS
A. Rates
1. Dividends received are to be taxed at capital gains rates. The 2003 Act added§ I(h)( 11), which provides that dividends received by taxpayers other than corporations generally will be
taxed at the same rate as long-term capital gains, i.e., 15 percent for taxpayers otherwise taxable at a rate
greater than 15 percent; and five percent for taxpayers otherwise at 10 or 15 percent (with a special zero
percent rate for 10- and 15-percent bracket taxpayers in 2008). This rate applies to dividends received
from domestic and qualified foreign corporations for purposes of both the regular tax and the alternative
minimum tax. A dividend is treated as investment income for purposes of determining the amount of
deductible investment interest under § 163(d) only if the taxpayer elects to treat the dividend as not
eligible for the reduced rates. The provision is effective for taxable years beginning after 12/31/02, and
beginning before 1/1/09.
* Note that § l(h)(1 1) treats dividends as "adjusted net capital gain"
under § l(h)(3), even though the dividend itself (in contrast to the stock) is not a capital asset as defined in §
1221, and dividends are not taken into account in the calculation of "net capital gain" under § 1222. The
principal effect of this statutory construction is to extend the 5-percent and 15-percent maximum rates under§ 1 (h) to dividends received by taxpayers, without permitting capital losses to be deducted against dividend
income (except to the extent allowed by §§ 1211 and 1212).
a. Which dividends are taxed at capital gains rates? The 2003 Act
added § l(h)(1 1), which provides that dividends received by taxpayers other than corporations generally
will be taxed at the same rate as long-term capital gains, i.e., 15 percent for taxpayers otherwise taxable
at a rate greater than 15 percent; and five percent for taxpayers otherwise at 10 or 15 percent (with a
special zero percent rate for 10- and 15-percent bracket taxpayers in 2008). The Conference Report
states:
Under [§ 1(h) (11)], dividends received by an individual shareholder from domestic [and
qualified foreign2 ] corporations are taxed at the same rates that apply to net capital gain.
2 Qualified foreign corporations include those "eligible for the benefits of a comprehensive income tax treaty [other
than the Barbados treaty]" and those paid "with respect to stock that is readily tradable on an established securities
market in the United States [including those whose stock is traded in the form of American Depository Receipts]."
This treatment applies for purposes of both the regular tax and the alternative minimum
tax. Thus, under the provision, dividends will be taxed at rates of five and 15 percent.
If a shareholder does not hold a share of stock for more than [60] days during the [120]-
day period beginning [60] days before the ex-dividend date (as measured under section
246(c)),4 dividends received on the stock are not eligible for the reduced rates. Also, the
reduced rates are not available for dividends to the extent that the taxpayer is obligated to
make related payments with respect to positions in substantially similar or related
property.
If an individual receives an extraordinary dividend (within the meaning of section
1059(c)) eligible for the reduced rates with respect to any share of stock, any loss on the
sale of the stock is treated as a long-term capital loss to the extent of the dividend.
b. Investment income § 163(d) limitations may lead to a taxpayer
election to have dividends taxed at regular rates. The existence of a preferential rate for dividends
gives rise to tax arbitrage possibilities similar to those that arise when an interest deduction is allowed
with respect investments that produce only tax-favored capital gains, for which § 163(d) historically has
limited interest deductions. Accordingly, the 2003 Act amended § 163(d)(4) to exclude from the
definition of net investment income any dividends that are taxed at preferential rates under § 1(h).
However, §§ 1(h)(l 1)(D)(i) and 163(d)(4)(B) allow taxpayers to elect to forgo the preferential rates for
dividends and to treat the dividends as investment income for purposes of § 163(d). If a taxpayer does not
have other investment income against which investment interest may be deducted under § 163(d), it may
be to the taxpayer's advantage to elect not to have the preferential rates under § 1(h) apply to an amount
of dividend income equal to the amount of investment interest that otherwise would be nondeductible by
virtue of §163(d).
2. Income tax rate reductions accelerated. In the 2003 Act, Congress accelerated
the rate reduction by putting the 25 percent, 28 percent, 33 percent, and 35 percent brackets previously
scheduled to take effect in 2006 into effect for all years after 2002.
3. Marriage penalty relief for the upper limit of the 15-percent bracket
accelerated. The 15-percent bracket rate was not reduced, but the 2003 Act increased the size of the
upper limit of the 15-percent regular income tax rate bracket for married taxpayers filing joint returns to
twice the width of the 15-percent regular income tax rate bracket for single returns for taxable years
beginning in 2003 and 2004.
• For taxable years beginning after 2004, the upper limit of the 15
percent rate bracket for married taxpayers filing joint returns reverts to the amount provided in § 1(a) and
(f).
4. Increased width of the 10-percent rate bracket. The 2003 Act also
temporarily accelerated an increase in the taxable income ceiling of the 10-percent rate bracket from
$6,000 to $7,000, and for married taxpayers filing joint returns from $12,000 to $14,000 (indexed for
inflation in 2004), previously scheduled to take effect in 2008, to be effective in 2003 and 2004.
* Starting in 2005, the taxable income ceiling for the 10-percent rate
bracket reverts to the levels provided under the 2001 Act (which are not adjusted for inflation). See § 1 (i).
5. Increased AMT exemption amount. The 2001 Act and the 2003 Act combined
to increase the alternative minimum tax exemption amount for 2001 and 2002 to $35,750 for single
taxpayers and $49,000 for married taxpayers filing joint returns, and for 2003 and 2004 to $40,250 for
unmarried taxpayers and to $58,000 for married taxpayers filing joint returns.
B. Miscellaneous Income
1. You have to prove that the damages were received for a physical personal
injury. Prasil v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-100 (4/9/03). The taxpayer received $7,650 to settle a
sex discrimination claim against her employer. The court held that § 104(a)(2) did not exclude the
3Payments in lieu of dividends are not eligible for the exclusion. See sections 6042(a) and 6045(d) relating to
statements required to be furnished by brokers regarding these payments.4In the case of preferred stock, the periods are doubled.
payment. The record was devoid of any evidence to corroborate the taxpayer's "own self-serving
testimony *** that [the employer's] sex discrimination caused a physical injury to or the physical
sickness of Mrs. Prasil." Furthermore, the settlement agreement referred only to the sex discrimination
claim and "did not specifically carve out any portion of the settlement payment as a settlement on
account of personal physical injury or physical sickness, let alone make reference to a physical injury or
a physical sickness .... 5
2. Forste v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-103 (4/16/03). When Deloitte,
Haskins & Sells informed the taxpayer that he was being terminated because of his refusal to fly to
meetings, he negotiated a settlement for retirement payments and "other amounts." In negotiating the
settlement, the taxpayer asserted numerous tort and contract causes of action. The settlement agreement
described $25,130 of the payments as "[i]n settlement of all claims for Workmen's Compensation arising
from my employment or termination with DH & S, and without DH & S admitting any liability, and
expressly denying any liability for any and all claims which may be or are claimed to result from my
employment or termination with DH & S . . . ." Additional amounts, equal to the difference between
$25,130 and the taxpayer's salary, were described as paid to settle other claims. Nevertheless, the
taxpayer excluded the full payments [which DH&S reported on W-2s], claiming that § 104(a)(2) [as in
effect before 11/13/95] applied. The Tax Court (Judge Ruwe) held that the taxpayer produced credible
evidence that $25,130 of the $45,615 received by the taxpayer was paid and received on account of tort
or tort type personal injuries, that under § 7491 the burden of proof shifted to the Commissioner with
respect to that amount of $25,130, and that the Commissioner had failed to satisfy the burden. The court
concluded that the workers' compensation language was based on advice from the taxpayer's accountant
and was intended to indicate that the payment was to settle tort-type claims, for which workers'
compensation is a substitute. Thus, $25,130 was excludable. The taxpayer, who bore the burden of proof
regarding the amount in excess of $25,130, failed to prove that the excess was excludable; as it was paid
to settle the contract claims.
3. A fraudulently obtained annulment leaves you married for filing status
purposes. Rinehart v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-109 (4/18/03). Judge Vasquez held that the
taxpayers proper filing status was as married, as asserted by the Commissioner, notwithstanding that they
had their marriage judicially annulled, because, on the unusual facts, the Tax Court found that annulment
had been obtained by a fraud on the Texas court.
C. Profit-Seeking Individual Deductions
1. The alternative minimum tax ("AMT") trap for attorneys' fees on large
recoveries.
a. Cases decided in past years by the First, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth,
Ninth, Tenth and Federal Circuits sprang the AMT trap. Attorney's fees incurred by an individual in
a nonbusiness profit-seeking transaction are [§ 212] miscellaneous itemized deductions [§67] and may
not be deducted for AMT purposes. To avoid this result, taxpayers in a number of cases in recent years
have argued the portion of a taxable damage award retained by the taxpayer-plaintiff's attorney as a
contingent fee is excluded from the taxpayer-plaintiff s income and treated as income earned directly by
the attorney. The Tax Court and most Courts of Appeals have reached conflicting results on this
question. Generally, the Tax Court holds that attorney's fee awards paid directly to a plaintiffs attorney
[or the portion of a damage award that is the attorney's contingent fee that is so paid] are nevertheless
includable in the litigant's gross income, and that the taxpayer then may claim a deduction, subject to any
applicable limitations, including disallowance of the deduction for AMT purposes if it is a § 212
deduction. Bagley v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 396 (1995), affid 121 F.3d 393 (8th Cir. 1997). Accord
Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d. 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affg 30 Fed. Cl. 248 (1993); Alexander v. IRS,
72 F.3d 938, 96-1 U.S.T.C. 50,011 (1st Cir. 1995), affg T.C. Memo 1995-51; Coady v. Commissioner,
213 F.3d 1187, 2000-1 U.S.T.C. 50,528 (9th Cir. 2000), affg T.C. Memo. 1998-29; Benci-Woodwardv.
Commissioner, 219 F.3d 941, 2000-2 U.S.T.C. 50,595 (9th Cir. 2000), affig T.C. Memo. 1998-395, cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1112 (2001); Kenseth v. Commissioner, 259 F.3d 881, 2001-2 U.S.T.C. 50,570, 88
A.F.T.R.2d 2001-5378 (7th Cir. 8/7/01), affg 114 T.C. 399 (5/24/00) (reviewed, 8-5); Young v.
Commissioner, 240 F.3d 369, 2001-1 U.S.T.C. 50,244, 87 A.F.T.R.2d 2001-889 (4th Cir. 2/16/01),
aff'g, 113 T.C. 152 (8/20/99); Hukkanen-Campbell v. Commissioner, 274 F.3d 1312, 2002-1 U.S.T.C.
50,351, 88 A.F.T.R.2d 2001-7983 (10th Cir. 12/19/01), affg T.C. Memo. 2000-180 (6/12/01), cert.
denied, 535 U.S. 1056 (5/13/02).
b. But the Fifth and Sixth Circuits see things differently.
5 See TAM 200041022 (7/17/00) for some indication as to what the IRS might consider a physical injury.
(1) In Cotnam v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959),
however, the Fifth Circuit held that attorney's fees so paid directly to a plaintiff's attorney are not
includable by the litigant. The court of appeals reasoned that under the Alabama attorney's lien law, the
ownership of the portion of the award representing attorney's fees vested in the attorney ab initio.
Subsequently, in Srivastava v. Commissioner, 220 F.3d 353, 2000-2 U.S.T.C. 50,597 (5th Cir. 2000) (2-
1), rev 'g T.C. Memo. 1998-362, a majority decision of a Fifth Circuit panel held that Cotnam applied to
attorneys' fees under Texas law because there is no difference in the "economic reality facing the
taxpayer-plaintiff' between Alabama and Texas attorney's liens and any distinction between them does
not affect the analysis required by the anticipatory assignment of income doctrine. A dissent by Judge
Dennis distinguished Cotnam on the ground that Alabama law gives the holders of attorney's liens
greater power than does Texas law.
(2) Estate of Clarks v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 2000-1 U.S.T.C.
50,158, 85 A.F.T.R.2d 2000-405 (6th Cir. 2000). The Sixth Circuit held that the taxpayer was not
required to include the portion of the taxable interest attached to a damage award excluded under§ 104(a)(2) that was paid directly to the taxpayer's attorney. The court discussed the particularities of the
attorney's fee statutory lien law in Cotnam, found the Michigan attorney's fees common law lien law to
be similar to the Alabama law involved in Cotnam, and stated that it was following Cotnam. But the
court also provided a broader explanation for its decision, concluding that the opinions representing the
weight of authority, e.g., Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995), inappropriately relied on
the assignment of income doctrine cases, e.g., Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930) and Helvering v. Horst,
311 U.S. 112 (1940), which, while relevant in family transactions, were not relevant in a arm's length
transaction.
6 (3) In the Eleventh Circuit (as derived from pre-split Fifth
Circuit precedents ), under the Golsen rule, attorney's fees are not included in the income of an
Alabama taxpayer who received a large punitive damages award. Davis v. Commissioner, 210 F.3d
1346, 2000-1 U.S.T.C. 50,431, 85 A.F.T.R.2d 2000-1567 (4/27/00) (per curiam), aff'g T.C. Memo.
1998-248 (7/7/98). The Eleventh Circuit panel held that, with respect to Alabama taxpayers, it was bound
by Cotnam.
* In Foster v. United States, 249 F.3d 1275, 1278 (1 1th Cir.2001),
the Eleventh Circuit followed Davis in a subsequent case involving another Alabama taxpayer.
c. And there is no AMT trap in Vermont! Will the Second Circuit get a
chance to opine? Raymond v. United States, 247 F. Supp. 2d 548, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,196, 91
A.F.T.R.2d 2003-535 (D. Vt. 12/17/02). The district court (Chief Judge Sessions) followed Cotnam v.
Commissioner, 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959), to exclude contingent attorney's fees in a wrongful
discharge cases attorney's fees because under state law the plaintiff taxpayer never personally owed the
contingent fee and attorney's lien gave him an equitable interest in the plaintiffs claim. He concluded
that the taxpayer transferred an interest in income producing property before the income was realized,
rejecting the reasoning of all of the cases to the contrary, e.g., Kenseth v. Commissioner, 259 F.3d 881
(7th Cir. 2001), affig 114 T.C. 399 (2000), that refused to treat state law as controlling and applying the
assignment of income doctrine of Old Colony Trust Co., 279 U.S. 716 (1929). Notably, Judge Sessions
also chose not to rely on Srivastava v. Commissioner, 220 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000), in which the Fifth
Circuit abandoned reliance on state law in holding that successful plaintiffs are not required to include
and deduct contingent attorney's fees but may simply exclude them.
d. Now we discover that in the Ninth Circuit it all depends on which
state's attorney's lien law controls. Banaitis v. Commissioner, _ F.3d __, 2003 WL 22016822, 2003
U.S. App. LEXIS 17913 (9th Cir. 8/27/03), rev'g T.C. Memo. 2002-5. In a case involving attorney's fees
subject to Oregon attorney's fee lien law, the Ninth Circuit (Judge Thomas) held the portion of a taxable
damage award (for wrongful discharge from employment) retained by the attorney as a contingent fee
was not includable in the taxpayer-plaintiff's gross income. Judge Thomas found that the nature of the
attorney's fee lien was determinative. Examining relevant state law, he concluded that under Oregon law,
the attorney's claim to the fee was even stronger than under Alabama law. Therefore he applied the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Cotnam v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir.1959), holding that contingent
attorney's fees paid directly to an attorney were not includable in the client's gross income because
Alabama attorney's fee lien law vested title in the attorney ab initio. Judge Thomas declined to apply the
Ninth Circuit's precedents in Benci-Woodward v. Commissioner, 219 F.3d 941, 943 (9th Cir.2000), cert.
6 Under Bonner v. City of Prichard, Alabama, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981), Fifth Circuit decisions rendered
before the Eleventh Circuit was created are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit.
denied, 531 U.S. 1112(2001), and Coady v. Commissioner, 213 F.3d 1187(9th Cir.2000), on the grounds
that Oregon attorney's fee lien law was significantly different than that of California and Alaska, which
were relevant in those cases.
0 In his opinion, Judge Thomas described the Fifth Circuit as having
"reached a similar conclusion about the operation of Texas law" in Srivastava v. Commissioner, 220 F.3d
353 (5th Cir.2000), and the Eleventh Circuit as "extending Cotnam's Alabama-law- based holding into the
law of the entire Eleventh Circuit" in Foster v. United States, 249 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir.2001),
notwithstanding that in Srivastava the Fifth Circuit actually reached its conclusion wholly apart form the
niceties of Texas attorney's lien law and in Foster the Eleventh Circuit was dealing with a case that arose in
Alabama, for which there was no doubt that Cotnam was the controlling precedent. [The Eleventh Circuit
has not yet decided an attorney's fees AMT trap case arising in Florida or Georgia.]
2. A nondeductible estate administration expense. Schwan v. United States,
2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,362, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-1658 (D. S.D. 3/16/03). Interest, required by a state
statute, on a specific legacy payable from an estate to the legatee when the legacy is not paid within a
statutorily specified period, is not deductible under either § 163 or § 212.
D. Hobby Losses and § 280A Home Office and Vacation Homes
E. Deductions and Credits for Personal Expenses
1. Another court imposes second-class citizen status on a trust's § 212
deductions for investment advisory fees. The Fourth Circuit follows the Federal Circuit's Mellon
case, but not the Sixth Circuit's O'Neill Trust case, in deciding that a trust's investment advisor
fees are subject to the § 67(a) two-percent floor for miscellaneous itemized deductions. Scott v.
United States, 328 F.3d 132, 2003-1 U.S.T.C 50,428, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-2100 (4th Cir. 5/1/03), aff'g
186 F. Supp. 2d 664, 2002-1 U.S. T.C. 50,364, 89 A.F.T.R.2d 1314 (E.D. Va. 2/28/02). The court used
dictionary definitions to affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the government, and
rejected the taxpayers' contention that the fees were fully deductible under § 67(e) (which allows full
deduction if the fees "would not have been incurred if the property were not held in trust"). The court
concluded that the requirement of the second clause of § 67(e)(1), excepting from the floor costs that
would not have been incurred if the property were not held by a trust or estate did not apply because
"investment-advice fees are commonly incurred outside the context of trust administration." That "'the
investment advisory fees were necessary to the continued growth of the Trust and were caused by the
fiduciary duties of the co-trustees"' was irrelevant. "[T]he second requirement of § 67(e)(1) does not ask
whether costs are commonly incurred in the administration of trusts. Instead, it asks whether costs are
commonly incurred outside the administration of trusts." The Fourth Circuit followed Mellon Bank, N.A.
v. United States, 265 F.3d 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2001), and declined to follow William J O'Neill Revocable
Trust v. Commissioner, 994 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1993), rev'g 98 T.C. 227 (1992). Judge King noted that
"investment advice fees are commonly incurred outside the administration of trusts."
* The Fourth Circuit did not reach the Virginia state law issue on
which the District Court decided the case.
2. Boltinghouse v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-134 (5/13/03). A declaration
that the custodial spouse will not claim the child as a dependent is valid pursuant to § 152(e)(2) even
though it was executed prior to the divorce decree and was not incorporated into the divorce decree.
3. Grandma's big teeth may not be whitened with tax-deductible dollars, but
the costs of breast reconstruction surgery and vision correction surgery are deductible. Rev. Rul.
2003-57, 2003-22 I.R.B. 959 (5/16/03). Costs for breast reconstruction surgery following a mastectomy
for cancer and for vision correction surgery are deductible medical care expenses under § 213. Costs to
whiten teeth discolored as a result of age are not medical care expenses under § 213(d) and are not
deductible.
4. Sometimes you need a prescription, sometime you don't. Rev. Rul. 2003-58,
2003-22 I.R.B. 959 (6/2/03). Amounts paid by an individual for medicines that may be purchased without
a prescription of a physician, e.g., aspirin, are not deductible under § 213 of the Code, even when the
taxpayer's physician instructs the taxpayer to take the medication to alleviate a medical problem.
Amounts paid by an individual for equipment, supplies [e.g., crutches for a taxpayer with a broken leg] or
diagnostic devices [e.g., a blood sugar monitoring kit for a taxpayer with diabetes] that may be purchased
without a physician's prescription may be deductible under § 213.
5. Marriage penalty relief for the standard deduction amount. The combined
effect of the 2001 Act and the 2003 Act has been to double of the basic standard deduction amount for
married taxpayers filing a joint return to twice the basic standard deduction amount for single individuals
on a temporary basis for 2003 and 2004.
* For 2005 the basic standard deduction amount married taxpayers
filing a joint return is 174 percent of the basic standard deduction for single individuals, increasing in steps
over the following four years, with the result that in 2009 and thereafter the amount of the basic standard
deduction for married taxpayers filing a joint return again will be twice the basic standard deduction for
single individuals. However, these changes sunset on 12/31/10.
6. Acceleration of increase in the § 24 child credit. In the 2001 Act, the amount
of the § 24 child credit was increased to $600 for taxable years 2001 and 2002. The 2003 Act increases
the amount to $1,000 for 2003 and 2004.
0 In 2005, the credit is reduced to $700, but then increases to in
steps to $1,000 for 2010. See § 24 (a)(2). However, these changes sunset on 12/31/10. Thus, absent further
congressional action the amount of the credit reverts to $500 in 2011.
7. Advance refund of the increased amount of 2003 child credit. The 2003 Act
adds new § 6429, which provides an advance cash refund of $400 per child who was allowed a § 24
credit for the 2002 year and who has not attained the age 17 (as of 12/31/03). The cash refund is to be
made before 10/1/03. The amount of the cash refund will reduce the 2003 child credit, but not below
zero.
* This provision may be expanded to include more children of
lower-income (non)taxpayers.
8. "Happy birthday to you, happy birthday to you. ... How old are you now?"
Rev. Rul. 2003-72, 2003-33 I.R.B. 346 (8/18/03). A child attains an age on his or her birthday for
purposes of §§ 21 (child and dependent care credit), 23 (adoption credit), 24 (child tax credit), 32 (earned
income credit), 129 (excludable dependent care benefits), 131 (excludable foster care benefits), 137
(excludable adoption assistance benefits), and 151 (dependency exemptions).
F. Education: Helping Pay College Tuition (or is it helping colleges increase tuition?)
1. Is there any HOPE that the educational credit rules ever will be
understandable to anyone in the income range eligible to use them - like the earned income tax
credit rules? T.D. 9034, Education Tax Credit, 67 F.R. 78687 (12/26/02). The Treasury Department has
promulgated final regulations regarding the Hope Scholarship Credit and the Lifetime Learning Credit
under § 25A.
2. Notice 2003-53, 2003-33 I.R.B. (7/31/03). Provides guidance for reporting
requirements and transitional rules applicable to Coverdell Education Savings Accounts ("CESAs")
under § 530.
VI. CORPORATIONS
A. Entity and Formation
1. Relief for late initial classification elections. Rev. Proc. 2002-59, 2002-39
I.R.B. 615 (9/30/02), modifying and superseding Rev. Proc. 2002-15, 2002-6 I.R.B. 490 (2/11/02). This
notice provides guidance for seeking relief from a late filed initial classification election under the §
7701 check-the-box regulations by a newly formed entity. Relief is available only if Form 8832 was not
filed, the due date for the return for the desired classification has not passed, and the entity shows
reasonable cause.
2. The "emerging equitable interpretation of § 357(c)" argument wasn't a
winner. Seggerman Farms v. Commissioner, 308 F.3d 803, 90 A.F.T.R.2d 2002-6981, 2002-2 U.S.T.C.
50,728 (7th Cir. 10/24/02), aff'g T.C. Memo. 2001-99 (4/25/01). Shareholders who transferred a family
farm to a corporation in a § 351 transaction were required under § 357(c) to recognize gain on the
transfer to the extent the liabilities to which the transferred property was subject exceeded the adjusted
basis of the property. The shareholders argued that because they had personally guaranteed the debt, they
were not relieved of their obligations on the transferred property, and, thus, no gain should be recognized
on the transfer. The court (Judge Bauer) held that § 357(c) requires gain recognition even if the transferor
remains liable as a guarantor. Judge Bauer rejected the taxpayers' argument that under "'the emerging
equitable interpretation of § 357(c)"' their guarantees should be treated in the same manner as the
shareholders' promissory notes to the corporations in Lessinger v. Commissioner, 872 F.2d 519 (2d Cir.
1989) and Peracchi v. Commissioner, 143 F.3d 487 (9th Cir. 1998), because the a guarantee, standing
alone, does not constitute an "economic outlay."
* Although the case arose prior to the 1999 amendments to § 357(c)
and (d), the Tax Court noted in its opinion that the result would not be different under the current statute.
3. Back to back § 351 transfers are OK. Rev. Rul. 2003-51, 2003-21 I.R.B. 938
(5/5/03). W Corporation and X Corporation (unrelated to W) both engaged in the same line of business.
W's business was worth $40x; X's business, conducted through its subsidiary, Y Corporation, was worth
$30x. Pursuant to a prearranged binding agreement W and X consolidated their business operations in a
new corporation with a holding company structure. W formed Z Corporation by transferring the business
assets to Z in exchange for all of Z's stock. W immediately contributed the Z stock to Y in exchange for
Y stock of Y and X simultaneously contributed $30x to Y (to meet the capital needs of the business) in
exchange for additional stock of Y. W and X owned 40 percent and 60 percent, respectively, of the Y
stock. Y, in turn, transferred all of its assets to Z. Viewed separately, each of the first transfer, the
combined second and third transfers, and fourth transfer qualifies as a transfer described in § 351. The
IRS ruled that the second transfer - W's transfer of its Z stock to Y - did not cause the first transfer -
W's transfer of assets to Z - to fail the control requirement of § 351, event though both transfers were
undertaken pursuant to a prearranged binding agreement. Citing Rev. Rul. 84-111, 1984-2 C.B. 88
(Situation 1), the IRS concluded that treating a transfer of property that is followed by a nontaxable
disposition of the stock received as a § 351 transaction is "not necessarily inconsistent with the purposes
of § 351." The IRS distinguished Rev. Rul. 70-140, 1970-1 C.B. 73, in which a transfer of assets of a
proprietorship to a controlled corporation, followed by an exchange of the subsidiary's stock for stock of
an unrelated, widely held corporation was treated as a direct transfer of assets to the other corporation in
a taxable transaction. In Rev. Rul. 70-140 no alternative form of transaction could have qualified for
nonrecognition. In the instant case, however, W's transfer of the business assets to Z was not necessary
for W and X to combine their businesses in a holding company structure that would have qualified under§ 351. If in exchange for Y stock, W had transferred the assets to Y and X had transferred $3 Ox to Y, and
Y had transferred the business to Z in exchange for all of the Z stock, the transfers would have would
have qualified under § 351. [See Rev. Rul. 83-34; Rev. Rul. 77-449.]
4. An ANPRM announcing that the Treasury intends to amend the Code via
regulations - and this time it might actually have the statutory authority to do so. REG-100818-01,
Liabilities Assumed in Certain Transactions, 68 F.R. 23931 (5/6/03). The IRS and Treasury are
concerned that §§ 357(d) and 362(d) [providing rules for determining the amount of liability treated as
assumed for purposes of §§ 357, 358(d), 358(h), 362(d), 368(a)(1)(C), and 368(a)(2)(B)], enacted as part
of the Miscellaneous Trade and Technical Corrections Act of 1999, Public Law 106-36, do not always
produce appropriate results and that it might be desirable to modify certain rules by regulation, as
permitted by § 357(d)(3). This notice explains the issues and the rules the IRS and Treasury are
considering proposing. The major proposals are as follows:
* (1) Modify § 357(d)(1)(B) to provide that if the transferor and the
transferee have no agreement regarding the satisfaction of a nonrecourse liability, the transferee will not be
treated as assuming the entire amount of the nonrecourse liability; if one or more of the assets that secure a
nonrecourse liability are transferred to a transferee, the transferee would be treated as assuming a pro rata
amount of the nonrecourse liability, based on relative fair market values of the transferred assets securing
the liability and the fair market value of all of the assets securing the liability that are retained by the
transferor.
* (2) Treating a transferee's express assumption of a nonrecourse
debt of the transferor as a debt assumption even if no assets secured by the debt have been transferred if the
transferee is expected to satisfy the nonrecourse liability.
* (3) Modifying § 357(d)(2) to reduce the amount of the
nonrecourse liability a transferee is treated as assuming to reflect the amount another person has agreed, and
is expected, to satisfy, even if such amount is in excess of the fair market value of the assets subject to such
liability that the other person owns after the transfer.
* (4) Applying standards similar to those used to determine whether
a transferee has assumed a recourse liability to determine whether a transferee has assumed a nonrecourse
liability, if the transferee agrees to satisfy all or a portion of the liability. In such a case should the amount of
liability assumed by a subsequent transferee be determined with reference to the rules pertaining to
assumptions of nonrecourse liabilities or with reference to the rules pertaining to assumptions of recourse
liabilities.
* (5) Whether to respect an agreement that the transferee will satisfy
only a portion of a nonrecourse debt secured by transferred property with a value greater than the agree
upon portion where the transferor does not agree to indemnify the transferee against a loss in excess of the
agreed upon debt assumption.
0 (6) Providing that if a transferee has agreed to satisfy an amount of
a liability that is greater than the amount that it is expected to satisfy, the transferee will be treated as having
agreed to satisfy only the amount of the liability that it is expected to satisfy [only if the transferor, the
transferee, and each person related to the transferor and transferee within the meaning of §§ 267(b) and
707(b) treat the transferee as having agreed to satisfy the amount of the liability that it is expected to
satisfy].
* (7) A debt assumed by a transferee will no longer be treated as a
debt of the transferor for any purposes, including a subsequent application of § 357(d).
* (8) Extending the rules of § 357 to §§ 304 and 336.
B. Distributions and Redemptions
1. Basis can live long after the stock is "redeemed." Who'd a thunk it? REG-
150313-01, Redemptions Taxable as Dividends, 67 F.R. 64331 (10/18/02). The IRS has proposed
replacing the "proper adjustment" to the basis of remaining stock rule of Reg. § 1.302-2(c), which takes
into account the unused basis of redeemed stock when the redemption is treated as a § 301 distribution.
Prop. Reg. § 1.302-5 would provide that the redeemed shareholder [who is taxed under § 301] would
retain the basis of the redeemed stock as a basis item separate from any remaining shares, whether or not
the shareholder continues to actually own the stock of the redeeming corporation, and take it into account
as a loss deduction at some future date. The loss subsequently can be claimed under either the "final
inclusion date" rule or the "accelerated loss inclusion date" rule. The "final inclusion date" rule allows
the loss deduction on the date on which the redeemed shareholder would have qualified under §
302(b)(1), (2) or (3) if the facts on that date had been the facts immediately after the redemption, or
alternatively, when an individual shareholder dies or a corporate shareholder is liquidated in a transaction
to which § 331 applies. The "accelerated loss inclusion date" rule allows the redeemed shareholder to
claim a loss attributable to the unutilized basis when the shareholder subsequently recognizes a gain on
stock of the redeeming corporation, but the loss may be claimed only to the extent of the gain recognized.
Because the loss attributable to the basis of the redeemed stock is treated as recognized on the
redemption date, the attributes (e.g., character and source) of the loss are fixed on the redemption date,
even if such loss is not taken into account until after the redemption date. These rules apply to §
304(a)(1) transactions taxed under § 301 by treating the unutilized basis in the redeemed corporation
stock as basis in the stock of the acquiring corporation. Special rules apply to partnerships, in
consolidated returns [Prop. Reg. § 1.1502-19(b)(5)], and to foreign corporations. These rules do not
apply to redemptions of § 306 stock, but they do generally apply even in the case of a corporation wholly
owned by a single shareholder, whether a corporation or an individual.
* These regulations are a reaction, in part, to basis shifting
transactions, such as that described in Notice 2001-45, 2001-33 I.R.B. 129 [the so-called Bank of America
transaction].
* It has been noted that if nuclear disaster ever overcomes the Earth,
only the cockroach and basis would survive.
2. The Tax Court is bearish on Merrill Lynch. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 120 T.C. 12 (1/15/03). In 1986 and 1987 Merrill Lynch structured several transactions to
sell certain assets of first-tier and second-tier subsidiaries and not only eliminate any tax on the gains, but
to create losses. To take advantage of the interaction of the consolidate return regulations and § 304
[before the promulgation of Reg. § 1.1502-80(b), rendering § 304 inoperative in consolidated returns],
Merrill Lynch caused the subsidiaries holding the assets to drop the assets to be retained into new lower
level subsidiaries [in § 351 transactions], following which the new subsidiaries were sold cross chain to
other Merrill Lynch subsidiaries. The sales proceeds were then distributed to its parent by the subsidiary
to be sold, and that subsidiary was then sold. The plan was that the cross chain sale would be
recharacterized as a dividend under § 304, which would result in a basis increase under Reg. §§ 1.1502-
32 and -33 [as then in effect] in the stock of the subsidiaries to be sold. The IRS did not contest that §
304 applied, but responded that the "distributions" coupled with the sales of the subsidiaries outside the
group were part of a firm and fixed plan by the subsidiaries that were sold outside the group to dispose of
the stock of the lower tier subsidiaries that had been sold cross chain. Therefore, even after applying §
304 the distributions were treated as amounts received in a redemption under §302(b)(3) [applying Zenz
v. Quinlivan, 213 F.2d 913 (6th Cir. 1954)]. The Tax Court (Judge Marvel) held that under the principles
of Niedermeyer v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 280 (1974), a firm and fixed plan existed with respect to every
such sale and held for the IRS.
The record establishes that on the dates of the cross-chain sales, petitioner had agreed
upon, and had begun to implement, a firm and fixed plan to completely terminate the
target corporations' ownership interests in the issuing corporations (the subsidiaries
whose stock was sold cross-chain). The plan was carefully structured to achieve very
favorable tax basis adjustments resulting from the interplay of section 304 and the
consolidated return regulations, and the steps of the plan were described in detail in
written summaries prepared for meetings of Merrill Parent's board of directors. As
described in those written summaries, the cross-chain sales of the issuing corporations'
stock and the sales of the target corporations were part of the same seamless web of
corporate activity intended by petitioner to culminate in the sale of the target
corporations outside the consolidated group.
3. Nothing succeeds like the sweet smell of success. Delta Plastics, Inc. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-54 (2/28/03). Shareholder loans to a start-up corporation were
respected as such, and an interest deduction allowed, even thought the corporation's debt-equity ratio
was 26:1. The corporation was capitalized with $183,500. It incurred $2,322,838 of secured startup loans
- $2,169,013 from three unrelated creditors and $153,825 from a 47 percent shareholder. The corporation
borrowed another $1,337,500 from a group of individuals consisting of six of its seven shareholders and
the father of the one shareholder who did not make a loan to the corporation. The shareholder loans were
roughly proportional to stock holdings, but they had all of the formal indicia of debt. They were
evidenced by debenture notes, bore reasonable interest, and had a 10-year repayment schedule. Payments
were not dependent upon profits or losses. Although the notes were unsecured and subordinated to
secured creditors, and the debenture holders could enforce payment on the debenture notes only if the
holders of more than 50 percent of the value of all the outstanding debenture notes joined in a proceeding
to enforce payment, the corporation made all scheduled payments due. In just over 3 years, as a result of
successful operations, the taxpayer's debt-equity ratio (treating the notes as debt and not as equity) was
reduced from approximately 26:1 to approximately 4:1. However, the corporation paid no dividends.
After examining those debt-equity analysis factors that it found relevant, the court concluded, "credible
trial testimony was offered that a debtor-creditor relationship was intended between petitioner and the
debenture holders with regard to the debenture funds."
4. Which dividends are taxed at capital gains rates? See V.A.1.a., above.
C. Liquidations
D. S Corporations
1. Excusing late elections is now simpler. Rev. Proc. 2003-43, 2003-23 I.R.B. 998
(5/9/03). Provides a simplified method for taxpayers to request relief for late S corporation elections,
ESBT elections, QSST elections and Qsub elections. Generally, relief is provided if the request for relief
is filed within 24 months of the due date of the election.
2. When your S corporation goes into bankruptcy, watch out! Mourad v.
Commissioner, 121 T.C. No. 1 (7/2/03). The filing of a bankruptcy petition by taxpayer's wholly-owned
S corporation for a chapter 11 plan of reorganization (in which an independent trustee was appointed by
the Bankruptcy Court) neither terminates an S election nor creates a separate taxable entity. Judge Ruwe
held that the taxpayer is liable for the tax on the sale by the S corporation of its principal assets.
0 Query: How could taxpayer have planned this better?
3. Stacking qualified subpart E or testamentary trust status and a QSST or
ESBT election. T.D. 9078, Qualified Subchapter S Trust Election for Testamentary Trusts, 68 F.R.
42251 (7/17/03). Amendments to Reg. § 1.1361-1 relating to the two-year period for which former
qualified subpart E trusts and testamentary trusts continue as qualified shareholders of S corporations and
QSST elections for testamentary trusts at the termination of that period. The final regulations provide
that a testamentary trust includes a trust that receives S corporation stock from a § 645 electing trust. The
regulations also clarify that an ESBT electiofi may be made for a former qualified subpart E trust or a
testamentary trust that qualifies as an ESBT. Subject to certain exceptions, the regulations are effective
7/18/03.
4. T.D. 9081; REG-129709-03, ESOP Qualifications, 58 F.R. 42970 (7/21/03).
Temporary and proposed regulations under § 409(p) concerning requirements for ESOPs holding stock of
S corporations, which prohibits allocations or accruals to the ESOP for any year that "meaningful
benefits" are not provided to rank-and-file employees. The temporary and proposed regulations provide
rules defining terms, such as "synthetic equity" and "disqualified persons."
E. Affiliated Corporations.
1. Suspended loss rules to be promulgated. Notice 2002-18, 2002-12 I.R.B. 644
(3/9/02). The Service announced that it and the Treasury
intend to issue regulations that will prevent a consolidated group from obtaining a tax
benefit from both the utilization of a loss from the disposition of stock (or another asset
that reflects the basis of stock) and the utilization of a loss or deduction with respect to
another asset that reflects the same economic loss. For example, where a member of a
group contributes built-in loss assets to another member of the group in exchange for
stock of such member in a transaction in which the basis of such stock is determined,
directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by reference to the basis of such assets and the
transferor member sells such stock without causing the deconsolidation of the transferee,
the group may benefit from the built-in loss in the contributed assets more than once. It is
expected that the regulations will defer or otherwise limit utilization of the loss on the
stock in such transactions and other transactions that facilitate the group's utilization of a
single loss more than once.
a. The proposed suspended loss regulations are here. REG-131478-02,
Guidance Under Section 1502; Suspension of Losses on Certain Stock Dispositions, 67 F.R. 65060
(10/23/02). Temp. Reg. §1.337(d)-2T (3/7/02), which generally allows a loss on the disposition of
subsidiary member stock only to the extent that a taxpayer can establish that the stock loss is not
attributable to the recognition of built-in gain, does not disallow stock loss that reflects loss
carryforwards, deferred deductions, or built-in asset losses of the subsidiary member.
b. Final regulations on suspended losses. T.D. 9048, Guidance Under
Section 1502; Suspension of Losses on Certain Stock Dispositions, 68 F.R. 12287 (3/14/03); Reg-
131478-02, 68 F.R. 12324 (3/14/03).7 The Treasury Department has promulgated Temp. § 1.1502-35T,
amended various provisions, and published identical proposed regulations that: (1) require a consolidated
group to redetermine the basis in subsidiary stock it owns immediately before certain transactions
involving the subsidiary; and (2) suspend certain losses that the group recognizes on the disposition of
subsidiary stock. These regulations implement Notice 2002-18, 2002-12 I.R.B. 644.
* Basis Redetermination: If a group member transfers subsidiary
stock with a basis exceeding its value ("loss shares") but the subsidiary remains a member of the group, the
basis of the subsidiary's stock held by members of the group immediately before the transfer must be
redetermined as follows: (1) all members of the group aggregate their bases in all shares of the subsidiary;
and (2) that basis is allocated, (a) first to the shares of the subsidiary's preferred stock owned by the
members of the group in proportion to, but not in excess of, their value on the date of the transfer, then (b)
second, among all common shares of the subsidiary held by members of the group in proportion to their
value on the date of the transfer.
* If a group member owns loss shares in a subsidiary before the
subsidiary deconsolidates the basis of the subsidiary's stock held by members of the group immediately
before the deconsolidation must be redetermined as follows: (1) the group's basis in subsidiary loss shares is
reduced by the "reallocable basis amount;" and (2) the "reallocable basis amount" is allocated (a) to increase
the basis of all preferred shares of the subsidiary held by members of the group after the transfer to increase
the basis of each share to its value immediately before the transfer, and then (b) to increase the group's basis
in common shares in the subsidiary so that to the extent possible each share has the same ratio of basis to
value The "reallocable basis amount" is the lesser of (1) the aggregate loss in the group's subsidiary loss
shares immediately before the deconsolidation, or (2) the subsidiary's items of deduction and loss that the
group took into account in computing its basis adjustments for any subsidiary shares that were not loss
shares. The basis redetermination rule does not apply if, among other things, the group disposes of all of its
subsidiary stock to nonmembers in a single taxable year in one or more fully taxable transactions, or is
7 We are indebted to Prof. Don Leatherman, University of Tennessee College of Law for assistance with this
description. Any errors that remain are our own.
allowed a worthless stock deduction with respect to all of its subsidiary stock (other than any transferred
stock).
* Suspended Losses: If, after applying the basis redetermination
rule, a member of the consolidated group recognizes a loss on the disposition of stock of a subsidiary that
remains a member of the group, the loss is suspended to the extent of the "duplicated loss" with respect to
that stock. The aggregate amount of duplicated loss for a subsidiary is the excess of (1) the sum of (a) the
aggregate basis of the subsidiary's assets (excluding stock in other subsidiaries), (b) the subsidiary's losses
that are carried to its first taxable year after the disposition, and (c) the subsidiary's deductions that have
been recognized but deferred under another provision, over (2) the sum of (a) the value of stock of the
subsidiary and (b) the subsidiary's liabilities that have been taken into account for tax purposes. The group
must allocate that aggregate amount among all subsidiary shares, including the transferred shares. The
suspended loss is limited to the duplicated loss for the transferred shares. The suspended loss is thereafter
reduced, i.e., disallowed, as the subsidiary's deductions and losses are taken into account (i.e., absorbed) in
determining the group's consolidated taxable income (or loss). But the loss reduction loss is limited to the
excess of (1) the amount of the subsidiary's losses and deductions, over (2) the amount of those items the
group takes into account in basis adjustments under the investment adjustment rules. An item of income or
deduction is not taken into account to the extent the group can establish that the item was not reflected in the
computation of the subsidiary's duplicated loss. Any suspended stock loss remaining at the time the
subsidiary leaves the group is allowed (to the extent otherwise allowable). The regulations also provide that
the loss suspension rule will not to be applied in a manner that permanently disallows an otherwise
allowable deduction for an economic loss.
* Worthlessness, Etc.: If a member treats subsidiary stock as
worthless under § 165(g) and § 1.1502-80(c) or if a member disposes of subsidiary member stock and on the
following day the subsidiary is not a member of the group and does not have a separate return year, e.g., a
liquidation or worthless stock deduction, the unabsorbed losses of the subsidiary are treated as expired at the
beginning of the group's next consolidated return year. However, the deemed expiration does not result in a
negative basis adjustment to any member's stock under Reg. § 1.1502-32,
* All of the rules are subject to various exceptions and tiering rules.
The regulations are generally effective after March 7, 2002, but only if the return is due after March 14,
2003.
2. So just when will this suspended loss be allowed? Textron, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 115 T.C. 104 (8/7/00). In 1967, when AVCO acquired Paul Revere (PR) and PR became
part of the AVCO group, PR owned 4 million shares of AVCO. In 1977, AVCO redeemed its shares
owned by PR, and pursuant to former Reg. §1.1502-14(b)(1), PR did not recognize its loss, but pursuant
to former Reg. 1.1502-31(b)(2)(ii) PR's basis in the stock was reallocated to the note. In 1987, after
AVCO had been acquired by Textron, AVCO redeemed the note held by PR, on which PR realized a
$15,000,000 loss, following which PR was liquidated into AVCO in a §332 liquidation. Judge Laro
agreed with the Commissioner that former Reg. §1.1504-14(d)(4)(i) "deferred" PR's loss in 1987
[because the note was received in exchange for property, i.e., AVCO stock, in an exchanged basis
transaction and the note was never held by a nonmember]. Judge Laro held that the determination of
whether a note has been held by a nonmember under former Reg. § 1.1 502-14(d)(4)(i)(c) looks to whether
the holder of the note is a nonmember at the time of the redemption, not to whether the holder of a note
was a nonmember when the note was received when the holder becomes a member before the
redemption. Finally, under former Reg. §1.1502-14(d)(4)(ii) and (e)(2), the liquidation of PR in a §332
liquidation did free up the suspended loss because AVCO inherited PR's tax characteristics.
* The analytical methodology of the Textron opinion is at odds with
Tax Court Judge Wells's opinions in CSI Hydrostatic Testers v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 398 (1994) and
Intermet Corp. v. Commissioner, Il1 T.C. 294 (12/8/98), rev'd, 209 F.3d 901(6th Cir. 4/20/00). Those
cases strictly construed the consolidated return regulations even though the results were difficult to support
theoretically. In contrast, in Textron, Judge Laro interpreted Reg. § 1.1502-14(d)(4)(i) in a manner that is
difficult to justify under the literal language, but which reached a sensible theoretical result [under the
single-entity theory of consolidated returns. He concluded that Reg. §1.1502-14(d)(4)(i) required PR to
defer its loss on the redemption of the obligation it received for its AVCO stock even though one of the
conditions for that section to apply is that the obligation "never have been held by a nonmember." Since PR
8 We are indebted to Prof. Don Leatherman, University of Tennessee College of Law, for insightful suggestions
regarding the analysis of the Textron case.
acquired the obligation before it became a member of the Textron group that redeemed the obligation, Judge
Laro's conclusion that membership status was determined at the time that the obligation was redeemed
effectively read out of the rule the word. He could have more effectively reached the same result by looking
to former Reg. §1.1502-13(f)(2) to note that the AVCO group was a predecessor group to the Textron, so
that Paul Revere should not have been considered ever to have been a nonmember.
0 Note that if the redemption by AVCO of its stock held by PR had
occurred after July 12, 1995, the loss would have been permanently disallowed under Reg. §1.1502-
13(f)(6), which disallows any loss to a member on the sale or exchange of stock of the common parent
corporation of a consolidated group. Under current regulations, if AVCO and PR both had been subsidiary
members of the same consolidated group and the redemption was described in §302(a) - which would be
unlikely - Reg. § 1.1502-20(a) would disallow the loss, although a portion of it might be allowed under Reg.
§1.1502-20(c). Section 267(0 would not defer the loss because Reg. §1.267(f)-1(c)(1) adopts the
acceleration rule of Reg. § 1.1502-13(d). The loss might, however, be subject to the anti-avoidance rules of
both Reg. §1.267(0- 1(h) and §1.1502-13(h).
a. Exactly when the taxpayer wanted to, says the court of appeals.
"Plain meaning" carries the day. Reversed. Textron v. United States, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5373 (1st
Cir. 7/16/03). The Court of Appeals (Judge Porfilio) applied Gitliz style "plain meaning" analysis to
interpreting the regulations and allowed the loss deduction. Since former Reg. § 1.1504-14(d)(4)(i)(c)
required that the note never have been held by a nonmenber, and PR was a nonmember when it acquired
the note, the condition in the regulation for deferring the loss had not been satisfied.
3. Deferred intercompany transaction timing rules are a method of
accounting. REG-125161-01, Conforming Amendments to Section 446, 66 F.R. 56262 (11/7/01). These
proposed regulations would conform Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(2)(iii) to Reg. § 1.1502-13(a)(3), promulgated in
1995, which provided that the deferred intercompany transaction rules are a method of accounting.
Members of the consolidated group are required to apply this method in addition to their usual methods
of accounting.
* In General Motors Corp. v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 270 (1999),
the Tax Court held that the timing rule of former [pre-1995] Reg. § 1.1502-13(b)(2) was not a method of
accounting for purposes of § 446(e). The proposed regulations confirm the IRS's position that the timing
rules of current § 1.1502-13 are a method of accounting.
a. Finalized. T.D. 9025, Intercompany Transactions: Conforming
Amendments to Section 446, 67 F.R. 76985 (12/16/02). The proposed regulations were adopted without
change, and are effective 11/7/01.
4. T.D. 9084, Consolidated Return Computation, 68 F.R. 44616 ( 7/30/03). Final
regulations providing that certain events will not trigger recapture of a dual consolidated loss or payment
of the associated interest charge.
F. Reorganizations
1. "Expessio unis est exclusio alterius"? Nope, not the way the IRS thinks.
Rev. Rul. 2002-85, 2002-52 I.R.B. 986 (12/8/02). An acquiring corporation's transfer of the target
corporation's assets to a subsidiary controlled by the acquiring corporation as part of a plan of
reorganization will not disqualify a transaction that otherwise qualifies as a § 368(a)(1)(D) reorganization
- i.e., the original transferee acquires substantially all of the target's assets, the COSI and COBE
requirements are met, and the remote continuity principle of Groman and Bashford does not apply - and
which would not have qualified as a type (C) reorganization [due to excessive boot]. The IRS reasoned,
as it did in Rev. Rul. 2001-24, 2001-1 C.B. 1290, that § 368(a)(2)(C) is permissive and not restrictive;
thus the lack of a reference to § 368(a)(1)(D) in § 368(a)(2)(C) does not indicate that such a transfer
following a transaction that otherwise qualifies as a reorganization under § 368(a)(1)(D) will prevent the
transaction from qualifying. In addition, the IRS treated the parenthetical exception in § 368(a)(2)(A),
dealing with the overlap of (C) and (D) reorganizations - "other than for purposes of [§ 368(a)(2)(C)]," -
as "in the same spirit as § 368(a)(2)(C), i.e., to resolve doubts about the qualification of transactions as
reorganizations, and *** not [to] indicate that the transfer of assets to a controlled subsidiary necessarily
prevents a transaction from qualifying as a reorganization under § 368(a)(1)(D)."
2. Merging tax somethings into tax nothings is OK, but not the opposite! T.D.
9038, Statutory Mergers and Consolidations, 68 F.R. 3384 (1/24/03), and REG-126485-01, Statutory
Mergers and Consolidations, 68 F.R. 3477 (1/24/03). In REG-126485-01, Statutory Mergers and
Consolidations, 66 F.R. 57400 (11/15/01), the Treasury withdrew the proposed regulations [REG-
106186-98, Certain Corporate Reorganizations Involving Disregarded Entities, 65 FR 31115 (5/16/00)]
that would have provided that neither the merger of a disregarded entity into a corporation nor the merger
of a target corporation into a disregarded entity was a statutory merger qualifying as a reorganization
under § 368(a)(1)(A), and proposed more liberal regulations [Prop. Reg. § 1.368-2(b)(1)]. Under the
2001 proposed regulations, a merger of a corporation into a disregarded entity that is wholly owned by
another corporation could qualify as a type (A) merger. The Treasury Department has now promulgated
the 2001 proposed regulations, with some modifications, as Temp. Reg. _§ 1.368-2T(b) and
simultaneously published new identical proposed regulations.
* The main point of the regulations is that the merger of a target
corporation into an LLC wholly owned by another corporation (thereby rendering the LLC a disregarded
entity) can qualify as a type (A) reorganization [and under more complex structures as a triangular
reorganization; that the merger of a corporation into a Q-Sub [also a disregarded entity] can qualify as a type
(A) reorganization; and that a merger into a qualified REIT subsidiary can qualify as a type (A)
reorganization.
* Nevertheless, the new regulations introduce significant
definitional jargon. The term "disregarded entity" means a business entity (as defined in Reg. § 301.7701-
2(a)) that is disregarded as an entity separate from its owner for federal tax purposes, including single
member corporate-owned LLCs, qualified REIT subsidiaries, and Q-Subs. "Combining entity" means a
corporation [as defined in Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)] that is not a disregarded entity. "Combining unit" means a
combining entity and all disregarded entities, if any, the assets of which are treated as owned by such
combining entity for federal tax purposes. Under the proposed regulations, a statutory merger or
consolidation under § 368(a)(1)(A) must be effected pursuant to the laws of the United States, a state or the
District of Columbia. [Foreign statutory mergers still do not qualify, but the domestic statute no longer
needs to be a "corporate" law.] All of the following events must occur simultaneously: (1) all of the assets
(other than those distributed in the transaction) and liabilities (except to the extent satisfied or discharged in
the transaction) of each member of one or more combining units (each a transferor unit) become the assets
and liabilities of one or more members of one other combining unit (the transferee unit); and (2) the
combining entity of each transferor unit ceases its separate legal existence [although its formal existence can
continue under state law for certain limited purposes that are not inconsistent with the "all of the assets"
requirement.]. The examples provide all of the details of the rules: Divisive mergers [see Rev. Rul. 2000-5,
2000-1 C.B. 436] cannot qualify (Ex. 1); forward triangular mergers (into a disregarded entity owned by a
subsidiary) are allowed (Ex. 2 & 4); the merger of a target S corporation that owns a Q-Sub into a
disregarded entity owned by a C corporation qualifies as to both the target S corporation and its Q-sub (Ex.
3); the owner of the disregarded entity must be a corporation (Ex. 5); mergers of disregarded entities into
corporations do not qualify (Ex. 6); none of the consideration received by the target shareholders may be
interests in the disregarded entity (Ex. 7); and the target can be tailored by selling assets and distributing
proceeds, as long as all of the remaining assets are transferred to the disregarded entity in the merger (Ex.
8).
* These regulations became effective on January 24, 2003.
3. CALIGULA XXI had COBE. Payne v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-90(3/27/03). The transfer from one corporation to another corporation wholly owned by the same
shareholder of the substantially all assets associated with operation of a Houston strip club [CALIGULA
XXI] in a transaction that met all of the statutory requirements of § 368(a)(1)(D) was a tax-free
reorganization, even though at the time of the transfer the shareholder contemplated selling strip club and
three months later the transferee corporation did sell all of its assets. Judge Halpern held that the
continuity of business enterprise requirement of Reg. § 1.368-1(d) was met:
[T]here is no direct evidence that JKP's actual sale of its assets was part of an overall
plan existing at the time of the transfer of the club's operation from 2618 to JKP; and we
do not infer the existence of such a plan by reason of the proximity in time of the two
transactions. The mere fact that petitioner may have contemplated selling the club at the
time of its transfer from 2618 to JKP does not require a finding that such transfer lacked
COBE....
[In Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646 (1"t Cir. 1984, the taxpayer's]
plan contemplated that the new company would carry on the * * *
business, and this was done. Although petitioners' intention was to
dispose of the * * * [business] eventually, the fact that a going business
was transferred and operated left the new company and petitioners, its
shareholders, in a position where they stood to gain or lose from
operations just as before the transfer; if business conditions warranted it,
the business could have been continued indefinitely.
We hold that the reasoning of the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Lewis v.
Commissioner, supra, applies to this case and that the transfer of the club from 2618 to
JKP possessed COBE.
4. Rev. Proc. 2003-33, 2002-16 I.R.B. 803 (4/21/03). This procedure provides
guidance to taxpayers in obtaining an extension of time under Reg. § 301.9100-3 to file § 338 elections
[Form 8023].
5. Mutual-to-Stock F reorganization followed by a second reorganization is
OK (Part I). Rev. Rul. 2003-19, 2003-7 I.R.B. 468 (1/23/03).
0 Situation I involved the conversion of a mutual insurance
company to a stock insurance company. The mutual amended its articles of incorporation to authorize the
issuance of stock and changed its name. Members of the mutual exchanged their interests for all the stock
company's voting common stock, but persons holding mutual membership interests under contracts covered
by § 403(b) or § 408(b) received policy credits in exchange for those interests. The IRS ruled that the
conversion was either a § 368(a)(1)(E) recapitalization or a § 368(a)(1)(F) reorganization.
* Situation 2 involved the conversion of a mutual insurance
company to a stock insurance company and the creation of a holding company structure. Mutual
incorporated a Mutual Holding Company, which incorporated a Stock Holding Company. Mutual amended
its articles of incorporation to authorize the issuance of stock and changed its name. Mutual's members
received Mutual Holding Company membership interests in exchange for their mutual membership
interests. Stock Company issued all of its stock directly to Mutual Holding Company; and Mutual Holding
Company transferred all of its Stock Company stock to Stock Holding Company in exchange for voting
stock of Stock Holding Company. The IRS ruled that the conversion was a reorganization under either §
368(a)(1)(E) or § 368(a)(1)(F). Furthermore, the result was not altered by the subsequent change in the
direct ownership of the converted company, citing Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(1); Rev. Rul. 96-29, 1996-1 C.B. 50;
and Rev. Rul. 77-415, 1977-2 C.B. 311. In addition, the acquisition by Stock Holding Company of Stock
Company qualified as reorganization under § 368(a)(1)(B), as well as a § 351 transfer.
* In Situation 3 Mutual Holding Company owned all of the stock of
Stock Holding Company, which owned all of the stock of Stock Company 1, a stock insurance company.
Mutual Company amended its articles to authorize the issuance of stock and changed its name to Stock
Company 2; Mutual Company's members received Mutual Holding Company interests in exchange for their
Mutual Company interests; Stock Company 2 issued all of its stock directly to Mutual Holding Company;
and Mutual Holding Company transferred all of its Stock Company 2 stock to Stock Holding Company in
exchange for voting stock of Stock Holding Company. The conversion from Mutual Company to Stock
Company 2 qualified as a reorganization under both § 368(a)(1)(E) and § 368(a)(1)(F). In addition, Mutual
Holding Company's acquisition of either an interest equivalent to the stock of Stock Company 2 or the
actual stock of Stock Company 2 qualified as a § 368(a)(1)(B) reorganization. Mutual Holding Company's
transfer of its Stock Company 2 stock to Stock Holding Company qualified as both a § 368(a)(1)(B)
reorganization and as a § 351 transfer.
6. Mutual-to-Stock F reorganization followed by a second reorganization is
OK (Part II). Rev. Rul. 2003-48, 2003-19 I.R.B. 863 (4/22/03). The revenue ruling applied the
principles developed in Rev. Rul. 2003-19, 2003-7 I.R.B. 468 (2/18/03), to the conversion of mutual
savings banks to stock banks, as well as the adoption of holding company structures. The initial
conversion and creation of a holding company qualified under § 351 and under § 368(a)(1)(E) and (F).
* But in Situation 1, which involved a reverse triangular merger of
the stock bank, into which the mutual bank had been converted, into a transitory subsidiary of the Mutual
Holding Company [to invert the parent-subsidiary relationship of the converted mutual and the Mutual
Holding Company] followed by a prearranged drop of the stock savings bank to a Stock Holding Company
[more than 50 percent, but less than 80 percent of the stock of which was owned by the Mutual Holding
Company], the merger was not a reorganization under § 368(a)(1)(B) or § 368(a)(2)(E) because mutual
holding did not control stock holding. However, because pursuant to the integrated plan the Stock Holding
Company had issued more than 20 percent but less than 50 percent of its common stock to the public in a
qualified underwriting transaction [as defined in Reg. § 1.35 1-1(a)(3)], the merger transfer was entitled to
nonrecognition under § 351.
0 In Situation 2, not more than 20 percent of the stock of Stock
Holding Company was issued to the public. In that situation, the merger qualified under both § 368(a)(1)(B)
and § 368(a)(2)(E).
7. Turning off the step transaction doctrine when the acquirer so chooses. T.D.
9071, Effect of Elections in Certain Multi-step Transactions, 68 F.R. 40766 (6/10/03). Temp. Reg. §
1.338(h)(10)-1OT(c)(2) provides that the step transaction doctrine will not be applied if a taxpayer makes
a valid § 338(h)(10) election with respect to a stock acquisition that, standing alone, is a qualified stock
purchase, even if the transaction is part of a multi-step transaction that would otherwise qualify as a
reorganization. The effective date of these temporary regulations is 7/9/03. See also, REG-143679-02, for
proposed regulations that mirror the temporary regulations.
& The principles underlying Rev. Rul. 2001-46, 2001-2 C.B. 321,
are reflected in these regulations.
G. Corporate Divisions
1. Does this ruling apply when the Geo dealer buys a Mercedes dealership?
Rev. Rul. 2003-18, 2003-7 I.R.B. 467 (1/22/03). This ruling held that the taxable acquisition of a
franchise to sell and service brand Y automobiles and the assets to operate the franchise by a corporation
that had a five-year history of being a dealer of brand X automobiles constituted an expansion of the
brand X business rather than the acquisition of a new or different business under Reg. §1.355-3(b)(3)(ii).
The facts of the ruling state that the brand X and brand Y dealership businesses were conducted on
adjacent leaseholds, but the analysis does not pursue this fact. The analysis states:
[B]ecause (i) the product of the brand X automobile dealership is similar to the product
of the brand Y automobile dealership, (ii) the business activities associated with the
operation of the brand X automobile dealership (i.e., sales and service) are the same as
the business activities associated with the operation of the brand Y automobile
dealership, and (iii) the operation of the brand Y automobile dealership involves the use
of the experience and know-how that D developed in the operation of the brand X
automobile dealership, the brand Y automobile dealership is in the same line of business
as the brand X dealership and its acquisition does not constitute the acquisition of a new
or different business ....
* Rev. Rul. 57-190, 1957-1 C.B. 121 was obsoleted.
* Although the quoted language might be read as a factual
conclusion that the specific cars involved were similar, e.g., Toyotas and Hondas, IRS Chief Counsel's
Office views it as a conclusion of law, e.g., Geos are the same as Mercedes.
2. Bricks to clicks business expansion passes the SMOAKE test.9 Rev. Rul.
2003-38, 2003-17 I.R.B. 811 (4/4/03). Corporation D operated a retail shoe store business in shopping
malls and other locations, under the name "D" for more than five years. D's business enjoyed favorable
name recognition, customer loyalty, and goodwill in the retail shoe market. D created an Internet web site
and began selling shoes at retail through the Internet. To take advantage of D's name recognition,
customer loyalty, and established goodwill, and to enhance the web site's chances for success, the web
site was named "D.com," To a significant extent, the operation of the web site drew upon D's experience
and know-how. Two years later, D transferred the web site based business's assets and liabilities to C, a
newly formed controlled subsidiary, and spun-off C pro rata. The IRS ruled that under Reg. § 1.355-
3(b)(3)(ii), the Internet sales operation was an expansion of the retail store business, not a new business.
Thus, each of D and C was engaged in the active conduct of a five-year trade or business. See Rev. Rul.
2003-18 and § 1.355-3(c), Examples (7) and (8). The products and the principal business activities of the
retail shoe store business and the internet-based business were the same. Although selling shoes on the
Internet required some know-how different from operating a retail store (different marketing approaches,
distribution chains, and technical operations issues), the web site's operation drew significantly on D's
existing experience and know-how, and its success would depend largely on D's pre-existing goodwill.
* The analytical model used by the Revenue Ruling to determine
that the clicks business was an expansion of the bricks business was based on analyzing the extent that the
9 Shared (1) subject matter; (2) operational activities; and (3) knowledge and experience.
two shared (1) subject matter; (2) operational activities; and (3) knowledge and experience. [The SMOAKE
test?] The first two were met and the third was not, but the deficiency was cured by the overlapping
goodwill.
3. Beef for the boy and grass for the girl equals business purpose. Rev. Rul.
2003-52, 2003-22 I.R.B. 960 (5/12/03). The IRS ruled that the business purpose requirement of Reg. §
1.355-2(b) was satisfied in the following circumstances. X Corporation was engaged in the fanning
business, consisting of breeding and raising livestock and growing grain, for more than five years. The
stock of X was owned equally by Father, age 68, Mother, age 67, Son, and Daughter. Father and Mother
participated in some major management decisions, but Son and Daughter performed most of the
management. Son and Daughter generally cooperated and operated the farm without disruption, but they
disagreed about the appropriate future direction of the farming business. Son wanted to expand the
livestock business, while Daughter wanted to sell the livestock business and concentrate on the grain
business. The disagreement prevented them from developing, as they saw fit, the business in which each
of them was most interested. Father and Mother were neutral regarding the disagreement, but because of
the disagreement, they wanted to bequeath separate interests in the farm business to the children. For
reasons unrelated to the farm, Son and Daughter's husband dislike each other. Although this did not
impair the farm's operation, Father and Mother believed that requiring Son and Daughter to run a single
business together was eventually likely to cause family discord. To enable Son and Daughter each to
devote his or her undivided attention to, and apply a consistent business strategy to, the farming business
in which he or she is most interested, to further the estate planning goals of Father and Mother, and to
promote family harmony, X transfers the livestock business to a newly formed wholly owned subsidiary,
Y Corporation, and X distributed 50 percent of the Y stock to Son in exchange for all of his X stock. The
remaining Y stock was distributed equally to Father and Mother in exchange for half of their X stock.
Thereafter, Father and Mother (who each owned 25 percent of the outstanding stock of X and Y)
continued to participate in some major management decisions related to the business of each corporation.
Daughter, who had no interest in the livestock corporation, managed and operated X, and Son managed
and operated Y and had no interest in X. Father and Mother amended their wills to devise their Y stock
to Son and their X stock to Daughter. The IRS reasoned that the distribution eliminated a disagreement
that prevented the development of the business and "allowed each sibling to devote his or her undivided
attention to, and apply a consistent business strategy to, the farming business in which he or she is most
interested, with the expectation that each business would benefit. Therefore, although the distribution is
intended, in part, to further the personal estate planning of Father and Mother and to promote family
harmony, it is motivated in substantial part by a real and substantial non- Federal tax purpose that is
germane to the business of X."
4. You only have to be pure of mind at the time of the distribution. Rev. Rul.
2003-55, 2003-22 I.R.B. 961 (5/12/03). The IRS ruled that the business purpose requirement of Reg. §
1.355-2(b) is satisfied if the distribution of the stock of a controlled corporation is, at the time of the
distribution, motivated, in whole or substantial part, by a corporate business purpose, but that purpose
cannot be achieved as the result of an unexpected change in circumstances following the distribution.
"The regulations do not require that the corporation in fact succeed in meeting its corporate business
purpose, as long as, at the time of the distribution, such a purpose exists and motivates, in whole or
substantial part, the distribution." The specific facts were as follows. D, a publicly traded corporation
conducted two businesses directly and a third business through its wholly owned subsidiary, C. To invest
in plant and equipment and to make acquisitions, C had to raise a substantial amount of capital. D's
investment banker advised D that the best way to raise this capital was by a public offering of C stock
after C was separated from D. D distributed the C stock to its shareholders, and C prepared to offer its
stock to the public, with a target date approximately six months after the distribution. Following the
distribution and before the offering could be undertaken, market conditions unexpectedly deteriorated to
such an extent that the public offering was postponed. One year after the distribution, conditions still had
not improved sufficiently to permit the offering to go forward and C funded its capital needs through the
sale of debentures.
5. Management focus is a business purpose. Rev. Rul. 2003-74, 2003-29 I.R.B.
77 (6/24/03). Distributing is a publicly traded corporation that conducts a software technology business.
Controlled is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Distributing and conducts a paper products business.
Management of each corporation would prefer to concentrate its efforts solely on the business conducted
by that corporation, but the ownership of Controlled by Distributing prevents Distributing's management
from concentrating solely on the software business. Held, the distribution of the stock of a controlled
corporation by a distributing corporation to enable the management of each corporation to concentrate on
its own business satisfies the business purpose requirement of Reg. § 1.355-2(b).
6. Competing for investors and lenders is a business purpose. Rev. Rul. 2003-
75, 2003-29 I.R.B. 79 (6/24/03). Distributing is a publicly traded corporation that conducts a
pharmaceuticals business. Controlled is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Distributing and conducts a
cosmetics business. These businesses compete for capital from borrowing and internal cash flows. The
distribution of the stock of a controlled corporation to resolve a capital allocation problem between the
two corporations satisfies the business purpose requirement of Reg. § 1.355-2(b).
7. Private letter rulings under § 355 will be harder to come by after August
8th. Rev. Proc. 2003-48; 2003-29 I.R.B. 86 (6/24/03). This revenue procedure notes that in the past the
IRS has not adhered to its policy of not giving "comfort rulings" in the § 355 area. It sets up a one-year
pilot program for rulings postmarked after 8/8/03 of not ruling on three issues with respect to corporate
divisions. The National Office will not determine (1) whether a proposed or completed distribution of the
stock of a controlled corporation is being carried out for one or more corporate business purposes, (2)
whether the transaction is used principally as a device, or (3) whether the distribution and an acquisition
are part of a plan under § 355(e).
8. "Nephew of Morris Trust" transaction is blessed. Rev. Rul. 2003-79, 2003-29
I.R.B. 80 (7/1/03). A spin-off or one of two business of equal size by means of a transfer of the assets of
one of the businesses to a controlled corporation, followed by the acquisition of substantially all the
assets of the controlled corporation by an unrelated corporation in the same business, meets all the
requirements of §§ 368(a)(1)(D), 355(a), and 368(a)(1)(C) - even though an acquisition of the same
properties from the distributing corporation would have failed this requirement if the transfer of those
properties had not been made to the controlled corporation.
H. Personal Holding Companies and Accumulated Earnings Tax
1. Personal holding company tax rate reduced to 15 percent. Because the 2003
Act reduced the maximum tax rate on dividends to 15 percent, § 541 was amended to reduce the personal
holding company tax rate to 15 percent.
2. Accumulated earnings tax rate reduced to 15 percent. Because the 2003 Act
reduced the maximum tax rate on dividends to 15 percent, § 531 was amended to reduce the accumulated
earnings tax rate to 15 percent.
3. Debt aversion avoids AET. Otto Candies, LLC v. United States, 91 A.F.T.R.2d
2003-2520, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,516 (E.D. La. 5/28/03). The taxpayer [an LLC taxed as an S corporation
that was a successor to a C corporation], a family corporation with three shareholders that was "one of
the leading providers of marine transportation in the Gulf of Mexico," was held not to be liable for the §
531 accumulated earnings tax. The corporation, which had accumulated reserves of between $15 and $21
million during the years in question, was engaged in a volatile business and the dominant shareholder
was conservative and avoided debt. Accumulations were required to fund necessary periodic fleet
replacement, including newer vessels with modem technology meeting customer demands, new ventures
into related businesses, and to internally fund future redemptions [under a contract] upon the death of a
shareholder.
I. Miscellaneous Corporate Issues
1. Telling the IRS about your corporate/shareholder transactions. T.D. 9022,
Information Reporting Relating to Taxable Stock Transactions, 67 F.R. 69468 (11/18/02). Temp. Reg. §
1.6043-4T imposes information reporting requirements [Form 8806] on corporations that have undergone
a change in control or a substantial change in capital structure, e.g., a recapitalization, redemption,
merger, transfer of substantially all its assets or an (F) reorganization. However, transactions in which the
amount of cash and the fair market value of property (including stock) provided to the shareholders is
less than $100,000,000 are exempt, as are transactions within an affiliated group.
2. Repeal of collapsible corporation rules. With dividends and long-term capital
gains taxed at the same rate, the tax avoidance issues at which § 341 was directed no longer exist.
Accordingly, § 341 was repealed in the 2003 Act.
VII. PARTNERSHIPS
A. Formation and Taxable Years
1. Husbands and wives are co-owners of a disregarded entity or partners
[their choice], if the business is community property; if the business is not community property,
then they are partners. Rev. Proc. 2002-69, 2002-45 I.R.B. 831 (10/9/02). This revenue procedure deals
with the classification of business entities (other than corporations), i.e., partnerships and LLCs, that are
wholly owned by a husband and wife as community property. If the husband and wife treat the entity as a
disregarded entity for federal tax purposes, the IRS will accept the position that the entity is a disregarded
entity for federal tax purposes. On the other hand, if the entity, and the husband and wife, treat the entity
as a partnership for federal tax purposes and file appropriate partnership returns, the IRS will accept the
position that the entity is a partnership for federal tax purposes. A change in reporting position will be
treated for federal tax purposes as a conversion of the entity.
0 Nothing in the revenue procedure allows husbands and wives who
wholly own an LLC or partnership in a common law property state to avoid entity characterization.
B. Allocations of Distributive Share, Partnership Debt, and Outside Basis
1. No more "inappropriate" increases or decreases in the adjusted basis of a
corporate partner's interest in a partnership. T.D. 8986, Determination of Basis of Partner's Interest;
Special Rules, 67 F.R. 15112 (3/29/02). The Treasury has finalized Reg. § 1.705-2 [proposed in REG-
106702-00, Determination of Basis of Partner's Interest; Special Rules, 66 F.R. 315 (1/3/01)] which is
intended to prevent what the IRS has determined to be "inappropriate" increases or decreases in the
adjusted basis of a corporate partner's interest in a partnership [consistent with Notice 99-57,1999-2 C.B.
692] resulting from the partnership's disposition of the corporate partner's stock [under the general
principles of Rev. Rul. 99-57, 1999-2 C.B. 678], when: (1) a corporation acquires an interest in a
partnership that holds stock in the corporation, (2) the partnership does not have a § 754 election in effect
for the year in which the corporation acquires the interest, and (3) the partnership later sells or exchanges
the stock. The increase or decrease in the corporation's adjusted basis in its partnership interest resulting
from the sale or exchange of the stock equals the amount of gain or loss that the corporate partner would
have recognized (absent the application of § 1032) if, for the tax year in which the corporation acquired
the interest, a § 754 election had been in effect. The final regulations require appropriate adjustments to
the basis of tiered partnerships to prevent evasion of their purpose where a corporation acquires an
indirect interest in its own stock though a chain of partnerships and gain or loss from the sale of stock is
subsequently allocated to the corporation. The regulation is effective retroactively to gain or loss
allocated on sales or exchanges of stock occurring after 12/6/99.
a. Proposed amendments before the ink is dry. REG-167648-01,
Amendments to Rules for Determination of Basis of Partner's Interest; Special Rules, 67 F.R. 15132
(3/29/02). The Treasury has proposed amendments to Reg. § 1.705-2, which was finalized on the same
day the proposed amendments were published, "to address remaining issues that [were] considered
during the development of the final regulations. The proposed amendments would extend the rules of
Reg. § 1.705-2 to situations in which a corporation owns a direct or indirect interest in a partnership that
owns stock in that corporation, the partnership distributes money or other property to another partner and
that partner recognizes gain on the distribution during a year in which the partnership does not have a §
754 election in effect, and the partnership subsequently sells or exchanges the stock. The proposed
amendments also clarify that "stock" of a corporate partner includes any position with respect to stock of
a corporate partner. The proposed amendments would be effective retroactively to gain or loss allocated
on sales or exchanges of stock occurring after 3/29/02.
b. Finalized. T.D. 9049, Amendments to Rules for Determination of Basis
of Partner's Interest; Special Rules, 68 F.R. 12815 (3/18/03). The proposed amendments to Reg. § 1.705-
2 have been finalized with a generally effective date of after 12/6/99. The final regulations extend the
rules of the proposed regulations to situations in which a corporation owns a direct or indirect interest in
a partnership that owns stock in that corporation, the partnership distributes money or other property to
another partner and that partner recognizes loss on the distribution or the basis of the property distributed
to that partner is adjusted during a year in which the partnership does not have an election under § 754 in
effect, and the partnership subsequently sells or exchanges the stock.
2. What happens when § 752 meets a deferred like-kind exchange that
straddles year-end? Rev. Rul. 2003-56, 2003-23 I.R.B. 985 (5/9/03). The ruling deals with the treatment
of partnership liabilities under § 752 when a partnership enters into a deferred § 1031 like kind exchange
in which property subject to a liability is transferred in one taxable year and replacement property subject
to a liability is received in the following taxable year. The IRS ruled that the liabilities are netted for
purposes of § 752. A net decrease in a partner's share of partnership liability is treated as a distribution
under § 752(b) in the year the surrendered property was transferred; and under Reg. § 1.731-1(a)(1)(ii)
and Rev. Rul. 94-4, 1994-1 C.B. 196, it is treated as an advance or draw of money to the extent of each
partner's distributive share of income for that year, with the result that basis increases for partnership
income for the year are taken into accounting for the deemed distribution. The gain recognized under §
1031 attributable to the boot that results from net debt relief is treated as recognized in the year in which
the relinquished property has been transferred; thus the gain from the § 1031 transaction is taken into
account in determining whether the § 752(b) deemed distribution exceeds the partner's basis in the
partnership interest under § 731. [If the relinquished liability and the replacement liability are
nonrecourse, under Reg. § 1.704-2(d), the partnership minimum gain on the last day of the first taxable
year of the partnership is computed by using the replacement property and its tax basis as determined
under § 1031(d) and the replacement nonrecourse liability (but only to the extent of the relinquished
nonrecourse liability).] A net increase in a partner's share of partnership liability is taken into account
under § 752(a) in the year in which the partnership receives the replacement property.
3. Fighting duplication and acceleration of losses through partnerships before
June 24, 2003. T.D. 9062, Assumption of Partner Liabilities, 68 F.R. 37414 (6/24/03). Temp. Reg. §
1.752-6T provides rules, similar to the rules applicable to corporations in § 358(h), to prevent the
duplication and acceleration of loss through the assumption by a partnership of a liability of a partner in a
nonrecognition transaction. Under the temporary regulations, if a partnership assumes a liability, as
defined in § 358(h)(3), of a partner (other than a liability to which § 752(a) and (b) apply) in a § 721
transaction, after application of §§ 752(a) and (b), the partner's basis in the partnership is reduced (but
not below the adjusted value of such interest) by the amount of the liability. For this purpose, the term
"liability" includes any fixed or contingent obligation to make payment, without regard to whether the
obligation is otherwise taken into account for Federal tax purposes. Reduction of a partner's basis
generally is not required if: (1) the trade or business with which the liability is associated is transferred to
the partnership, or (2) substantially all of the assets with which the liability is associated are contributed
to the partnership. However, the exception for contributions of substantially all of the assets does not
apply to a transaction described in Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255 (or a substantially similar
transaction).
The temporary regulations are effective for transactions occurring
after 10/18/99 and before 6/24/03.
4. Defining the term "liability" in § 752 and fighting duplication and
acceleration of losses through partnerships after June 24, 2003. REG-106736-00, Assumption of
Partner Liabilities, 68 F.R. 37434 (6/24/03). The Treasury has proposed extraordinarily complex, verging
on incomprehensible, regulations: (1) defining liabilities under § 752; (2) dealing with a partnership'sassumption of certain fixed and contingent obligations in exchange for a partnership interest [Prop. Reg.
§ 1.752-7]; and (3) providing rules under § 358(h) for assumptions of liabilities by corporations from
partners and partnerships [Prop. Reg. § 1.358-7]. Reg. § 1.752-1(a)(1)(i) would be amended to include
the principles of Rev. Rul. 88-77, 1988-2 C.B. 128; an obligation is a liability to the extent that incurring
the obligation: (1) creates or increases the basis of any of the obligor's assets (including cash); (2) gives
rise to an immediate deduction; or (3) gives rise to an expense that is not deductible in computing taxable
income and is not properly chargeable to capital. Prop. Reg. § 1.752-7 deals with the assumption by a
partnership of a partner's fixed or contingent obligation to make payment that is not one of the three
types described in Reg. § 1.752-1(a)(1)(i) [including accrual method liabilities the deduction for which
was deferred under § 453(h)]. Unlike Temp. Reg. § 1.752-6T, the proposed regulations do not reduce the
partner's outside basis when the partnership assumes a § 1.752-7 liability. If the partnership satisfies the
liability while the partner remains in the partnership, the deduction with respect to the built-in loss
associated with the § 1.752-7 liability is allocated to the partner, reducing that partner's outside basis.
Alternatively, if one of three events occurs that separate the partner from the, then the partner's outside
basis is reduced immediately before the occurrence of the event. The events are: (1) a disposition (or
partial disposition) of the partnership interest by the partner, (2) a liquidation of the partner's partnership
interest, and (3) the assumption (or partial assumption) of the liability by another partner. The basis
reduction generally is the lesser of (1) the excess of the partner's basis in the partnership interest over the
adjusted value of the interest, or (2) the remaining built-in loss associated with the liability. (In the event
of a partial disposition, the reduction is pro rated.) Thereafter, to the extent of the remaining built-in loss
associated with the liability, the partnership (or the assuming partner) is not entitled to any deduction or
capital expense upon satisfaction (or economic performance) of the liability, but if the partnership
notifies the partner, the partner is entitled to a loss or deduction. If another partner assumed the liability,
the partnership must immediately reduce the basis of its assets by the built-in loss, and upon satisfaction,
the assuming partner must make certain basis adjustments to his partnership interest. There are
exceptions for (1) transfer of the trade or business with which the liability is associated is transferred to
the partnership, and (2) de minimis transactions (liabilities less that 10 percent of the partnership's assets
or $1,000,000). Unlike under the Temporary regulations, there is no exception for transactions in which
substantially all of the assets with which the liability is associated are contributed to the partnership.
When finalized, the regulations will be effective for transactions occurring after 6/24/03.
5. "[One brother got the ... income without paying all of the tax, while the
other brother paid the tax without getting any of the income." Estate of Ballantyne v. Commissioner,
92 A.F.T.R. 2003-5694 (8th Cir. 8/7/03), aff'g T.C. Memo. 2002-160 (6/24/02). The decedent taxpayer
(Melvin) and his brother (Russell) for many years operated a partnership that engaged in the oil and gas
business, run by the decedent, and the farming business, run by the decedent's brother. The partnership
was an oral partnership, and the brothers consistently reported as equal partners, even though the
decedent consistently withdrew the profits from the oil and gas business and decedent's brother
consistently withdrew the profits from the fanning business. After the decedent's death, the estate took
the position that all of the income from the fanning activity was reportable as the decedent's brother's
distributive share. Because the partnership did not maintain capital accounts, the allocation lacked
economic substance, and the partners' interests in the partnership were determined under the facts and
circumstances test of Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(3). Based on the evidence, the estate could not overcome the
presumption that the partners were equal partners. There was no record of capital contributions; the
amount of profits of each activity varied from year to year, as did withdrawals but the partners' economic
interests and interests in cash flow could not be determined because the partnership books and records
were inadequate. However, the "facts" - mostly the witnesses' "beliefs" that the brothers were 50/50
partners indicated that they were to share liquidating distributions equally. That factor, combined with
the brothers long-time consistent reporting as equal partners and the absence of any evidence that the
brothers' reporting position involved tax avoidance, was sufficient to convince Judge Ruwe that they
were equal partners.
0 The Court of Appeals (Judge Beam) affirmed. First, the claimed
allocation did not have economic effect because the partnership failed to comply with the capital account
rules in the § 704(b) regulations. Second, the Tax Court correctly applied the regulations to determine the
partners' distributive shares based upon their interests in the partnership based on all the facts and
circumstances. The court rejected the estate's argument it was clear that the brothers had agreed that Russell
would get farming profits and Melvin the oil profits, because it was also "clear that the brothers had evenly
split some of the burdens, i.e., the tax consequences of the combined profits and losses." Finally, the
brothers' interests in cash flow and liquidating distributions supported the Tax Court's conclusion. Actual
operating distributions were not based on the clear-cut delineation claimed by the taxpayer - to some
extent the brothers shared the profits form the two businesses.
C. Distributions and Transactions Between the Partnership and Partners
1. Partnership capital shifts resulting from option exercises won't be taxable.
REG-103580-02, Noncompensatory Partnership Options, 68 F.R. 2930 (1/22/03). The Treasury
Department has published proposed regulations dealing with noncompensatory partnership options,
including convertible debt and convertible equity interests. The proposed regulations do not address
compensatory options, and the preamble states that no inferences regarding the treatment of
compensatory options should be drawn. Under the proposed regulations, neither the grant nor the
exercise of an option generally results in the recognition of gain or loss to either the partnership or the
option holder. Prop. Reg. § 1.721-2. The issuance of an option is not governed by § 721, but rather
(under general tax principles) is an open transaction for the issuer and an investment (capital
expenditure) by the holder. If the holder uses appreciated or depreciated property to acquire the option,
the holder recognizes gain or loss.
• Upon exercise, the option holder is treated as contributing
property in the form of the premium, the exercise price, and the option privilege to the partnership in
exchange for the partnership interest, and § 721 applies, even if the conversion results in a shift of capital
from the old partners to the option holder. The conversion right in convertible debt or convertible equity is
taken into account for tax purposes as part of the underlying instrument. (The proposed regulations do not
deal with the consequences of a right to convert partnership debt into an interest in the issuing partnership to
the extent of any accrued but unpaid interest on the debt.) An amendment to Reg. § 1.1271-1 (e) would treat
partnership interests as stock for purposes of the special OlD rules for convertible debt instruments. Section
721 does not apply to the lapse of an option; the lapse of an option results in recognition of income by the
partnership and the recognition of loss by the former option holder.
* The proposed regulations amend the §704 regulations to deal with
the fact that the option holder generally receives a partnership interest with a value that is greater or less
than the sum of the option premium and exercise price, i.e., there is a capital shift. The option holder's
initial capital account equals the consideration paid to the partnership for the option plus the fair market
value of any property (other than the option itself) contributed to the partnership upon exercise. To meet the
substantial economic effect test of Reg. § 1.704-1(b), the partnership must revalue its property following the
exercise of the option, and must allocate the unrealized income, gain, loss, and deduction from the
revaluation, first, to the option holder to reflect the holder's right to partnership capital, and, then, to the
historic partners. To the extent that unrealized appreciation or depreciation in the partnership's assets has
been allocated to the option holder's capital account, under § 704(c) principles the holder will recognize any
income or loss attributable to that appreciation or depreciation as the underlying assets are sold, depreciated,
or amortized. If after all of the unrealized appreciation or depreciation in the partnership's assets has been
allocated to the option holder, the option holder's capital account still does not equal the amount of
partnership capital to which the option holder is entitled, the partnership must adjust the capital accounts of
the historic partners by the amounts necessary to provide the option holder with a capital account equal to
the holder's rights to partnership capital under the agreement. Starting with the year the option is exercised,
the partnership must make corrective allocations of tax items - that differ from the partnership's allocations
of book items - of gross income or loss to the partners to reflect any shift in the partners' capital accounts
occurring as a result of the exercise of an option.
* The proposed regulations also provide rules for revaluing the
partners' capital accounts under Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(o) while an option is outstanding. The aggregate
value of partnership property is reduced by the amount by which the value of the option exceeds it price or
is increased by the amount by which price of the option exceeds its value.
0 An option holder will be recharacterized as a partner if (1) under a
facts and circumstances test, the option holder's rights are substantially similar to the rights afforded to a
partner and (2) as of the date that the noncompensatory option is issued, transferred, or modified, there is a
strong likelihood that the failure to treat the option holder as a partner would result in a substantial reduction
in the present value of the partners' and the option holder's aggregate tax liabilities. Prop. Reg. § 1.761-3. If
an option is reasonably certain to be exercised, the first half of this test is generally met. If the option holder
is treated as a partner under the proposed regulations, then the holder's distributive share of the partnership's
income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit must be determined in accordance with such partner's interest in the
partnership under Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(3). For this purpose, the option holder's share of partnership items
should reflect the lesser amount of capital investment if appropriate; the option holder's distributive share of
partnership losses and deductions may be limited by §§ 704(b) and (d) to the amount paid for the option.
* The proposed regulations do not apply to options issued by single
member LLCs.
* The regulations will apply to noncompensatory options issued on
or after the date final regulations are published.
2. Permitting a partnership book-up when you can't make the regs work if
you don't do it. REG-139796-02, Section 704(b) and Capital Account Revaluations, 68 F.R. 39498
(7/2/03). Proposed amendments to the § 704(b) regulations would expressly allow partnerships to
increase or decrease the capital accounts of the partners to reflect a revaluation of partnership property on
the partnership's books in connection with the grant of an interest in the partnership (other than a de
minimis interest) in consideration of services to the partnership by an existing partner acting in a partner
capacity or by a new partner acting in a partner capacity or in anticipation of being a partner. The
regulation will be effective when finalized.
3. If you want § 707(a) treatment, document the transaction as such. Bitker v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2003-209 7/15/03). The taxpayers owned farmland that they allowed a family
partnership engaged in the farming business to use in that business without any express rental agreement.
The partnership made payments of principal and interest on the taxpayer's mortgage debt secured by on
the land, and the taxpayers claimed that the payments should be deductible by the partnership as rental
expenses and includable by them as passive activity rental income. Although this type of transaction
could be so characterized under § 707(a), the taxpayer's offered no evidence that partnership actually
made the payments as rent for such use or the payments represented fair rental value. Accordingly, the
taxpayers' shares of partnership income were not be reduced for rent, their income from their rental real
estate activity was not be increased for such rent, and the payments were treated as partnership
distributions (which, on the facts, were not in excess of basis).
D. Sales of Partnership Interests, Liquidations and Mergers
E. Inside Basis Adjustments
1. Partnership inside basis adjustments fully coordinated with §§ 197 and
1060. T.D. 9059, Coordination of Sections 755 and 1060; Allocation of Basis Among Partnership Assets
and Application of the Residual Method to Certain Partnership Transactions, 68 F.R. 34293 (6/9/03). The
Treasury has promulgated final regulations [proposed in REG-107872-99, 65 F.R. 17829 (4/5/00) to
replace Temp. Reg. § 1.755-2T] relating to the allocation of basis adjustments among partnership assets
under § 755 to implement § 1060(d) [which applies the residual method to partnership transactions in
connection with determining the value of § 197 intangibles].
0 * The new rules are amendments to Reg. § 1.755-1. As amended,
Reg. § 1.775-1 applies the residual method to all allocations for § 743(b) and § 734(d) inside basis
adjustments under § 755. Reg. § 1.755-1(a) uses the residual method to value all § 197 intangibles [not just
goodwill and going concern value, as would have been the rule under the proposed regulations]. Values are
assigned to assets as follows. First, the partnership determines the values of its assets other than § 197
intangibles [taking into account § 7701(g)]. Second, the partnership determines the "partnership gross
value." Third, the partnership determines the value of its § 197 intangibles under the residual method
[partnership gross value minus value of assets other than § 197 intangibles]. If the aggregate value of
partnership property other than § 197 intangibles is equal to or greater than the partnership gross value, all §
197 intangibles are treated has having zero value. If there is any value assigned to the § 197 intangibles, that
value is allocated among § 197 intangibles other than goodwill and going concern value before any value is
assigned to goodwill and going concern value. In allocating values [and basis to § 197 intangibles, value is
assigned first to those § 197 intangibles (other than goodwill and going concern value) that would produce §
751 (c) flush language unrealized receivables [i.e., previously amortized or depreciated] to the extent of basis
and the unrealized receivable amount; then among all § 197 intangibles (other than goodwill and going
concern value) relative to fair market value. For most § 743(b) basis adjustments, the benchmark for
determining the gross partnership value is the amount paid for a transferred partnership interest. Partnership
gross value is the amount that, if assigned to all partnership property, would result in a liquidating
distribution to the transferee partner equal to that partner's basis (reduced by the amount, if any, of such
basis that is attributable to partnership liabilities) in the transferred partnership interest immediately
following the relevant transfer. In cases involving § 734(b) basis adjustments [and § 743(b) basis
adjustments resulting from substituted basis transactions], partnership gross value is the value of the entire
partnership as a going concern, increased by the amount of partnership liabilities.
F. Partnership Audit Rules
1 . Even the IRS doesn't know when it has to have a partnership level audit in
order to send a valid deficiency notice to a partner. Katz v. Commissioner, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5153
(10th Cir. 7/7/03), rev 'g 116 T.C. 5 (2001). The Commissioner disallowed the taxpayer's losses claimed
as a distributive share of partnership income in 1990, the year he filed a bankruptcy petition, on the
grounds that the distributive share for the entire partnership taxable year was reportable by bankruptcy
estate.
* The Tax Court (Judge Vasquez) denied the taxpayer's motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, in which the taxpayer argued that the deficiency notice was invalid because
there had not been any FPAA under the partnership audit provisions. Judge Vasquez held that the allocation
of the distributive share of partnership loses between the bankrupt partner and his bankruptcy estate was not
a partnership item that would require a partnership-level proceeding, because the bankrupt partner and his
bankruptcy estate were a single partner as far as the partnership-level audit rules were concerned. On the
merits, he held that the entire distributive share of partnership losses was properly reportable by the
bankruptcy estate.
* The Court of Appeals (Judge Hartz) reversed. First, the court held
that Reg. § 301.6231(c)-7T(a), which converts items that otherwise would be partnership items into
nonpartnership items if they arose in a taxable year "ending on or before the last day of the latest taxable
year of the partner with respect to which the United States could file a claim for income tax due in the
bankruptcy proceeding," was not controlling because 1989 was the latest taxable year for which the United
States could file a claim in the bankruptcy proceeding. Second, the court held that the partner's share of
partnership losses was a partnership item that could not be determined without a partnership-level
proceeding even though the allocation of the distributive share of losses between the bankrupt partner and
his bankruptcy estate did not affect other partners. The holding was grounded on the idea that regardless of
whether the items were properly the bankrupt partner's or the bankruptcy estate's, the partnership return
was required to show the allocation and the allocation is a partnership item that can be challenged only in a
partnership- level proceeding, even if there might be "sound policy reasons for not requiring a full-blown
partnership-level proceeding when an alleged error in one partner's return affects only one other taxpayer
rather than all the partners."
G. Miscellaneous
VIII. TAX SHELTERS
A. Tax Shelter Cases
1. Tax shelter benefits from § 453 contingent sale partnership tax shelter not
allowed because the tax shelter is a sham and "serves no economic purpose other than tax savings."
Merrill Lynch's persistence overcomes initial doubts of tax department. ACM Partnership v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-115 (3/5/97) aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 157 F.3d 231, 98-2 U.S.T.C.
50,790, 82 A.F.T.R.2d 98-6682 (3d Cir. 10/13/98) (2-1), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1017 (3/2/99). Judge
Laro found a § 453 contingent sale partnership tax shelter to be a prearranged sham, "tax-driven and
devoid of economic purpose," and "serv[ing] no economic purpose other than tax savings," following
Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967). Under the
scheme to shelter Colgate's $105 million 1988 capital gain, a partnership was formed in 1989; its three
partners were affiliates of (a) a foreign bank (about 90%), (b) Colgate (about 9%), and (c) Merrill Lynch
(about 1%). A bank note was purchased by the partnership and immediately sold for a large immediate
payment and much smaller future contingent payments. Under the contingent payment sale provisions of
the temporary regulations [§ 15a.453-1(c)] the partnership's basis was to be allocated ratably over the
several years in which contingent payments could be made, resulting in a large 1989 installment sale gain
to the partnership. The lion's share of that installment sale gain was allocated to the foreign bank (which
was not taxable on U.S. source capital gain), followed by the redemption of the foreign bank's
partnership interest. This left Colgate as the 90 percent partner. In 1991, the installment sale obligation
was sold by the partnership, triggering about $100 million of capital losses, which Colgate attempted to
use to shelter its 1988 capital gain.
* The Third Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's application of the
"economic substance" doctrine, which eliminated the capital gains and losses attributable to ACM's
application of the ratable basis recovery rule of the contingent installment sale provisions. The Third Circuit
held, however, that out-of-pocket amounts were deductible.
2. Judge Foley finds another Merrill Lynch § 453 partnership plan does not
work because, under the facts, there was no partnership. ASA Investerings Partnership v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-305 (8/20/98). In another Merrill Lynch § 453 partnership plan to
create capital losses to shelter earlier capital gains, AlliedSignal lost when Judge Foley held that the
parties to the partnership agreement did not join together for a common purpose of investing in interest-
bearing instruments, and they did not share profits and losses.
a. Affirmed, ASA Investerings Partnership v. Commissioner, 201 F.3d
505, 2000-1 U.S.T.C. 50,185, 85 A.F.T.R.2d 2000-675 (D.C. Cir. 2/1/00), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 871
(10/2/00). The D.C. Circuit's opinion noted that it disagreed with the Tax Court's statements that persons
with "divergent business goals" are precluded from having the requisite intent to form a partnership;
however, this view was not essential to the Tax Court'sconclusion that the parties did not intend to join
together as partners to conduct business activities for a purpose other than tax avoidance. The court held
that there was a single business purpose rule.
3. Saba Partnership v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-359 (10/27/99).
Brunswick's (the taxpayer's) transactions, which were identical to ACM's, were found to lack economic
substance. Judge Nims held that the transactions lacked nontax business purposes and that Congress did
not intend to favor such transactions "regardless of their economic substance." He held that fees paid for
the organization of the partnership were deductible subject to the limitations of § 709(b) [60-month
amortization], but that the fees paid with respect to the sham transactions were not deductible.
a. D.C. Circuit remands Saba for reconsideration in light of its opinion
in ASA Investerings. Saba Partnership v. Commissioner, 273 F.3d 1135, 2002-1 U.S.T.C. 50,145, 88
A.F.T.R.2d 2001-7318 (D.C. Cir. 12/21/01), remanding for reconsideration in light of ASA Investerings
T.C. Memo. 1999-359 (10/27/99), on remand to T.C. Memo. 2003-31 (2/11/03). The court felt this case
was indistinguishable from ASA Investerings, which was decided on a sham partnership theory, as
opposed to Judge Nims' decision in the Tax Court, which was grounded on a sham transaction theory.
The court of appeals refused to simply affirm the Tax Court's decision on the alternative ground that the
partnerships were shams. Even the government conceded that the sham transaction and sham partnership
approaches yield different results; the adjustments under the sham transaction theory would be different
from those under the sham partnership theory [although the government apparently conceded at oral
argument that under either approach, Brunswick could deduct actual losses from the transactions]. The
government argued that the court of appeals should apply ASA Investerings to hold that the partnerships
were shams, and remand the case to the Tax Court for the limited purpose of determining the amount of
any necessary adjustments. But the court of appeals accepted the taxpayer's argument that the "question
of whether 'an entity should be regarded as a partnership for federal tax purposes is inherently factual,"'
and remanded to allow the taxpayer to address the question to the trial court, even though it doubted that
the Tax Court's "findings are inadequate because of 'significant differences"' alleged by the taxpayer
"between the actions of Brunswick in this case and those of [the taxpayer] in ASA." Indeed, the court of
appeals opinion said: "As far as we can tell, the only difference between this case and ASA is that
Brunswick and ABN did not meet in Bermuda." In remanding, Judge Tatel foreshadowed what he
expected to be the result on remand:
In any case, ASA makes clear that "the absence of a nontax business purpose is fatal" to
the argument that the Commissioner should respect an entity for federal tax purposes.
*** Here, the Tax Court specifically found "overwhelming evidence in the record that
Saba and Otrabanda were organized solely to generate tax benefits for Brunswick." ***
Arguably, this broader finding subsumes any factual differences that might exist between
this case and ASA. [citations omitted].
*** Although the present record might strongly suggest that Saba and Otrabanda were
sham partnerships organized for the sole purpose of generating paper tax losses for
Brunswick, fairness dictates that we ought not affirm on this ground. In particular, in
presenting its case in the Tax Court, Brunswick may have acted on the mistaken belief
that the Supreme Court's decision in Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S.
436, 87 L. Ed. 1499, 63 S. Ct. 1132 (1943), established a two-part test under which Saba
and Otrabanda must be respected simply because they engaged in some business activity,
an interpretation that ASA squarely rejected * * *
* Note the effect of this opinion on the Boca Investerings case,
below.
b. On remand, the same result, following the Court of Appeals'
instructions. T.C. Memo 2003-31 (2/11/03). On remand Judge Nims again denied the deductions. He
found the case indistinguishable from ASA Inversterings. The partnerships were not recognized for tax
purposes because they had no business purpose other than tax avoidance. The minimal business activity
of the partnership with respect to commercial paper did not amount to a nontax purpose.
4. Same arrangement as earlier failed shelters, different trial court judge - it's
a business deal, not a shelter. Boca Investerings Partnership v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 2d 298,
2001-2 U.S.T.C. 50,690, 88 A.F.T.R.2d 2001-6252 (D. D.C. 10/5/01). American Home Products [now
Wyeth] entered into a Merrill Lynch marketed tax shelter virtually identical to those in ACMPartnership
v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231, 98-2 U.S.T.C. 50,790 (3d Cir. 10/13/98), affg T.C. Memo. 1997-115
(3/5/97), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1017 (1999), ASA Investerings Partnership v. Commissioner, 201 F.3d
505, 2000-1 U.S.T.C. 50,185 (D.C. Cir. 2/1/00), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1998-305 (8/20/98), and Saba
Partnership v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-359 (10/27/99), judgment vacated by 273 F.3d 1135
(D.C. Cir. 2001), on remand to T.C. Memo. 2003-3 1. The losses from the transaction sheltered the gain
on the sale of a corporate subsidiary. Judge Friedman held that a valid partnership existed and that the
losses were allowable because he found that the taxpayer had both a business purpose and an objective
profit potential in entering into the transaction.
a. Reversed: ASA Investerings is followed. Boca Investerings Partnership
v. United States, 314 F.3d 625, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,181 (1/10/03). The D.C. Circuit held that the district
court "erred as a matter of law when it did not properly apply the holding of ASA Investerings, requiring
that a legitimate non-tax business necessity exist for the creation of the otherwise sham entity inserted
into the partnership for tax avoidance reasons in order to meet the intent test of Commissioner v.
Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949), as applied to this type of partnership transaction." Judge Sentelle
quoted ASA to make clear that "the absence of a nontax business purpose" is fatal to an argument that the
Commissioner should respect an entity for federal tax purposes.
5. Lease-strip transaction by pseudo-black box intermediary fails in the Tax
Court; affirmed by Second Circuit, Nicole Rose Corp. v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 328 (12/28/01),
aff'd by summary order, 320 F.3d 282, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,137; 90 A.F.T.R.2d 2002-7702 (2d Cir.
12/13/02) (per curiam), publication status changed by the court from unpublished to published, (2d Cir.
2/24/03). The taxpayer corporation's stock was sold to an intermediary [which then merged
downstream], following which its assets were sold to the prearranged ultimate purchaser. To offset the
gains realized on the asset sale, the taxpayer acquired by a § 351 transaction interests in certain
equipment leaseback transactions [secured by trusts that resulted in a circular cash flow] that had no
foreseeable value, which it immediately transferred to a Dutch bank, the sole consideration for which was
assumption of taxpayer's obligations [of which there were in reality none]. Taxpayer claimed a $22
million ordinary business expense deduction as a result of the transfer of the leaseback interests. The
deduction was denied because the transactions lacked business purpose and economic substance under
"any version" of the tests. Judge Swift held that the transaction lacked business purpose and economic
substance even as measured against the Eleventh Circuit's broad articulation of the test in UPS of
America, Inc. v. Commissioner, 254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001), that "a transaction has a 'business
purpose' when we are talking about a going concern ... , as long as it figures in a bona fide, profit-
seeking business."
6. The Tax Court hammers another shelter, and in the process tells us the
"purpose" of the legislative plan." Andantech L.L.C. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-97 (4/9/02),
aff'd and remanded, 331 F.3d 972, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-2623, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,530 (D.C. Cir.
6/17/03). Norwest, through its equipment-leasing subsidiary, engaged in a complex [seven PowerPoint
slides worth] purchase and leaseback tax shelter transaction involving 40 IBM mainframe computers
already under lease to end-users. The promoter [Comdisco] sold the computers for cash and notes to an
LLC owned by two nonresident aliens, which leased them back to the promoter, who retained all
responsibilities to the end-users; the LLC sold the stream of rental payment to be received for net present
value, thereby accelerating income realization, and applied the proceeds to the balance due on the note.
Less than three months later, one of the nonresident aliens [indirectly] transferred his 2 percent LLC
interest to a trust established by promoter, and Norwest, thorough a subsidiary, acquired the remaining 98
percent interest in the LLC [thereby closing the taxable year in which the income had been realized] for
an amount roughly equal to one half of one percent of the approximately $122 million basis of the
computers. Norwest subsequently reported its distributive share of depreciation deductions, but was
allocated no income. After three years, the computers were reconveyed to the promoter, pursuant to an
"early termination option," which the court found the "economics of the transaction ... mandate[d]," and
the LLC was liquidated.
0 The Tax Court (Judge Jacobs) struck down the shelter. He
concluded that neither the original LLC, with the foreign partners, nor the subsequent LLC of which
Norwest's subsidiary was a member, was a valid partnership to be recognized for federal tax purposes; in
neither case did the purported partners intend to join together as partners for the purpose of carrying on a
business, i.e., they did not join together to share in the profits or losses from an equipment leasing activity.
Alternatively, Judge Jacobs would have disregarded the participation of the foreign LLC members in the
transactions under the step transaction doctrine [applying either the end result or mutual interdependence
test]. Furthermore, the LLC's sale-leaseback transaction with the promoter was a sham because it (a) was
not a true multiple-party transaction, (b) lacked economic substance, (c) was not compelled or encouraged
by business realities, and (d) was shaped solely by tax-avoidance features. As far as Norwest and its
subsidiary were concerned, the transaction was not respected because it lacked both business purpose and
economic substance. The LLC, and Norwest's subsidiary, had no reasonable possibility of making an
economic profit, but the tax benefits were more than sufficient to cover any potential losses. The Norwest
subsidiary never acquired the benefits and burdens of ownership of the depreciable equipment, and thus was
not entitled to depreciation deductions. In addition, the LLC's debts were not bona fide and no interest
deductions were allowable.
* Finally, Judge Jacobs concluded by looking back to early Supreme
Court jurisprudence:
In Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. [473] at 476-477 [1940], the Supreme Court stated:
There is no illusion about the payment of a tax exaction. Each tax, according to a
legislative plan, raises funds to carry on government. The purpose here is to tax earnings
and profits less expenses and losses. If one or the other factor in any calculation is
unreal, it distorts the liability of the particular taxpayer to the detriment or advantage of
the entire tax-paying group. * * *
The sale-leaseback transaction was designed by Comdisco to create just such a
distortion.
It is axiomatic that taxpayers may structure transactions to take advantage of tax benefits.
But "After a certain point, * * *, the transaction ceases to have any economic substance
and becomes no more than a sale of tax profits." Hines v. United States, 912 F.2d 736,
741 (4th Cir.1990). Here, the evidence in the record clearly indicates that the investment
scheme devised and orchestrated by Comdisco "reached the point where the tax tail
began to wag the dog." Id.
a. The Sixth Circuit (Judge Sentelle) concluded that the partnership should
be disregarded and remanded to the Tax Court for a determination as to how the reported income and
losses should be allocated. The court followed ASA Investerings and determined that the purported
partners "did not intend to join together in order to share any profit or loss from the business activity of
Andantech [partnership,] namely the sale and leaseback of computer equipment," and "'the absence of a
nontax business purpose' is fatal to the validity of a partnership."
7. Third Circuit comes down hard on COLI, with lots of language the
government will love. Internal Revenue Service v. CM Holdings Inc. (In re CM Holdings Inc.), 301 F.3d
96, 90 A.F.T.R2d 2002-5850, 2002-2 U.S.T.C. 50,596 (3d Cir. 8/16/02), aft'g 254 B.R. 578, 2000-2
U.S.T.C. 50,791, 86 A.F.T.R.2d 2000-6470 (D. Del. 10/16/00). In CMI's bankruptcy, the IRS filed
proofs of claim for taxes based on the disallowance of interest deductions that CMI claimed for its COLI
plan (involving policies on 1400 employees).
a The district court held no interest deduction was allowable under§ 163(a) because the entire transaction was a "sham in substance" that lacked subjective business purpose.
Apart from tax savings from the interest deduction, CMI could not reasonably expect a positive cash flow
from the COLI plan in any year and could not expect to benefit from the inside cash value build-up [which
continuously remained at zero throughout the plan] or profit from the death benefits on covered employees.
Interest deductions were disallowed, and § 6662 substantial understatement penalties were imposed because
the transaction lacked economic substance. The transaction was entered into without a reasonable
expectation of profit - in the absence of the interest deductions - over the life of the 40-year transaction
from either the inside build-up or mortality components of the plan.
0 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals (Judge Ambro) affirmed on
the ground that the "COLI policies lacked economic substance and therefore were economic shams." [The
court did not reach the issue of whether the transactions were factual shams.] The court dismissed out of
hand the need to examine the "intersection of... statutory details."
[P]ursuant to Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), and Knetsch v. United States,
364 U.S. 361 (1960), courts have looked beyond taxpayers' formal compliance with the
Code and analyzed the fundamental substance of transactions. Economic substance is a
prerequisite to the application of any Code provision allowing deductions ... It is the
Government's trump card; even if a transaction complies precisely with all requirements
for obtaining a deduction, if it lacks economic substance it "simply is not recognized for
federal taxation purposes, for better or for worse."
In holding for the government, the court rejected the taxpayer's argument that [based on Gregory,
Knetsch, ACM Partnership and other cases] the application of the economic shams doctrine properly
hinges on the 'fleeting and inconsequential' nature" of the transaction under scrutiny. Rather, the court
concluded that "[d]uration alone cannot sanctify a transaction that lacks economic substance. The
appropriate examination is of the net financial effect to the taxpayer, be it short or long term. The point
of our analysis in ACM Partnership is that the transactions 'offset one another with no net effect on
ACM's financial position."' In any event, the court found the COLI transactions bore "striking
similarities" to Knetsch. The court further rejected the argument that for analytical purposes the pre-tax
profit should have been "grossed-up" by the anticipated tax benefits because,
[t]he point of the analysis is to remove from consideration the challenged tax deduction,
and evaluate the transaction on its merits, to see if it makes sense economically or is
mere tax arbitrage. Courts use "pre-tax" as shorthand for this, but they do not imply that
the court must imagine a world without taxes, and evaluate the transaction accordingly.
Instead they focus on the abuse of the deductions claimed: "[w]here a transaction has no
substance other than to create deductions, the transaction is disregarded for tax
purposes." [citation omitted] Choosing a tax-favored investment vehicle is fine, but
engaging in an empty transaction that shuffles payments for the sole purpose of
generating a deduction is not.
0 Finally, the court rejected the taxpayer's argument that because
"the transaction had objective non-tax economic effects ... the Court must not look further," and that the
district court improperly applied a subjective analysis. Rather, the Court of Appeals read Gregory to permit
an inquiry into motive. "If Congress intends to encourage an activity, and to use taxpayers' desire to avoid
taxes as a means to do it, then a subjective motive of tax avoidance is permissible. But to engage in an
activity solely for the purpose of avoiding taxes where that is not the statute's goal is to conduct an economic
sham." Because the court found that nothing in statute to indicate that Congress intended to encourage
leveraged COLI investments, the inquiry into motive was proper. In this regard, it was significant that "the
plan was marketed as a tax-driven investment." Because the COLI "plan had no net effect on Camelot's
economic position, ... it fails the objective prong of the economic sham analysis." Because there was no
"legitimate business purpose behind the plan, ... it fails the subjective prong as well." Penalties were also
upheld.
a. But a District Court finds for the taxpayer in an incredible opinion.
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 2d 748, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,346, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-
1489 (E.D. Mich. 3/31/03). In a carefully-detailed opinion Judge Lawson finds that Dow did correctly
almost everything that Camelot and AEP did incorrectly. The interest rate on policy loans was not
unreasonably high, and a positive pre-tax cash flow was expected. The court found that there was a
business purpose for the COLI arrangements, i.e., to provide retiree benefits. The premiums for the first
three years were payable with policy loans and the premiums for years four through seven were payable
90% with partial [cash] withdrawals (from policies whose cash value had been previously borrowed) and
10% with cash from the taxpayer. Judge Lawson found that the partial withdrawals were "shams in fact"
because there was no cash value left in the policies to borrow, but that the § 264(c)(1) test was met
because of the payments of 10% of the premiums by taxpayer with its own cash in years four through
seven. The court found that the § 264(c)(1) safe harbor did not require level premiums over the first
seven years and that the "premium" for each of years four to seven was the 10% paid in cash. Judge
Lawson found that Reg. § 1.264-4(c)(1)(ii) (which required level premiums) was invalid, and he rejected
the holding in both CM Holdings and AEP that the four-out-of-seven test required level premiums.
* In finding that taxpayer expected a positive pre-tax cash flow,
Judge Lawson refused to admit into evidence a statement in taxpayer's protest that could have led to a
contrary conclusion on the ground that Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that statements
made during settlement negotiations are inadmissible at trial.
b. There's no harm in asking? Not from asking Judge Lawson! Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14784 (E.D. Mich. 8/12/03). The government's
motion to amend the court's judgment was granted in part and denied in part, but the same judgment and
basic result. Ironically, since the motion opened up all findings of fact, Judge Lawson reversed his earlier
finding that the partial withdrawals in years four through seven were "shams in fact," thus making moot
the government's argument relating to the logical consequences of this earlier finding, i.e., that taxpayer
did not meet the four-of-seven test because it did not pay the entire premium in each of years four
through seven from its own funds.
c. The circuit to which Dow is appealable (Sixth Circuit) holds for the
government in a COLI case. American Electric Power Co. v. United States, 326 F.3d 737, 91
A.F.T.R.2d 2003-2060, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,416 (6th Cir. 4/28/03). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed a the District Court finding that taxpayer's COLI plan was an economic sham because it would
lose a substantial amount of money absent the policy-loan interest deductions. The court declined to
decide whether the dividends in years 4-7, generated by circular cashless netting transactions, were
factual shams.
B. Identified "tax avoidance transactions."
1. Some of these are still being peddled to your clients. Notice 2001-51, 2001-34
I.R.B. 190 (8/3/01), superseding Notice 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 826. The IRS has identified sixteen listed
transactions for purposes of Temp. Reg. §§ 1.6011-4T(b)(2) and 301.6111-2T(b)(2). The listed
transactions include:(1) Rev. Rul. 90-105, 1990-2 C.B. 69, transactions (deductions for contributions to
certain pension plans attributable to future year's compensation); (2) Notice 95-34, 1995-1 C.B. 309,
certain trust arrangements (purported multiple employer welfare benefit funds); (3) Notice 95-53, 1995-2
C.B. 334, "lease strips"; (4) Notice 98-5, 1998-1 C.B. 334, transactions in which the expected economic
profit is insubstantial in comparison to the value of the expected FTCs; (5) ASA Investerings-type and
ACM-type transactions; (6) Prop. Reg. § 1.643(a)-8 transactions involving distributions from charitable
remainder trusts; (7) Rev. Rul. 99-14, 1999-1 C.B. 835, lease-in/lease-out [LILO] transactions) ; (8)
Notice 99-59, 1999-2 C.B. 761, transactions involving the distribution of encumbered property in which
taxpayers claim tax losses for capital outlays that they have in fact recovered (the PwC so-called BOSS
tax shelter); (9) Treas. Reg. § 1.7701(1)-3 fast-pay arrangements; (10) Rev. Rul. 2000-12, 2000-11 I.R.B.
744 certain transactions involving the acquisition of two debt instruments the values of which are
expected to change significantly at about the same time in opposite directions; (11) Notice 2000-44,
2000-36 I.R.B. 255 transactions generating losses resulting from artificially inflating the basis of
partnership interests (the KPMG so-called BLIPS10 tax shelter); (12) Notice 2000-60, 2000-49 I.R.B.
568, transactions involving the purchase of a parent corporation's stock by a subsidiary, a subsequent
transfer of the purchased parent stock from the subsidiary to the parent's employees, and the eventual
liquidation or sale of the subsidiary; (13) Notice 2000-61, 2000-49 I.R.B. 569, transactions purporting to
apply § 935 to Guamanian trusts; (14) Notice 2001-16, 2001-9 I.R.B. 730, intermediary sales
transactions; (15) Notice 2001-17, 2001-9 I.R.B. 730, contingent liability § 351 transfer transactions; and
(16) Notice 2001-45, 2001-33 I.R.B. 129 (certain redemptions of stock in transactions not subject to U.S.
tax in which the basis of the redeemed stock purports to shift to a U.S. taxpayer.
2. Rev. Rul. 2002-71, 2002-44 I.R.B. 763 (10/17/02). A taxpayer should take into
account gain or loss on the termination of a notional principal contract that hedges a portion of the term
of a debt instrument issued by the taxpayer over the period to which the hedge relates. This is because of
the matching requirement of Reg. § 1.446-4(b), which requires that this be done in order to clearly reflect
income.
3. Notice 2003-22, 2003-18 I.R.B. 851 (4/4/03). This notice addresses an abusive
arrangement designed to evade income and employment taxes on compensation income through the use
of unrelated conduit domestic and foreign employee leasing companies. The arrangements are "listed
transactions." See VIII.D., below for a more complete description.
4. Temporary and proposed Son-of-Boss regulations. T.D. 9062, Assumption of
Partner Liabilities, 68 F.R. 37414 (6/24/03); REG-106736-00, Assumption of Partner Liabilities, 68 F.R.
37434 (6/24/03). Temporary and proposed regulations regarding a partnership's assumption of a
partner's liabilities in a transaction substantially similar to the Son-of-Boss transactions described in
Notice 2000-44. These regulations prevent taxpayers from relying on the exceptions in § 358(h)(2)(B)
[for transfers of the trade or business with which the liability is associated is, or substantially all of the
assets with which the liability is associated are, transferred to the partnership assuming the liability],
which were intended to exclude ordinary business transactions from the application of § 358(h), and were
not intended to allow taxpayers to engage in transactions that create noneconomic tax losses.
5. Lease strips are made a listed transaction. Notice 2003-55, 2003-34 I.R.B.
(7/21/03), superseding Notice 95-53, 1995-2 C.B. 354. The IRS has concluded - based upon its victories
in Andantech L.L.C. v. Commissioner, 331 F.3d 972 (D.C. Cir. 2003), and Nicole Rose v. Commissioner,
320 F.3d 282 (2d Cir. 2002) - that lease strips improperly separate income from related deductions. The
notice also states that the IRS may challenge lease strips on other grounds, including (1) assignments or
accelerations of future payments as financings, (2) lack of a valid partnership, and (3) judicial doctrines
such as lack of business purpose, step transaction, sham, etc.
a. But not on § 482 grounds. Rev. Rul. 2003-96, 2003-34 I.R.B. (7/21/03).
The IRS has concluded the inapplicability of the § 482 rationale of Notice 95-53 because an agreement
between unrelated parties to arbitrarily shift income or deductions "does not by itself evidence the type of
control necessary to satisfy [§ 482]."
10 See 2003 TNT 112-12.
6. See VII.D., below, for additional "listed transactions" aimed at individuals.
C. Disclosure and Settlement
1. June 2002 temporary and proposed regulations. T.D. 9000 and REG-1 10311-
92, Return Filing Requirement, 67 F.R. 41324 & 41362 (6/18/02). These temporary and proposed
regulations modify the disclosure, registration and list maintenance rules under §§ 6011 (a), 6111 (d) and
6112 with respect to tax shelters.
* The new regulations extend the requirement to disclose listed and
other reportable transactions under Reg. § 1.6011-4T to individuals, trusts, partnerships, and S corporations
that participate, directly or indirectly, in listed transactions. Further, they clarify indirect participation in a
reportable transaction. A taxpayer indirectly participates in a reportable transaction if the taxpayer knows or
has reason to know that the tax benefits claimed from the transaction are derived from a reportable
transaction.
* The IRS notes that some taxpayers and promoters have applied the
"substantially similar" standard in Reg. §§ 1.6011-4T and 301.6111-2T in an overly narrow manner to avoid
disclosure, and the regulations to clarify that the term "substantially similar" includes any transaction that is
expected to obtain the same or similar types of tax benefits and that is either factually similar or based on
the same or similar tax strategy. Further, the term "substantially similar" must be broadly construed in favor
of disclosure.
a. Additional guidance in October 2002. T.D. 9017 and REG-103735-00,
Tax Shelter Disclosure Statements, 67 F.R. 64799 and 64840 (10/22/02). The IRS has promulgated
temporary and proposed regulations to provide additional guidance needed to comply with the § 6011 (a)
disclosure rules. Covers transactions involving tax shelters involving income, estate, gift, employment, or
exempt organizations excise taxes. Revises the categories of transactions that must be disclosed on
returns: (1) listed transactions; (2) confidential transactions; (3) transactions with contractual protection;
(4) loss transactions above stated thresholds; (5) transactions with a significant book-tax difference; and
(6) transactions involving a less-than-45-day holding period that result in a tax credit exceeding
$250,000. These temporary regulations are effective 1/1/03.
(1) T.D. 9018 and REG-103736-00, Requirement to Maintain a List
of Investors in Potentially Abusive Tax Shelters, 67 F.R. 64807 and 64842 (10/22/02). The IRS has
promulgated conforming temporary and proposed regulations, which modify the list maintenance
requirements under § 6112.
b. February 2003 final regulations. T.D. 9046, Tax Shelter Regulations,
68 F.R. 10161 (2/28/03). Modifies and makes final the rules relating to tax shelter disclosure statements
to be filed with tax returns under § 6011 (a), as well as the rules relating to the registration of confidential
corporate tax shelters under § 6111(d) and the resulting list maintenance requirements under § 6112.
Retains the six disclosure categories contained in the October 2002 temporary regulations, see a., above,
with the following modifications: (2) deletes the clarification that a claim of privilege does not cause a
transaction to be confidential because a privilege does not restrict the taxpayer's ability to disclose the
tax treatment or tax structure of the transaction; (3) changes the focus to provide that this refers to
refunds of fees to be received back from a person who stated what the tax consequences of the
transaction would be, or from the person on whose behalf the statement was made; (4) a list of the loss
which need not be taken into account for reporting is contained in Rev. Proc. 2003-24, 2003-11 I.R.B.
599 (3/17/03); (5) a list of the transactions with significant book-tax difference which need not be taken
into account for reporting is contained in Rev. Proc. 2003-25, 2003-11 I.R.B. 601 (3/17/03). In addition,
the provision for retention of documents contains the following added sentence:
A taxpayer is not required to retain earlier drafts of a document if the taxpayer retains a
copy of the final document (or, if there is no final document, the most recent draft of the
document) and the final document (or most recent draft) contains all the information in
the earlier drafts of the document that is material to an understanding of the purported
tax treatment or tax structure of the transaction.
* Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(3)(iii) contains a presumption relating to
whether a transaction is confidential:
Presumption. Unless the facts and circumstances indicate otherwise, a transaction is not
considered offered to a taxpayer under conditions of confidentiality if every person who
makes or provides a statement, oral or written, to the taxpayer (or for whose benefit a
statement is made or provided to the taxpayer) as to the potential tax consequences that
may result from the transaction, provides express written authorization to the taxpayer in
substantially the following form: "the taxpayer (and each employee, representative, or
other agent of the taxpayer) may disclose to any and all persons, without limitation of
any kind, the tax treatment and tax structure of the transaction and all materials of any
kind (including opinions or other tax analyses) that are provided to the taxpayer relating
to such tax treatment and tax structure". Except as provided in paragraph (b)(3)(ii) of this
section, this presumption is available only in cases in which each written authorization
permits the taxpayer to disclose the tax treatment and tax structure of the transaction
immediately upon commencement of discussions with the person providing the
authorization and each written authorization is given no later than 30 days from the day
the person providing the written authorization first makes or provides a statement to the
taxpayer regarding the tax consequences of the transaction. A transaction that is claimed
to be exclusive or proprietary to any party other than the taxpayer will not be considered
a confidential transaction under this paragraph (b)(3) if written authorization to disclose
is provided to the taxpayer in accordance with this paragraph (b)(3)(iii) and the
transaction is not otherwise confidential.
* These regulations are effective for transactions entered into on or
after 2/28/03, except that taxpayers may elect to apply them for transactions entered into on or after 1/1/03.
2. Warm-up the photocopier for those tax accrual workpapers. Announcement
2002-63, 2002-27 I.R.B. 72 (7/8/02). In auditing returns filed after 7/1/02 that claim any tax benefits
from a "listed transaction," see Notice 2001-51, 2001-34 I.R.B. 190, the IRS may request tax accrual
workpapers. Listed transactions will be determined "at the time of the request." Neither the attorney
client privilege nor the § 7525 tax practitioner privilege protects the confidentiality of the workpapers.
a. Specific procedures regarding requests for tax accrual workpapers.
Chief Counsel Notice CC-2003-012 (4/9/03). Procedures to be used regarding requests for tax accrual
and other financial audit workpapers.
3. IRS News Release IR-2002-105 (10/4/02). The IRS announced it will for a
limited time offer settlements to taxpayers involved in three types of tax shelters.
a. Rev. Proc. 2002-67, 2002-43 I.R.B. 733 (10/5/02), as revised (10/17/02).
Procedures to settle cases involving Contingent Liability Transactions (§ 351 contingent liability tax
shelters), similar to the ones described in Notice 2001-17, 2001-1 C.B. 730, are provided.
b. Announcement 2002-97, 2002-43 I.R.B. 757 (10/11/02). This
announcement provides procedures to settle cases involving the § 302/318 basis shifting tax shelter
transactions that are the same or similar to those described in Notice 2001-45, 2001-2 C.B. 129.
Notification of the IRS must be made on or before 12/3/02.
c. Announcement 2002-96, 2002-43 I.R.B. 756 (10/11/02). This
announcement terminates the appeals settlement initiative to settle corporate-owned life insurance
(COLI) transaction tax shelters, subject to a 45-day window within which taxpayers will be permitted to
enter into the "current settlement arrangement."
4. "The. IRS and Treasury believe that taxpayers have improperly relied on
opinions or advice issued by tax advisors to establish reasonable cause and good faith as a basis for
avoiding the accuracy-related penalty." REG-126016-01, Establishing Defenses to the Imposition of
the Accuracy-Related Penalty, 67 F.R. 79894 (12/31/02). The Treasury Department has published
proposed amendments to the regulations under §§ 6662 and 6664 [Regs. §§ 1.6662-3; 1.6664-4] to limit
the available defenses to an accuracy-related penalty when a taxpayer (1) fails to disclose a reportable
transaction or (2) fails to disclose that it has taken a position on a return based upon a regulation being
invalid. Under the proposed amendments, a taxpayer who takes a position that a regulation is invalid
cannot rely on an opinion or advice to satisfy the reasonable cause and good faith exception under §
6664(c) with respect to that position unless the position was disclosed on a return (including disclosing
the position that the regulation in question is invalid). A taxpayer who engages in a reportable transaction
[See Temp. Reg. § 1.6011-4T] cannot rely on an opinion or advice to satisfy the reasonable cause and
good faith exception under § 6664(c) with respect to the transaction unless the transaction was disclosed
pursuant to the § 6011 regulations. Finally, a taxpayer who engages in a reportable transaction cannot
rely on the realistic possibility standard under § 6662 to avoid the accuracy-related penalty for negligence
or disregard of rules or regulations if the position regarding the reportable transaction is contrary to a
revenue ruling or notice. When finalized, the amendments will apply to returns filed after 12/30/02, with
respect to transactions entered into after 12/31/02.
* But be careful about over-reliance on effective dates. The
preamble states:
The IRS, however, cautions taxpayers and tax practitioners that it will rigorously apply
the existing facts and circumstances standard under § 1.6664-4(c) regarding a taxpayer's
reasonable reliance in good faith on advice from a tax professional, as well as the other
provisions of the regulations under sections 6662 and 6664, including § 1.6664-4(c)
relating to special rules for the substantial understatement penalty attributable to tax
shelter items of a corporation. In addition to the modifications contained in these
proposed regulations, and regardless of when a transaction was entered into, the IRS, in
appropriate circumstances, may consider a taxpayer's failure to disclose a reportable
transaction or failure to disclose a position that a regulation is invalid as a factor in
determining whether the taxpayer has satisfied the reasonable cause and good faith
exception under section 6664(c) to the accuracy-related penalty.
D. Individual Tax Shelters
1. Another listed tax shelter - this time an individual tax shelter. Notice 2002-
65, 2002-41 I.R.B. 690 (10/15/02). This notice adds to the list of "listed transactions" a tax shelter
involving a straddle entered into by an S corporation or partnership, with one or more transitory
shareholders or partners. The entity closes the gain leg, and passes through the gain, redeems some
shareholders or partners, with the redeemed members claiming losses, closes the books for allocating
gain or loss, and then closes the loss leg of the straddle, which is passed through to the remaining
shareholders or partners.
2. Government misconduct amounting to fraud does not require a showing of
prejudice to justify relief. Tax shelter investors entitled to the same deal received by the taxpayers
who cooperated with the government. Dixon v. Commissioner, 316 F.3d 1044, 2003-1 U.S.T.C.
50,194 (9th Cir. 1/17/03), remanding T.C. Memo. 2000-116 and T.C. Memo. 1999-101. The Ninth
Circuit reverses the Tax Court finding that misconduct by IRS attorneys during the trial of test cases
[secretly allowing the deduction of attorney's fees in exchange for taxpayer cooperation] constituted
harmless error. The tax shelter was one designed and administered by Honolulu businessman Henry
Kersting, in which participants purchased stock with loans from entities financed by two layers of
promissory notes, resulting in their being enable to claim interest deductions on their individual returns.
Judge Hawkins held that the taxpayers demonstrated fraud and that a demonstration of prejudice was
unnecessary. The Tax Court was directed to enter judgment in favor of taxpayers on terms equivalent to
the secret settlement agreements entered into with the test case taxpayers who cooperated with the
government.
* Three lawyers from the Houston area represented various
taxpayers. They are Henry Binder of Porter & Hedges, Michael Louis Minns, and Joe Alfred Izen, Jr.
a. Chief Counsel Notice CC-2003-008 (2/3/03). This notice reminds Chief
Counsel attorneys of their obligation to adhere to the highest ethical standards in all aspects of their
responsibilities, including representation of the Commissioner before the Tax Court. ABA Model Rules
3.3 [candor to tribunals], 3.4 [fairness to opposing party and counsel], 4.1 [truthfulness in statements to
third persons], and 8.4 [misconduct] were discussed in the notice.
3. Faux foreign. Notice 2003-22, 2003-18 I.R.B. 851 (4/4/03). This notice
addresses an abusive arrangement designed to evade income and employment taxes on compensation
income through the use of unrelated conduit domestic and foreign employee leasing companies. The
taxpayer purports to terminate his employment relationship with his employer, to enter unto an
employment relationship with a foreign employee leasing corporation, which leases the employee to a
domestic employee leasing corporation, which it turn leases the employee to his original employer.
Domestic leasing pays taxpayer substantially less than the original employer and remits the balance (less
a fee) to the foreign company, which (1) claims treaty benefits resulting in no US tax because it has no
effectively connected income, and (2) effectively sets-aside the funds for the taxpayer's benefit. The IRS
will challenge these (and similar) arrangements on a variety of theories, and will impose penalties. The
arrangements are "listed transactions."
4. Sale of nonqualified stock option to related person is a listed transaction.
Arrangements heavily promoted to executives to defer the tax on the option gain by selling the
option to a related person for a long-term unsecured note, and claiming that the option gain is not
taxable until payments are made on the note. The IRS attacks the E&Y, inter alia, nonstatutory
stock option deferral shelter, Act I. Notice 2003-47, 2003-30 I.R.B. 132 (7/1/03). Transactions
involving the transfer of nonstatutory stock options to a related person in exchange for a long-term,
unsecured deferred payment obligation are not arm's length transactions for purposes of Reg. § 1.83-7.
The receipt of the deferred payment obligation will not result in a deferral of the recognition of income
arising from the transfer. "[T]he IRS will argue that the option recipient recognizes income to the extent
that the amount of the deferred payment obligation transferred to the option recipient, plus any cash or
other property received by the individual, exceeds the amount, if any, the option recipient paid for the
option." The transactions (and any substantially similar transactions) are "listed transactions" for
purposes of Reg. §§ 1.6011-4(b)(2), 301.6111-2(b)(2), and 301.6112-1(b)(2).
a. Act H: The IRS hammers the nonstatutory stock option deferral
shelter. T.D. 9067, Transfers of Compensatory Options, 68 F.R. 39453 (7/2/03). Temp. Reg. § 1.83-7T
provides that a sale or other disposition of a nonstatutory stock option to a related person will not be
treated as a transaction that closes the application of § 83 with respect to the option. A person is related
to the service provider if: (1) the person and the service provider bear a relationship to each other that is
specified in § 267(b) or § 707(b)(1), modified to replace "50 percent" with "20 percent" and to treat the
spouse of any family member as a family member for purposes of constructive stock ownership under §
267(c)(4), or (2) the service provider and the person are engaged in trades or businesses under common
control (as defined in § 52(a) and (b)), excepting the service recipient with respect to the option or the
grantor of the option. The effective date is 7/2/03
IX. EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS AND CHARITABLE GIVING
A. Exempt Organizations
1. HMOs are not tax exempt. IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Commissioner, 325 F.3d
1188, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,368, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-1767 (10th Cir. 4/9/03), aff'g T.C. Memo. 2001-
246. The Commissioner denied HMOs' requests for tax exemption under § 501(c)(3), and this decision
was affirmed by the Tax Court and by the Tenth Circuit on appeal. Judge Tacha held that the HMOs did
not operate primarily for the purpose of promoting health for the benefit of the community - even though
they covered fifty percent of Utah's total Medicaid population and twenty percent of Utah's total
population - because providing health care services to all in the community in exchange for a fee is not
sufficient for charitable tax exemption. The organization must provide some additional "plus," such as
(1) providing free or below-cost services, (2) maintaining an emergency room open to all regardless of
ability to pay, or (3) devoting surpluses to research, education and medical training. In the absence of any
"positive externalities," or "public goods," or "additional community or public benefits" - however this
"plus" is denominated - the HMOs do not provide a community benefit in order to be charitable
organizations exempt from taxation under § 501(c)(3).
0 Additionally, the HMOs do not qualify for exemption as an
"integral part" of IHC Health Services, Inc., a related § 501(c)(3) organization that operates hospitals and
provides charitable care, because "separately incorporated entities must qualify for tax exemption on their
own merits," following and quoting Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner, 30 F.3d 494, 498 (3d Cir.
1994).
B. Charitable Giving
1. Do you have Kelly's Blue Book on your desk? Rev. Rul. 2002-67, 2002-47
I.R.B. 873 (11/8/02). The IRS has ruled that an automobile donated to charity may be valued by reference
to an established used car pricing guide if, and only if, the guide lists the sales price for a car that is the
same make, model, and year, sold in the same area, and in the same condition as the donated car. The
ruling also provides that the substantiation requirements of § 170(0(8) can be met through an authorized
[for-profit] agent of the charity who solicits donations on the charity's behalf, in this case an entity that
solicited and accepted the donations of used cars, sold the cars, and remitted the proceeds to the charity.
2. Professor donates his patent to the university, but . . . Contributions of
partial interests in-patents aren't deductible. Rev. Rul. 2003-28, 2003-11 I.R.B. 594 (2/26/03). No
deduction is allowed under § 170 for a charitable contribution of (1) a license to use a patent, if the
taxpayer retains any substantial right in the patent [e.g., a right to license to others], or (2) a patent
subject to a conditional reversion [e.g., a contribution of a patent to a university subject to a reversion if a
particular faculty member ceases to be a member of the faculty within 15 years], unless the likelihood of
the reversion is so remote as to be negligible. Both of these transfers are transfers of partial interests, a
deduction for which is disallowed by § 170(f)(3). A § 170 deduction is allowable for a charitable
contribution of a patent subject to a license or transfer restriction generally [e.g., a restriction of transfer
or licensing for 3 years], but the restriction reduces what would otherwise be the value of the patent.
X. TAX PROCEDURE
A. Penalties and Prosecutions
1. If you abuse the bankruptcy process to delay your Tax Court case, you
might acquire a new debt - a fine for criminal contempt. Williams v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 276
(12/12/02). After filing a Tax Court petition, the taxpayer repeatedly filed and withdrew bankruptcy
petitions to invoke the automatic stay rule [11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(8)], to delay proceeding in the Tax Court,
and on one occasion he filed a forged bankruptcy petition with the Tax Court. In addition to imposing a
$25,000 penalty under § 6673 for delay, Judge Gerber imposed a $5,000 criminal contempt sanction.
2. This false W-2 resulted in a felony rather than a misdemeanor. United States
v. Gambone, 314 F.3d 163, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,162, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-330 (3d Cir. 1/3/03). An
employer who files fraudulent W-2s for the purpose of evading employment taxes and income tax
withholding, and who encourages employees to file fraudulent returns consistent with the W-2s, can be
convicted of a felony under § 7206(2). The exclusivity of § 7204, which makes filing a false or
fraudulent W-2 a misdemeanor in lieu of any other crime is limited to instances in which the only action
taken is "merely furnish[ing] false W-2s." Conduct involving the furnishing of false W-2s, but not
limited to filing false W-2s, such as encouraging employees to file false returns, can be prosecuted under
§ 7206(2).
3. IRS announces an amnesty for offshore credit-card abusers who clear up
their tax liabilities by April 15th 2003. IRS News Release IR-2003-5, 2003 TNT 10-11 (1/14/03). An
Offshore Voluntary Compliance Initiative provides that "eligible taxpayers," who used offshore payment
cards or other offshore financial arrangements to hide their income, may avoid civil fraud and
information return penalties [but not failure to pay tax or accuracy-related penalties] if they come
forward and pay up by 4/15/03 and provide full details on those who promoted or solicited the offshore
scheme. Promoters and solicitors are not eligible. The information release contains the following
example:
For example, a taxpayer who understated his income to avoid $ 100,000 in taxes in 1999
would wind up paying $ 149,319 to the government. This includes the tax liability plus $
29,319 in interest and an additional accuracy-related penalty of $ 20,000.
a. Rev. Proc. 2003-11, 2003-4 I.R.B. 311 (1/14/03). This revenue
procedure contains detailed procedures for the Offshore Voluntary Compliance Initiative, including as an
exhibit the "specific matters closing agreement" to be executed by the taxpayer.
4. Rev. Rul. 2003-23, 2003-8 I.R.B. 511 (2/24/03). An individual who files a late
return for the preceding taxable year and pays as required the installments properly based upon the tax
shown on that return, will not be liable for the § 6654(a) addition to tax for an underpayment of estimated
tax for the current taxable year. The § 6654(d)(1)(B)(ii) safe harbor does not require a timely return.
5. The IRS foot-faulted on preparing a tax protestor's substitute return and
lost the failure to pay penalty, but salvages a frivolous position penalty. Cabirac v. Commissioner,
120 T.C. 163 (4/22/03). The taxpayer filed income tax return forms with zeros on the relevant lines for
computing tax liability. The IRS prepared unsubscribed substitute returns showing zeros, and sent a
deficiency notice based on a calculation of taxable income and tax shown in a revenue agent's report,
which had not been attached to the substitute returns. The Tax Court (Judge Ruwe) held that the taxpayer
was liable for the § 6651(a)(1) failure to file penalty, but not for the § 6651(a)(2) failure to pay penalty.
The unsubscribed substitute returns showing zero taxes did not meet the requirements for a § 6020(b)
return, and the subsequently prepared notice of proposed adjustments and the revenue agent's report,
which were not attached to the unsubscribed substitutes for return, whether viewed separately or in
conjunction with the substitute return, were not an adequate § 6020(b) return. However, a $ 2,000 §
6673(a)(1) frivolous position penalty was assessed.
6. The Tax Court just says "no" to impermissible stacking of penalties. Said v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-148 (5/22/03). Where one spouse is liable for the civil fraud penalty on
the entire underpayment relating to a joint return, the § 6662 accuracy related penalty cannot be assessed
against the other spouse with respect to any part of the understatement.
B. Discovery: Summonses and FOIA
1. The PwC deal. IR-2002-82 (6/27/02). The IRS announced in a news release that
it cut a deal with PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) "to resolve tax shelter registration and list maintenance
issues. The IRS news release, which is similar to one issued last August regarding Merrill Lynch, says
that without admitting or denying liability, PwC has agreed to make a 'substantial payment' to the IRS to
resolve issues in connection with advice rendered to clients dating back to 1995. Under the agreement,
PwC will provide to the IRS certain client information in response to summonses. It will also work with
the IRS to develop processes to ensure ongoing compliance with the shelter registration and investor list
maintenance requirements, according to the release."
a. The EY deal. IR-2003-84 (7/2/03). The IRS announced in a news
release that it has settled Ernst & Young's potential liability under the tax shelter registration and list
maintenance penalty provisions for a nondeductible payment of $15 million.
2. Does the crime/fraud exception to the attorney client privilege defeat
privilege claim? United States v. BDO Seidman, 225 F. Supp. 2d 918, 2002-2 U.S.T.C. 50,763, 90
A.F.T.R.2d 2002-6810 (N.D. I11. 10/10/02). Documents for which accounting firm claimed § 7525
privilege were ordered to be produced for magistrate's in camera review. In his opinion, Judge Shadur
noted,
One last point has occurred to this Court -- something that has not been addressed by
either of the parties. Suppose that some of the documents for which BDO claims
privilege could otherwise fit within the standards governing the attorney-client privilege
(and hence the equivalent statutory accountant-client privilege), but that they relate to the
types of "abusive tax shelters" that have triggered the congressional enactment at issue
here. In that event, would the utilization of such an "abusive tax shelter" by a taxpayer to
whom BDO has given advice as to its use create the potential of criminal as well as civil
liability on the taxpayer's part? And if so, would that trigger the application of the crime-
fraud exception to the privilege?
a. Decision on whether proposed intervenors could claim "identity"
privilege under § 7525. United States v. BDO Seidman, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,255 (N.D. Ill. 2/4/03).
Judge Holderman decides that there are four criteria as to whether client identity is privileged on a
document-by-document basis: (1) Was the purposed of the representation to provide tax advice? [must be
"yes" to be privileged]; (2) whether revealing identity would reveal client's motives for seeking tax
advice [must be "yes"]; (3) whether the IRS could determine that clients participated in the transactions
without obtaining their names from BDO [must be "no"]; and (4) whether the document was generated
for the purpose of preparing tax returns [must be "no"]. Findings for each in camera document followed.
b. Affirmed. Seventh Circuit say tax shelter disclosure rules virtually
preclude assertions of identity privilege by tax shelter investors. United States v. BDO Seidman, 92
A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5443 (7th Cir. 7/23/03). The Court of Appeals (Judge Ripple) affirmed the district
court's determination that the investors failed to establish that a confidential communication would be
disclosed if their identities were revealed. Disclosure of their identities would disclose to the IRS only
that they had participated in one of the tax shelters described in the summonses, but no confidential
communication could be inferred from that information alone. The court distinguished In re Grand Jury
Proceeding (Cherney), 898 F.2d 565 (7th Cir.1990); Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663 (7th Cir.1965),
as cases in which "the Government already knew much about the substance of the communications
between the attorney and his unidentified client," from this case, where "the IRS knows relatively little
about the interactions between BDO and the [the investors], the nature of their relationship, or the
substance of their conversations." Furthermore none of the summonsed documents were not subject to
any other independent claim of privilege beyond identity. Then, in sweeping language, the court
concluded that the tax shelter disclosure rules virtually preclude assertions of identity privilege by tax
shelter investors.
More fundamentally, the Does' participation in potentially abusive tax shelters is
information ordinarily subject to full disclosure under the federal tax law. ... Congress
has determined that tax shelters are subject to special scrutiny, and anyone who
organizes or sells an interest in tax shelters is required, pursuant to I.R.C. § 6112, to
maintain a list identifying each person to whom such an interest was sold. This list-
keeping provision precludes the Does from establishing an expectation of confidentiality
in their communications with BDO, an essential element of the attorney-client privilege
and, by extension, the § 7525 privilege. ... At the time that the Does communicated their
interest in participating in tax shelters that BDO organized or sold, the Does should have
known that BDO was obligated to disclose the identity of clients engaging in such
financial transactions. Because the Does cannot credibly argue that they expected that
their participation in such transactions would not be disclosed, they cannot now establish
that the documents responsive to the summonses, which do not contain any tax advice,
reveal a confidential communication....
BDO's affirmative duty to disclose its clients' participation in potentially abusive tax
shelters renders the Does' situation easily distinguishable from the limited circumstances
in which we have determined that a client's identity was information subject to the
attorney-client privilege ...
c. You don't have to be a criminal to claim identity privilege in
Chicago. United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5207 (N.D. Ill. 6/30/03). Investors
in tax shelters promoted by Arthur Andersen successfully intervened anonymously and asserted identity
privilege under § 7525 when the IRS sought to enforce an administrative summons to obtain the lists of
investors. The court (Judge Castillio) rejected the government's argument [based on In re Grand Jury
Proceeding (Cherney), 898 F.2d 565 (7th Cir.1990); Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663 (7th Cir.1965)]
that identity privilege can exist only where the client has engaged in past criminal conduct, and applied
the four part test of United States v. BDO Seidman, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-1016, 20031 U.S.T.C. 50,255
(N.D. I11. 2/4/03). (N.D. Ill. 2003) [United States v. BDO Seidman, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5443 (7th Cir.
7/2/03)]. Judge Castillio concluded that "revealing the clients' identities would reveal their motives for
seeking tax advice [because] [t]he IRS is seeking information, including the identities ... in an effort to
determine whether or not Andersen was complying with the IRS regulations governing potentially
abusive tax shelters. ... Under these circumstances, it is difficult to see how revealing the identities of the
Poes and the Does could amount to anything less than a revelation of their motivations in seeking
Andersen's tax advice-to invest in potentially abusive tax shelters. This motivation, the "very substantive
reason that the client sought ... advice in the first place," is confidential and therefore privileged under §
7525. Judge Castillio held further that Reg. § 301.6112-IT Q & A-17(b) provides that the § 7525
privilege trumps the requirements of § 6112. Finally, he rejected the government's argument that the
crime-fraud exception to privilege applied because there was no primafacia showing of a crime.
0 It would appear that the Seventh Circuit's subsequent opinion in
BDO Seidman, see above, overrules Judge Castillio's opinion in Arthur Andersen, LLP.
d. And indeed it does! United States v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 2003-2
U.S.T.C. 50,624, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5800 (N.D. I11. 8/15/03). Judge Castillo characterizes BDO as
providing that "it appears that the Seventh Circuit intended in BDO to pronounce a generally applicable
prohibition on the assertion of the identity privilege in IRS summons enforcement actions that does not
seem altered by differing factual scenarios," and reluctantly holds that the intervenors may not assert a §
7525 privilege in their identities.
3. Now here's a legitimate case of identity privilege. United States v. Braun, 92
A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5406 (N.D. Cal. 6/17/03). The IRS was investigating the civil tax liability of W. W and
C were under investigation by a local police force for grand theft. C was charged by the U.S. government
with structuring transactions to avoid reporting under 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3). C was represented in the
criminal matter by attorney A. C waived attorney client privilege and the IRS obtained documents from
attorney A that identified attorney B as the source of payments of C's legal fees. The district court
refused to enforce an IRS summons against attorney B seeking the identity of his client who had sought
legal representation for C, because, based on information in the attorney's sealed affidavit, the court
found that the client had disclosed confidential information to the attorney that would necessarily be
revealed if the client's identity were known.
4. Are you practicing law or practicing tax when you write that opinion letter?
United States v. KPMG LLP, 237 F. Supp. 2d 35, 2003-1 U.S.T.C 50,174, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-317 (D.
D.C. 12/20/02). The IRS served administrative summonses on KPMG in connection with investigating
KPMG's promotion and participation in tax shelters and sought judicial enforcement when it determined
that KPMG had not complied. KPMG withheld documents that would have been responsive to the
summonses on grounds that the documents were privileged, and KPMG provided the IRS with a privilege
log of the withheld documents. Citing United States v. Lawless, 709 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1983), for the
principle that the attorney-client privilege does not extend to communications between a taxpayer and his
attorney simply for the purpose of preparing a tax return, the court held that the § 7525 privilege does not
extend to communications between a taxpayer and tax practitioner simply for the purpose of preparing a
tax return. The court then went on to hold that KPMG's tax opinion letters to its clients were not
privileged because they were prepared in connection with the preparation of tax returns. Furthermore,
memoranda of KPMG's employees' discussions with clients' lawyers were not privileged because the
communications were in connection with tax return preparation. Somewhat contradictorily, however, the
court held that opinion letters prepared by law firms in connection with preparation of tax returns were
privileged if the taxpayer, rather than the accounting firm, retained the lawyer.
0 The court also held that § 7525 did not protect accountant work
product. With respect to attorney work product, the court articulated the following standard: "The burden of
showing that the materials prepared were in anticipation of litigation is on the party asserting the privilege,"
and " this burden entails a showing that the documents were prepared for the purpose of assisting an
attorney in preparing for litigation, and not for some other reason." After an in camera review and
comparison of a random sample of thirty allegedly privileged documents and the corresponding entries in
the privilege log prepared in response to the summons, the court found that only four of the privilege log
entries were completely supportable; accordingly it referred the matter to a special master to conduct an
examination of the withheld documents, evaluate the asserted privileges, and submit a report and
recommendation.5. District court finds subject-matter waiver of privilege in all
communications between two corporations and their outside tax counsel by reason of the assertion
of a "reasonable cause" defense. In re: G-I Holdings Inc., 2003-2 U.S.T.C. 50, (D. N.J. 7/18/03). The
court (Judge Bassler) refused to bifurcate discovery and trial on the issue of penalties pending resolution
of the substantive tax issues because the debtors waived any attorney-client privilege with respect to their
outside tax counsel [Bill McKee and Will Nelson] by asserting a "reasonable cause" defense that placed
attorney-client communications at issue. The court further finds that the debtors' communications with
Michael Baldasaro [an accountant then with Arthur Andersen] are not privileged under United States v.
Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961), because he was hired as a consultant - his expertise in partnership
transactions taxation was too great to consider him as a "translator or facilitator."
6. Long-Term Capital Holdings rulings. Long-Term Capital Holdings v. United
States, 90 A.F.T.R.2d 2002-7446, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,105 (D. Conn. 10/30/02), modified by, 2003-1
U.S.T.C. 50,304, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-1139 (D. Conn. 2/14/03). In connection with a transaction, the
taxpayer obtained opinions from Sherman & Sterling and from King & Spalding relating to different
aspects of the transaction. Without specifically disclosing the K&S opinion letter itself, the taxpayer
revealed to its tax accountant that it had a "more likely than not' opinion with respect to the allowability
of the deduction. The S&S opinions, in contrast, were voluntarily disclosed in the course of the audit.
The magistrate held that disclosure of existence of the K&S opinion and that it was a more likely than
not opinion with respect to allowance of deduction disclosed gist of opinion and thus was an express
subject matter waiver even though disclosure was extra-judicial. In addition, the magistrate alternatively
reasoned that voluntary disclosure of the S&S opinions, while asserting privilege as to K&S opinion
regarding a different aspect of the same transaction, was attempt to use the "privileged communications
as both a shield and a sword." The magistrate found implied waiver as to the K&S opinion. The
alternative holding is confusing, however, because the magistrate also factored in the express waiver
resulting from the disclosure of the existence of the K&S to its tax accountant. Nevertheless, the
Magistrate ultimately concluded that the K&S opinion could constitute work product under Second
Circuit's application of the doctrine to documents prepared "in anticipation of litigation," in United
States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194 (2d Cir. 1998). Accordingly, the magistrate required submission of
documents for in camera inspection.
0 On reconsideration, the magistrate found that the S&S opinion
was not privileged because it was prepared for the purpose of ascertaining the basis of a partnership interest
and thus was a record that had to be made available to the IRS under Reg. § 1.6001-1(a). Since the S&S
opinion was not privileged to begin with, its disclosure was not a subject matter waiver. Furthermore, after
considering further facts the K&S opinion was found not to deal with the same issues as the S&S opinion,
and thus the disclosure of the S&S opinion was not a waiver with respect to the K&S opinion. However, the
magistrate reaffirmed that the disclosure of existence of the K&S opinion and that it was a more likely than
not opinion with respect to allowance of deduction disclosed gist of opinion and thus was an express waiver,
but rather than being a subject matter waiver - as originally held - the waiver was only of those portions of
the opinion letter reflecting the matter actually disclosed. Finally, the magistrate held that the K&S opinion
was opinion attorney work product that was not discoverable by the IRS.
7. Attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine can shield documents
from the IRS, but you've got to have a privilege log. Toler v. United States, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,476,
91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-2262 (S.D. Ohio 4/29/03). In connection with a criminal investigation [prior to a
referral to the Justice Department], the IRS issued a summons seeking the taxpayer's documents,
including all records used or resulting from preparation of the taxpayer's tax returns, to Kiesling, an
accountant-attorney, who had advised the taxpayer on various tax matters in his capacity as an attorney.
Kiesling represented the taxpayer in the criminal matter until August 2000, when the taxpayer retained
another law firm, "SZD," which in turn retained Kiesling. Because prior to August 2000, Kiesling did not
possess any of the documents in question, the summons was quashed in that regard. However, if Kiesling
possessed any documents or obtained any information described in the summons that were created or
obtained after the taxpayer retained SZD - a fact that was not admitted - the documents and
information were protected by the attorney-client privilege to the extent that they "serve[d] to disclose
confidential legal communications between [taxpayer] and SZD," since Kiesling was SZD's agent.
Furthermore, to the extent any relevant documents were prepared or created to assist in defending against
the possible criminal charges, they were protected by the work product doctrine, regardless of whether
Kiesling was acting as an attorney or accountant after being retained by SZD. However, because the
taxpayer failed to provide a privilege log, the motion to quash was denied, without prejudice to renew.
following preparation of a disclosure log. Finally, the pre-existing documents that were gathered after
August 2000 were not protected by the Fifth Amendment because the "fact that the contents of such
documents, tot eh extent they exist, may be incriminating does not render the production of those
documents incriminating.
8. A lawyer's description and opinion regarding a prepackaged tax shelter
transaction is not privileged. Doe #1 v. Wachovia Corporation, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5125 (W.D. N.C.
6/24/03). The IRS served an administrative summons on Wachovia seeking investor lists, documents, and
other information relating to potentially abusive tax shelters under Reg. § 301.6112-iT. Investors argued
that disclosure of their names would "be tantamount to disclosure of privileged information" provided by
them to KPMG [§ 7525 privilege] and to Jenkens & Gilchrist [attorney-client privilege], and that other
confidential privileged information would be disclosed by compliance with the summons. The court
found that there was no attorney-client relationship between the investors and Jenkens & Gilchrist.
Rather, Jenkens & Gilchrist "appear[ed] to have merely sold a package to them which contained a
description of the transaction and a memorandum as to the potential tax consequences stemming from the
transaction." There was no any evidence that any investor "ever had so much as a conversation with an
attorney at J & G," and there was nothing uniquely tied to the individual investors' financial situation.
The package contained no confidential information, was sent to all investors without any individual
tailoring, and was delivered by Wachovia, not Jenkens & Gilchrist.
[I]n this case there is no evidence that J & G was (1) retained by the client, as opposed to
by Wachovia; (2) contacted by the client, except through Wachovia; (3) providing legal
advice based on individual financial information, as opposed to selling a tax advantaged
structure; and (4) by the terms of its own agreement, acting as an attorney for the
"client."
Similarly, the § 7525 privilege did not apply with respect to
KPMG. First, the privilege only applies in cases by or against the government and before the IRS. This was
a suit by investors seeking an injunction against Wachovia, not a proceeding in which the United States
appeared, and the issuance of an administrative summons to a bank is not a "tax proceeding" before the IRS.
Second, the privilege does not apply "to any written communication between a federally authorized tax
practitioner and a director, shareholder, officer, or employee, agent, or representative of a corporation in
connection with the promotion of the direct or indirect participation of such corporation in any tax shelter,"
which exactly described this cases. Third, KPMG did not provide any advice other than in the context of
return preparation, which is not privileged.
• On 6/26/03, the investors filed a notice of intent to appeal.
9. There's no client identity privilege when it's the lawyer's tax return being
audited. Najar v. United States, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,470, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-2166 (S.D. Ind. 4/11/03).
The IRS issued a summons to the taxpayer-lawyer's bank seeking documents relating to the taxpayer's
account designated as an Interest on Lawyers' Trust Account (IOLTA). The court rejected the taxpayer's
argument that the requested documents were protected by attorney client-privilege. Banking transactions
are not confidential communications between an attorney and client; they are commercial transactions
that disclose the identity of the parties to the transaction to the third party banking institution. The
requested documents were relevant because "the clients themselves may be instrumental in identifying
and verifying non-income and income items in the attorney's trust account."
10. A § 7602 summons solely for a criminal investigation is OK! Scom's
Contracting and Stone, Inc. v. United States, 326 F.3d 785, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,413, 91 A.F.T.R.2d
2003-2047 (6th Cir. 4/24/03). The IRS issued summonses to accountants for Scotty's Contracting and its
owner, Scott, "to determine whether *** has unreported federal income tax liabilities ***, and whether
*** Scott has committed any offense under the internal revenue laws." The Court of Appeals (Judge
Gibbons) rejected the government's argument that Scotty's Contracting lacked standing to challenge the
summonses because they were issued for the sole purpose of a criminal investigation of Scott, not
Scotty's. However, the court held that under § 7602, as amended in 1982, the IRS may validly issue a
summons pursuant for the sole purpose of a criminal investigation, as long as the case has not yet been
referred to the Justice Department. Accord: United States v. Millman, 822 F.2d 305, 308 (2d Cir.1987);
Pickel v. United States, 746 F.2d 176, 183-84 (3d Cir.1984); United States v. G & GAdver. Co., 762 F.2d
632; United States v. Schmidt, 816 F.2d 1477 (10th Cir.1987); La Mura v. United States, 765 F.2d 974
(11 th Cir. 1985).
11. Chief Counsel sets forth the rules for playing hardball by keeping secret
certain Chief Counsel Advice. Chief Counsel Notice CC-2003-022, 2003 TNT 129-3 (7/1/03),
modifying and supplementing Chief Counsel Notice CC-2002-026 (5/16/02). This notice apprises Chief
Counsel employees of the procedures for processing taxpayer specific Chief Counsel Advice when it is
determined that no portion of a particular CCA need be disclosed to the public under the provision of §
6110.
C. Litigation Costs
1. Frivolous arguments are painful to lawyers' pocketbooks. Takaba v.
Commissioner. 119 T.C. 285 (12/16/02). Judge Halpern sua sponte awarded the government excess
attorneys costs of $10,500, payable by taxpayer's counsel, under § 6673(a)(2), where counsel continued
to press a frivolous "§ 861 argument" [that only income earned from possessions, corporations, or the
Federal government is subject to tax] originally advanced by the taxpayer actingpro se.
2. It will warm your heart to know that the sword to push the IRS to settle has
a keen edge. Gladden v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. No. 16 (6/27/03). The taxpayer made a "qualified
offer" under § 7430(c)(4)(E), and after a judicial decision relating to issues pertinent to the substantive
tax adjustment the parties finally settled the substantive tax adjustment for less than the offer. Temp.
Reg. § 1.7430-7T(a) provides that "[tihe provisions of the qualified offer rule do not apply if the
taxpayer's liability under the judgment * * * is determined exclusively pursuant to a settlement ......
Because legal arguments and issues relating to the substantive issues were litigated and decided by a
court, the judgment was not regarded as merely pursuant to a settlement. Thus the taxpayer's qualified
offer was not limited by the settlement limitation on qualified offers in section § 7430(c)(4)(E)(ii)(I).
Accordingly, the taxpayers qualified as a prevailing party under § 7430(c)(4) by reason of section
7430(c)(4)(E).
D. Statutory Notice
1 . The IRS does not have to comply with at least one section of the IRS
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998. Elings v. Commissioner, 324 F.3d 1110, 2003-1 U.S.T.C.
50,357, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-1648 (9th Cir. 4/8/03). The Ninth Circuit held that the failure to comply
with § 3463(a) of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, an uncodified provision, stating that
the IRS "shall include on each notice of deficiency ... the date determined by [the IRS] as the last day on
which the taxpayer may file a petition in the Tax Court," does not invalidate the deficiency notice.
Accord Rochelle v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 356 (2001), aff'd, 293 F.3d 740 (5th Cir. 2002); Smith v.
Commissioner, 275 F.3d 912 (10th Cir. 2001).
2. The IRS relies on Postal Service Forms. Clough v. Commissioner, 119 T.C.
183 (10/18/02). The taxpayer's petition was dismissed as untimely. Where the existence of the notice of
deficiency is not disputed, Postal Service Form 3877, Acceptance of Registered, Insured, C.O.D., and
Certified Mail, or its equivalent - a certified mail list - is direct documentary evidence of the date and
fact of mailing. Exact compliance raises a presumption of official regularity in the Commissioner's favor.
E. Statute of Limitations
1. The Eighth Circuit rejects a thirty-year-old Revenue Ruling. Kaffenberger v.
United States, 314 F.3d 944, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,164, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-374 (8th Cir. 1/3/03).
Section 6532(a) allows the IRS to agree to an extension of time [beyond the normal two year period of
limitations] for filing a refund suit. In Rev. Rul. 71-57, 1971-1 C.B. 405, the IRS ruled that such an
agreement was valid only if the agreement is executed before the statutory time expired. The court of
appeals held that Rev. Rul. 71-57 misconstrues § 6532(a)(2), and that an agreement to extend the statute
of limitations executed by the IRS after it had expired was valid. The court reasoned that § 6501, the
provision limiting the period for the IRS's to assess taxes allows the period to be extended "by
subsequent agreements in writing made before the expiration of the period previously agreed upon," but
that § 6532(a)(2) contains no such language; and the inference therefore is that the agreement need not be
entered into before the period expires, because to "do so renders the above quoted portion of § 6501
'insignificant, if not wholly superfluous."'
2. Brosi v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 5 (1/13/03). Tolling of the statute of limitation
under § 651 1(h) is not available to a taxpayer who serves as a "care-giver" to a relative; it applies only in
the case of a serious mental or physical disability of the individual taxpayer seeking relief.
3. The government end-runs the statute of limitations via a setoff. Pacific Gas
& Electric Co. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 271, 91 AFTR2d 2003-1035, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,267
(2/20/03). Without any particular statutory authority, the government may setoff an erroneous refund
against other refunds due to the taxpayer. If the other refund relates to the same taxpayer, tax, and tax
year, the government can setoff the prior erroneous refund even if the statute of limitations on bringing
suit for the erroneous refund has expired. In this case, an erroneous overpayment of interest on
overpayment of income tax was setoff against a subsequent refund claim. The IRS did allow the taxpayer
a deduction for the amount of the setoff in the year of the setoff.
4. Counting the days on the calendar. Rev. Rul. 2003-41, 2003-17 I.R.B. 814(4/28/03). If pursuant to § 7503 [providing that, if the last day for filing a return falls on a Saturday,
Sunday, or legal holiday, the return will be considered timely if filed on the next succeeding day that is
not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday], a taxpayer files a timely return after April 15, e.g., on April 17,
then § 651 lstatute of limitations for filing a refund claim expires three years after the extended filing
date, e.g. April 17. But if the taxpayer had filed a timely return before April 15, when the due date was
extended by § 7503 to a later date, a refund claim filed after April 15 three years later, because
§6513(b)(1) treats wage withholding as paid on April 15, and § 7503 does not affect § 6513(b)(1).
5. Regulations on the statute of limitations suspension when enforcement is
sought with respect to a designated summons issued to a corporation. REG-208199-91, Suspension
of Limitations Period, 68 F.R. 44905 (7/31/03). Proposed regulations under § 6503(j), relating to the
suspension of the statute of limitations when a case is brought with respect to a "designated" or "related"
summons issued to a corporation.
6. No Mulligan for the Tax Court and the IRS. Carroll v. United States, 339 F.3d
61, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5650, 2003-2 U.S.T.C. 50,608 (2d Cir. 8/5/03). For purposes of suspending the
statute of limitations for deficiencies pending a Tax Court order in a docketed case, the order is entered
under § 7459 when it is signed, docketed, and served, even if the document itself is undated due to a
clerical error. The Tax Court's order vacating its earlier undated order and reentering the original order
did not restart the statute of limitations - either because the Tax Court had no jurisdiction to vacate its
first order or because the second order was a "non-substantive housekeeping document," and the
assessment was untimely.
F. Liens and Collections
1. You'll soon have to pay the IRS for the privilege of proving that you can't
pay the IRS. REG-103777-02, User Fees for Processing Offers to Compromise, 67 F.R. 67573
(11/06/02). The proposed regulations [31 C.F.R. § 300.3] impose a $150.00 user fee for processing offers
in compromise [pursuant to the Independent Offices Appropriations Act, 31 U.S.C. § 9701]. The
proposed user fee would not apply to offers based on doubt as to liability, offers made by low income
taxpayers, offers accepted to promote effective tax administration, and offers accepted based on doubt as
to collectibility where there has been a determination that, although an amount greater than the amount
offered could be collected, collection of more than the amount offered would create economic hardship
within the meaning of Reg. § 301.6343-1.
2. "Decision letter," "determination letter." What's the difference? Craig v.
Commissioner, 119 T.C. 252 (11/14/02). After the IRS sent the taxpayer a final notice of intent to levy,
the taxpayer filed a timely request for a § 6330 hearing. The taxpayer was accorded an "equivalent
hearing" [under Reg.§. 301.6330-1(i)], at which the taxpayer was erroneously told that he was not
entitled to a hearing, and after which a decision letter upholding the levy was issued, stating that the
taxpayer was not entitled to judicial review of the decision because the request for a hearing was
untimely. The taxpayer appealed and Judge Laro held that the Tax Court had jurisdiction to review the
IRS's decision even though the IRS never issued the taxpayer a notice of determination with respect to a
§ 6330 hearing. The Commissioner conceded that the taxpayer was entitled to and should have been
given a hearing, and Judge Laro accepted the Commissioner's argument that the Tax Court had
jurisdiction on the grounds that the taxpayer had received an "equivalent hearing" and a decision letter.
Since there was a timely request for a hearing, an equivalent hearing, and decision letter, "the 'decision'
reflected in the decision letter issued to petitioner is a 'determination' for purposes of section
6630(d)(1)." The court proceeded to grant summary judgment for the Commissioner, rejecting the
taxpayer's tax protestor arguments and imposing a $2,500 § 6673(a)(1) penalty.
a. But timeliness counts. Herrick v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-167
(6/9/03). Special Trial Judge Armen held that where the taxpayer fails to file a timely request for a
collection due process hearing, the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to review a the IRS's decision in a
"decision letter" following an "equivalent hearing." It was irrelevant that the IRS had erroneously
advised the taxpayer that he had been granted an extension of time to request the due process hearing,
because Kennedy v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 255 (2001), held that the Commissioner is not authorized to
waive the time period requirements in § 6330.
3. T.D. 9027, Levy Restrictions During Installment Agreements, 67 F.R. 77416
(12/18/02). The Treasury Department has promulgated regulations [Reg. § 301.6331-4] under § 6331(k)
relating to restrictions on levy during the period that an installment agreement is proposed or in effect.
4. Due process in jeopardy assessments and levies. Dom v. Commissioner, 119
T.C. 356 (12/30/02). Section 6330(f) denies taxpayers the right to a pre-levy hearing in the case of
jeopardy assessments, but § 6330(b) accords the taxpayer a right to an administrative due process hearing
within a reasonable time after the levy. Judge Colvin held that under § 6330(d), the taxpayer is entitled to
Tax Court review of an administrative decision in a § 6330(b) hearing that finds a jeopardy levy was
proper.
5. The taxpayer won the procedural battle but lost the substantive war.
Washington v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 114 (3/6/03). In a reviewed opinion by Judge Chiechi, the Tax
Court held (majority of 8, with 7 judges concurring) that in a § 6330 due process hearing, the Tax Court
has jurisdiction to determine whether the U.S. Bankruptcy Court previously had discharged the taxpayers
from unpaid income tax liabilities for the years in question. [The bankruptcy court order simply provided
"the Debtor is released from all dischargeable debts."] PS - the taxpayer lost on the merits.
6. It can be expensive to seek judicial review of a §§ 6320/6330 due process
hearing primarily for purposes of delay. Roberts v. Commissioner, 329 F.3d 1224, 2003-1 U.S.T.C.
50,359. 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-1673 (1 1th Cir. 3/13/03), aff'g 118 T.C. 365 (5/3/02). In reviewing the
Appeals Officer's decision in a §§ 6320/6330 due process hearing that collection of a tax shown on the
return but not paid was warranted, Judge Chiechi held that a computer generated record of assessment on
Form RACS 006 complied with the requirements of Reg. § 301.6203-1; a signed Assessment Certificate,
Form 23C, is not required. A $10,000 penalty under § 6673(a)(1) was imposed on the taxpayer for
petitioning for review of the §§ 6320/6330 due process hearing primarily for purposes of delay. The
Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the taxpayer's due process claims without merit and that the Tax
Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions.
7. Administrative levy on property held as tenants by the entirely for one
spouse's tax liability is OK. Hatchett v. United States, 330 F.3d 875, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-2457, 2003-1
U.S.T.C. 50,504 (6th Cir. 6/4/03). The Sixth Circuit held that pursuant to Craft v. United States, 535
U.S. 274 (2002) [holding that under § 6321 a tax lien for one spouse's tax liability attached to that
spouse's interest in real property held with his wife an tenants by the entirely], the IRS had to power
under § 6331 to levy on the taxpayer-husband's interest in real property held as tenants by the entirely by
seizing and selling the entire property and accounting to the wife for her interest.
8. You have a right to make an oral recording of the frivolous arguments you
make in a due process hearing, even if you can't do so in an ordinary Appeals conference. Keene v.
Commissioner, 121 T.C. No.2 (7/8/03). In a reviewed opinion (Judge Dawson) adopting the opinion of
Special Trial Judge Armen, the Tax Court held that § 7521(a)(1) provides taxpayers the right to audio
record a § 6330 due process hearing. Several concurrences pointed out that the holding did not invalidate
any other IRS procedures or regulations regarding the ordinary Appeals process.
Judge Chiechi (joined by Judge Cohen and Swift) dissented on the
grounds that § 7521 was intended to apply only to the in-person audit interviews and the in-person
collection interviews that existed in 1988, when § 7521 was enacted, and did not intend the provision to
apply to voluntary conferences initiated by taxpayers "conducted in an informal setting in order to review
and consider actions taken by the examination division or the collection division of the IRS and to discuss
the facts and the law relating to such actions for the purpose of settling or resolving those matters without
resort to litigation."
* Judge Swift dissented on the grounds that the taxpayer had raised
only frivolous argument and should not be permitted to complain about procedural questions to further
delay the proceedings.
9. Sometimes it's a return, sometimes it isn't. Swanson v. Commissioner, 121
T.C. No. 7 (8/28/03). A substitute for a return prepared by the IRS pursuant to § 6020 is not a return for
purposes of § 523(a)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Act. Because the taxpayer had not files any returns for the
year in issue, he was not discharged from his income tax liabilities by the discharge in bankruptcy.
10. A QDRO creates an interest in a pension fund that trumps a later federal
tax lien. United States v. Taylor, 338 F.2d 947, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5606 (8th Cir. 1/14/03). When the
IRS attempted to levy on a delinquent taxpayer's pension fund, his ex-wife, who had an interest in the
fund under a valid QDRO intervened. The court (Judge Riley) held that as a result of the QDRO, the ex-
wife was a "judgment lien creditor" with a perfected interest, regardless of whether she had satisfied state
law perfection requirements. Furthermore, a modification of the QDRO related back to the date of the
original QDRO. Accordingly, her claim had priority over a subsequent federal tax lien.
G. Innocent Spouse
1. Innocent spouse relief applies only to joint returns. Raymond v.
Commissioner, 119 T.C. 191 (10/22/02). The filing of a joint return is a statutory prerequisite for relief
under § 6015(b) and (c), but the statute is silent as to § 6015(f) relief. The Tax Court (Judge Vasquez)
held that a taxpayer who did not file a joint return is not entitled to relief under the equitable relief
provisions of § 6015(f) because the Conference Report states that relief is to be granted where "it is
inequitable to hold an individual liable for all or part of any unpaid tax or deficiency arisingfrom a joint
return." Relief was unavailable to the taxpayer, who claimed that the income reported on her "married
filing separately return" was not hers and that she had not filled it out, but had signed a blank return.
2. Did a procedural detail slip through the statutory cracks? Maier v.
Commissioner, 119 T.C. 267 (11/20/02). When one spouse requests innocent spouse relief from the IRS,
§ 6015(h)(2) assures the other spouse a right to participate in the process [although it does not guarantee
a personal appearance]. If a requesting spouse seeks Tax Court review of a denial of innocent spouse
relief in a proceeding to which the other spouse is not already a party, § 6015(e)(4) provides the
nonrequesting spouse the right to intervene. But if the IRS administratively grants the requesting spouse
innocent spouse relief, according to the Tax Court [Judge Panuthos], the nonrequesting spouse has no
independent right to petition the Tax Court to review the administrative grant of relief to the requesting
spouse.
3. A limitation on claiming the assessment is barred by the statute of
limitations. Block v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 62 (1/23/03). Judge Ruwe held that he Tax Court's
jurisdiction under § 6015(e) to review the Commissioner's denial of innocent spouse relief pursuant to a
stand alone petition does not permit the taxpayer seeking innocent spouse relief to raise other substantive
or procedural claims (e.g., the statute of limitations on assessments).
4. Appeal rights for taxpayers seeking relief under § 66. Rev. Proc. 2003-19,
2003-5 1.R.B. 371 (2/3/03). This revenue procedure provides guidance regarding administrative appeal
rights of a taxpayer seeking relief from tax liability under § 66(c). [Section 66(c) provides relief for a
spouse who does not file a joint return, and does not know of or include in income certain items of
community income attributable to the other spouse, if it would be "inequitable" to include the items in
the innocent spouse's gross income.]
5. Sorry Kathryn, the Tax Court is indeed a court of limited jurisdiction.
Bernal v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 102 (2/20/03). The taxpayer, a resident of a community property state,
sought relief under § 66(c) from tax liability for community income earned by her spouse, from whom
she lived apart and was in the process of divorcing and with whom she did not file a joint return. The
Commissioner denied the relief and the taxpayer filed a stand alone petition for review of the
Commissioner's decision. The Tax Court dismissed the petition because § 66(c) does not contain a
provision parallel to § 6015(e) providing for review by the Tax Court of the Commissioner's decision not
to grant innocent spouse relief: "There is nothing in the statute or legislative history from which we could
conclude that Congress intended to provide independent ("stand alone") review by the Tax Court of the
denial of a claim for relief under section 66."
6. Innocent spouse relief for the dead. Rev. Rul. 2003-36, 2003-18 I.R.B. 849
(5/5/03). An executor may pursue an existing § 6015 request for innocent spouse relief made during
decedent's lifetime, and he has authority under § 6903 to file a request for innocent spouse relief under §
6015 "as long as the decedent had satisfied any applicable requirements while alive."
7. "[Slince refunds are included in the relief provided under section 6015, ... a
request for relief under section 6015 encompasses a request for a refund of tax to the extent
permitted under section 6015." Washington v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 137 (4/21/03). The taxpayer
and her then husband filed a joint return for 1989, reflecting her salary income and his self-employment
income, that showed tax owed, but did not pay the tax, beyond the wage withholding on the taxpayer's
salary. The IRS garnished the taxpayer's wages and applied overpayments of her tax from 1992 and
1994-98 to the unpaid 1989 tax liability. The IRS denied the taxpayer's request for § 6015 equitable
relief. Judge Jacobs held that the IRS had abused its discretion because it had not taken into account the
extent of the economic hardship that the taxpayer would suffer if relief were not granted and the facts
established that the unpaid tax was attributable to the taxpayer's former husband's income and she had
no knowledge of reason to believe at the time the returns was signed that he would not pay it. No factors
in Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447 or Reg. § 301.6343-1 weighed against granting relief. The court
also reject the IRS's argument that even if the taxpayer was entitled to relief under § 6015(f), the
provision did not apply to the portion of the tax liability that was paid on or before July 22, 1998 [the
date of enactment of Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998], for which she was
seeking a refund. Section 6015 applies to the full amount of any preexisting tax liability for a particular
taxable year, if any of that liability remained unpaid as of July 28, 1998, and not just to the portion of tax
liability that remained unpaid thereafter [following Flores v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 49 (2001),
followed]. However, pursuant to sec. 6015(g)(1) the taxpayer's right to a refund was limited to amounts
for which claims were filed within the periods in § 6511 - in this case amounts paid within two years
prior to filing the refund claim. Taxpayer's letters to a revenue officer seeking to have her account placed
on "uncollectible status" and requesting abatement of interest and penalties on the grounds that her
husband owned the taxes constituted a sufficient informal refund request.
8. The Tax Court is the Chancellor under § 6015(f). Wiest v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo 2003-91 (3/27/03). The Commissioner's denial of § 6015(f) equitable innocent spouse relief
was arbitrary where only $900 of a $4,162 underpayment (after wage withholding) was attributable to the
requesting spouse's income, and the nonrequesting spouse had handled the preparation and filing of the
return. In light of the nonrequesting spouse's "pattern of deception," the taxpayer had no reason to know
that she would not pay the tax shown on the return, and the IRS erred in treating signing the return as
knowledge or reason to know that the tax would not be paid. Furthermore, the IRS's calculation of the
taxpayer's share of the unpaid tax was arbitrary.
9. You might be able to wriggle out of a closing agreement under the power of§ 6015. Hopkins v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. No. 17 (6/30/03). The taxpayer-wife (Yvonne) filed a
request for innocent spouse relief under § 6015 with respect to 1982 and 1983. The taxpayers had
reported losses from a partnership for those years; in 1988 they signed a closing agreement under §
7121with respect to adjustments relating to the deductions. In a subsequent bankruptcy the taxpayer-wife
sought innocent spouse relief under former § 6013(e), but the bankruptcy court, in a decision that was
affirmed [In re Hopkins, 146 F.3d 729 (9th Cir.1998)], held that the closing agreement precluded
innocent spouse relief. In the instant case the Commissioner argued that the closing agreement precluded
a claim for relief under § 6015, and also argued that res judicata and collateral estoppel precluded the
taxpayer's claim. Judge Ruwe held that a closing agreement entered into prior to the effective date of §
6015 does not preclude the taxpayer from seeking § 6015 innocent spouse relief, which may be available
for any tax that remained unpaid as of 6/22/98. Nor did resjudicata or collateral estoppel preclude the
claim.
10. When they both have income and erroneous deductions, how do you
apportion liability? Hopkins v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. No. 5 (7/29/03). Mr. and Mrs. Hopkins filed ajoint return on which he claimed erroneous deductions passed-through from a partnership and she
claimed erroneous NOL deductions. Mrs. Hopkins (Marianne) was denied innocent spouse relief under §
6015(b), but was granted some apportioned liability relief under § 6015(c). She was granted relief from
tax liability attributable to Mr. Hopkins erroneous partnership deductions except for the portion, if any,
that offset her income. She was liable for any deficiencies attributable to her erroneous NOL deductions
to the extent they offset her income, but she was relieved of liability for any remaining portion of the
deficiencies attributable to the NOL that offsets his income. Decision was entered under Rule 155.
11. But you can't wriggle out of a prior judgment in a stand alone innocent
spouse petition. Just one bite at the innocent spouse apple. Thumer v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. No. 3
(7/11/03). Judge Cohen held that a taxpayer who had failed to raise a innocent spouse claim in a prior
district court proceeding instituted by the IRS to reduce an assessment to judgment was barred by res
judicata from raising the claim in a stand alone petition if the taxpayer participated meaningfully in the
prior action. Because the Mr. Thurner had meaningfully participated, his claim was barred; whether Mrs.
Thurner had materially participated could not be determined on a motion for summary judgment. On
another issue, the court held that § 6015 relief is not available for tax liabilities that had been paid prior
to 6/22/98.
12. Community property income on separate returns. T.D. 9074, Treatment of
Community Income for Certain Individuals Not Filing Joint Returns, 68 F.R. 41067 (7/10/03). The
Treasury has promulgated final regulations under § 66, relating to the treatment of married individuals in
community property states who do not file joint income tax returns. The regulations deal primarily with
issues under § 66(c) [relief from community property rules]. The regulations apply only to community
income, and provide that whether income is community property is determined by the law of the state in
which the taxpayer is domiciled. The regulations apply an item-by-item approach to § 66(c) relief, and
provide that knowledge of the source of community income or the income-producing activity, without
knowledge of the specific amount of income, is sufficient knowledge to preclude relief.
13. "Equitable relief" revenue procedure. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B.
(7/24/03). Rules for spouses requesting equitable relied from income tax liability under § 6015(f) or its
community-property equivalent, § 66(c).
H. Miscellaneous
1. Miller v. Commissioner, 310 F.3d 640, 2002-2 U.S.T.C. 50,759, 90 A.F.T.R.2d
2002-7159 (9th Cir. 11/8/02). Reg. § 301.6404-2(a)(1) properly restricts the IRS's authority to abate
interest to income, estate, gift generation skipping, and certain excise taxes. The abatement of interest
provisions do not apply to employment taxes.
2. December 2002 proposed amendments to Circular 230. REG-122380-02,
Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 67 F.R. 77724 (12/19/02). The
proposed regulations include a proposal to rename the Director of Practice as the Director of the Office
of Professional Responsibility, together with a list of proposed procedural changes.
3. What do you say about this, Wilson? Notice 2002-62, 2002-39 I.R.B. 574
(9/5/02) This notice modifies and supersedes Notice 2001-62, 2001-2 C.B. 307, and provides an updated
list of approved private delivery services that under § 7502 qualify for the timely mailed/timely filed rule.
Certain specified Airborne Express, DHL Worldwide Express, Federal Express, and UPS services are
approved. Services not specifically listed, even if offered by an approved service provider, do not qualify.
4. Published guidance will be followed by the courts. Rauenhorst v.
Commissioner, 119 T.C. 157 (10/7/02). Taxpayers transferred warrants to four charities, which the
charities sold shortly thereafter. At the time of the transfer, the taxpayers knew of a contemplated
acquisition of the corporation. Judge Ruwe held that the taxpayers were not subject to tax on the
charities' sale of warrants, under the anticipatory assignment of income doctrine, because Rev. Rul. 78-
197, 1978-1 C.B. 83, holds that the anticipatory assignment of income doctrine is inapplicable to donated
property where the charitable donees are not legally obligated, nor can they be compelled, to sell the
contributed property.
a. Chief Counsel reminds IRS lawyers. Chief Counsel Notice CC-2002-
043 (10/17/02). The IRS reminds Chief Counsel attorneys of the requirement to follow published
guidance in papers filed in the Tax Court or in defense or suit letters sent to the Department of Justice.
b. And again, this time with more specificity. Chief Counsel Notice CC-
2003-014 (5/8/03). Clarifies the guidance of CC-2002-043 to provide specific rules regarding the
requirement to follow published guidance.
Rule 1: Chief Counsel attorneys may not argue contrary to final
guidance; they should generally follow final or temporary regulations in force even if the Service has
subsequently issued proposed regulations which might yield a different result;
* Rule 2: proposed regulations have no legal effect unless and until
they are adopted; proposed regulations should not be the subject of PLRs and TAMs;
* Rule 3: if there are no final or temporary regulations, Chief
Counsel attorneys may not take a position that is inconsistent with proposed regulations;
0 Rule 4: perceived conflict between proposed regulations and final
guidance (or between two or more pieces of nonregulatory final guidance) should be coordinated;
0 Rule 5: case law invalidating or disagreeing with the Service's
published guidance does not alter rule 1 or 3; and
* Rule 6: The government's authority to resolve cases through
settlement or other dispute resolution mechanisms remains unchanged, so long as the rules set forth above
are not violated.
5. T.D. 9023, Taxpayer Identification Number Rule Where Taxpayer Claims Treaty
Rate and Is Entitled to an Unexpected Payment, 67 F.R.70310 (11/22/02). The Treasury has promulgated
regulations [Reg. §§ 1.1441-6(g); 301.6109-1] governing withholding agents obtaining individual TINs
on an expedited basis when foreign individuals who claim reduced withholding rates under a treaty
receive an unexpected payment from the withholding agent and do not have a TIN.
6. T.D. 9028, Third Party Contacts, 67 F.R. 77419 (12/18/02). The Treasury
Department has promulgated final regulations under § 7602(c) [requiring reasonable advance notice to
the taxpayer] regarding third party contacts made by the IRS in audits and collections. The final
regulations generally follow the proposed regulations, REG-104906-99, Third Party Contacts, 66 F.R. 77
(1/2/01).
7. Just how detailed a finding on the burden of proof issue does the Eighth
Circuit want the Tax Court to make? Griffin v. Commissioner, 315 F.3d 1017, 2003-1 U.S.T.C.
50,186, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-486 (8th Cir. 1/14/03), rev'g T.C. Memo. 2002-6 (1/8/02). Reversing the
Tax Court, the Eighth Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, held that the taxpayer had introduced credible
evidence that payments of real estate taxes on property owned by an S corporation in which he was a
shareholder were made in his capacity as a proprietor of a business, not in his capacity as a shareholder.
(If the payments had been made in his capacity as a proprietor they could have been deductible.) The
court accepted the Commissioner's definition of "credible evidence": "'the quality of evidence which,
after critical analysis, the court would find sufficient upon which to base a decision on the issue if no
contrary evidence were submitted (without regard to the judicial presumption of IRS correctness)"', and
found this standard satisfied by the testimony of the taxpayer and his accountant. The Commissioner had
cross examined the taxpayer's witnesses, but had not introduced any evidence. The case was remanded to
the Tax Court for further proceedings to determine if the Commissioner met the burden of proof, even
though the Tax Court opinion, in a footnote, stated that its decision would have been the same if the
Commissioner had borne the burden of proof. Perhaps tipping its hand that it wanted the taxpayer to win,
the Court of Appeals admonished the Tax Court that "[i]f the same conclusion is reached by the tax court
without a new hearing, an explanation is warranted as to how the existing record justifies the conclusion
that the Commissioner has met his burden of proof."
* According to the Tax Court, the taxpayers did "not contend that
the real property taxes in question were imposed upon them, that they owned the real property against which
the taxes were assessed, or that they owned any equitable or beneficial interest in the real property that
might entitle them to a deduction under section 164. ... The only evidence regarding the nature of
[taxpayers'] business activities consists of [one taxpayer's] summary and uncorroborated testimony. He
testified, with little elaboration, that he has been a building contractor and land developer for about 30 years,
during which time he has developed about one project a year. On cross-examination, he testified that his
construction and real-estate development businesses are not separate businesses, but are 'all tied together.
They're all - any business I have is - if I - if they are - oftentimes I incorporate, because of the liability
aspect. They are Subchapter S if they are.' ... [T]here is no credible evidence that the tax payments were
made with respect to such activities. To the contrary, [taxpayer's] accountant testified that the tax payments
were reported on Schedule E because they were attributable to [his] S corporations.... [Taxpayers] failed to
introduce credible evidence to establish that [taxpayer's] failure to make the tax payments would have
caused direct and proximate adverse consequences to any businesses conducted in [taxpayers'] individual
capacities. [One taxpayer] testified that he made the tax payments 'in order to preserve my integrity and my
standing with the bank, and my good name, my goodwill.' There is no evidence to indicate, however, to
what extent [the taxpayer's] failure to make the tax payments would have resulted in any damage to his
reputation or creditworthiness. [Taxpayers] have introduced no credible evidence to show that petitioner
made the tax payments to protect the reputation of any business operation conducted in [their] individual
capacities. On the basis of [taxpayer's] testimony, we are unable to conclude that the tax payments would
have represented ordinary expenses to advance any business carried on in [taxpayers'] individual capacities,
as opposed to capital outlays to establish or purchase goodwill or business standing...."
8. Burton Kanter in trouble again. Investment Research Associates, Ltd. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-407 (12/15/99). In a 600-page opinion Burton Kanter was held liable
for the §6653 fraud penalty by reason of his being "the architect who planned and executed the elaborate
scheme with respect to the kickback income payments .... In our view, what we have here, purely and
simply, is a concerted effort by an experienced tax lawyer [Kanter] and two corporate executives [Claude
Ballard and Robert Lisle] to defeat and evade the payments of taxes and to cover up their illegal acts so
that the corporations [employing the two corporate executives] and the Federal Government would be
unable to discover them."
a. So far, he is unable to wriggle out, the way he did 25 years ago when
he was acquitted by a jury." The taxpayers subsequently moved to have access to the special trial
judge's "reports, draft opinions, or similar documents" prepared under Tax Court Rule 183(b). They
based their motion on conversations with two unnamed 2 Tax Court judges that the original draft opinion
from the special trial judge was changed by Judge Dawson before he adopted it. They were turned down
because the Tax Court held that the documents were related to its internal deliberative processes. See,
Tax Court Order denying motion, 2001 TNT 23-31 (4/26/00) and (on reconsideration) 2001 TNT 23-30
(8/30/00). Taxpayers sought mandamus from the Fifth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, but were
unsuccessful.
b. And the Tax Court's procedures are vindicated and taxpayer
Ballard loses on appeal on the fraud issue in the Eleventh Circuit. Ballard v. Commissioner v.
Commissioner, 321 F.3d 1037, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,246, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-928 (1 1th Cir. 2/13/03),
aff'g T.C. Memo 1999-407. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court decision and rejected the
taxpayers' argument that changes allegedly made by the Tax Court Special Trial Judge were improper.
Judge Fay stated:
Even assuming Dick's [taxpayers' lawyer's] affidavit to be true and affording Petitioners-
Appellants all reasonable inferences, the process utilized in this case does not give rise to
due process concern. While the procedures used in the Tax Court may be unique to that
court, there is nothing unusual about judges conferring with one another about cases
assigned to them. These conferences are an essential part of the judicial process when,
by statute, more than one judge is charged with the responsibility of deciding the case.
And, as a result of such conferences, judges sometimes change their original position or
thoughts. Whether Special Trial Judge Couvillion prepared drafts of his report or
subsequently changed his opinion entirely is without import insofar as our analysis of the
alleged due process violation pertaining to the application of [Tax Court] Rule 183 is
concerned. Despite the invitation, this court will simply not interfere with another court's
deliberative process.
The record reveals, and we accept as true, that the underlying report adopted by the Tax
Court is Special Trial Judge Couvillion's. Petitioners-Appellants have not demonstrated
that the Order of August 30, 2000 is inaccurate or suspect in any manner. Therefore, we
conclude that the application of Rule 183 in this case did not violate Petitioners-
Appellants' due process rights. Accordingly, we deny the request for relief and save for
another day the more troubling question of what would have occurred had Special Trial
Judge Couvillion not indicated that the report adopted by the Tax Court accurately
reflected his findings and opinion.
" His partner (and son-in-law) was convicted and imprisoned. See United States v. Baskes, 649 F.2d 471 (7th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1000 (1981).
12 Kanter's attorney revealed the names of the two judges when asked at oral argument to the Seventh Circuit as Tax
Court Judge Julian Jacobs and Chief Special Trial Judge Peter J. Panuthos. See the text at footnote I of Judge
Cudahy's dissent in the Seventh Circuit Kanter Estate opinion, below.
c. And the Tax Court's procedures are vindicated and taxpayer
Kanter's Estate 3 loses on appeal on the fraud issue in the Eleventh Circuit Estate of Kanter v.
Commissioner, 337 F.3d 833, 2003 U.S.T.C. 50,605, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5459 (7th Cir. 7/24/03) (per
curiam) (2-1), aff'g in part and rev'g in part T.C. Memo 1999-407. The court finds the nondisclosure of
the special trial judge's original report to be proper, following the Eleventh Circuit's Ballard opinion. It
affirms the findings on deficiencies, fraud and penalties, but reverses on the issue of the deductibility of
Kanter's expenses for his involvement in the aborted sale of a purported John Trumball painting of
George Washington because "Kanter has shown a distinct proclivity to seek income and profit through
activities similar to the failed sale of the painting."
d. And the Tax Court's procedures are vindicated but taxpayer Lisle's
Estate wins on appeal on the fraud issue in the Fifth Circuit. Estate of Lisle v. Commissioner, _
F.3d _, 2003 U.S.T.C. 50,606, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5566 (5th Cir. 7/30/03), aff'g in part and rev'g in
part T.C. Memo 1999-407. The Fifth Circuit (Judge Higginbotham) followed the Eleventh and Seventh
Circuits on the nondisclosure of the special trial judge's original report by the Tax Court. It affirms-the
findings of deficiencies, except for the deficiency in a closed year because the government's proof of
Lisle's fraud did not rise to the level of "clear and convincing evidence."
9. Alleged settlement based upon Appeals Officer's mistake in computation is
unenforceable. Estate of Halder v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-84 (3/25/03). The Tax Court
(Judge Vasquez) declined to enter decision on a settlement that was reached after an appeals officer
faxed the estate's accountant a valuation that mistakenly listed the proposed value of a partnership
interest as $1 million [its 1987 value], as opposed to $1,124,410 [its value as of the 1997 date of death].
The Tax Court ruled that the appeals officer's offer was based upon a mistake, so that there was no
meeting of the minds between the parties. In a footnote, Judge Vasquez also noted:
Even if we held there was a meeting of the minds, we would deny the estate's motion
because the "settlement" was never signed or approved by, or even submitted to, any IRS
official authorized to approve it. Gardner v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 475, 479 (1980).
0 The accountant advised the estate's lawyers and beneficiary of the
mistake and was advised by them not to inform the Appeals Officer, but instead to accept the $1 million
offer.
10. The regulations say I have to file this document at an IRS office that no
longer exists. Notice 2003-19, 2003-14 I.R.B. 703 (3/19/03). Guidance on the proper locations for filing
elections, statements and the like following the IRS reorganization. The notice provides that, pending
issuance of revised regulations, if a taxpayer files a document as directed in existing regulations, the
Service will forward it to its proper filing location.
11. Strong v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-87 (3/25/03). In response to an IRS
reconstruction of the taxpayer's income using the bank deposit method, the taxpayer claimed that he had
held a $165,000 cash hoard at the beginning of the period under examination, even though he had
asserted in a bankruptcy petition that he had no such cash at that time. The Commissioner moved for
summary judgment on the issue of the existence of the cash hoard on the grounds that the taxpayer was
estopped from claiming its existence, but the court (Judge Panuthos) denied summary judgment on the
grounds that there were genuine material issues of fact regarding the reason for the omission of the cash
hoard from the bankruptcy petition that might affect the application of estoppel.
12. The TEFRA notice wasn't an unauthorized disclosure even if some of the
recipients turned out not to be partners. Abelein v. United States, 323 F.3d 1210, 2003-1 U.S.T.C.
50,331, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-1476 (9th Cir. 3/7/03). The taxpayer, an investor in a tax shelter
partnership of which the IRS was conducting a TEFRA audit, claimed the mailing of final partnership
administrative adjustment (FPAA) forms to all persons who the IRS believed might have been partners
entitled to notice improperly disclosed confidential tax return information because some notices went to
people who were not partners. There was no doubt that return information had been disclosed, but the
IRS argued that the § 6103(h)(4) exception for disclosure in administrative proceedings applied. The
Court of Appeals (Judge Fernandez) held that the administrative proceeding exception applied because
(1) the taxpayers were parties to the administrative proceeding, and (2) under § 6231 the IRS must notify
all persons who the IRS believes to be partners in the partnership undergoing the TEFRA audit.
13 Burton Kanter died on October 31, 2001.
13. Sign the Form 870 and sue for a refund. Smith v. United States, 328 F.3d 760,
2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,396, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-1919 (5th Cir. 4/16/03), rev'g 2002-1 U.S.T.C 50,409
(S.D. Tex. 4/1/02), corrected by 2003-1 U.S.T.C 50,176 (S.D. Tex. 11/22/02). The taxpayer, whose
deficiency was determined in a partnership level proceeding, could seek refund of penalties after
executing Form 870 with phrase "Settlement Position" at top. Although the taxpayer clearly waived right
to file a Tax Court petition, neither Form 870, nor accompanying "penalty report," which taxpayer also
signed, clearly indicated that the taxpayer was his waiving right to contest the penalties through a refund
claim.
14. The ACLU unsuccessfully tries to protect Irwin Schiff's right to pander
fraudulent tax-scams. United States v. Schiff, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5047 (D. Nev. 6/16/03). The United
States obtained an injunction against Irwin Schiff, an infamous fraudulent tax-scam promoter. Schiff
falsely stated that income earned by individuals is not subject to federal income taxes, advised customers
to file zero-income tax returns, assisted them in submitting false W-4 forms to stop withholding taxes
from wages, helped them prepare other fraudulent tax documents, and urged customers to inundate the
IRS, federal courts and Department of Justice with frivolous lawsuits and hearings. The First Amendment
did not prevent an injunction against the promotion of the tax scam though publication and sale of
Schiff's book, THE FEDERAL MAFIA, even though the Nevada ACLU vigorously argued that Schiff
should not be censored. The IRS identified nearly 5,000 zero-income federal income tax returns filed by
approximately 3,100 of Schiff s customers during the past three years using a two-page attachment
referenced in THE FEDERAL MAFIA.
15. You have a choice of forum for review of the Commissioner's refusal to
abate interest. Beall v. United States, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5001 (5th Cir. 6/27/03). The Fifth Circuit
(Judge Garwood) held that a district court has jurisdiction in a refund suit to review for abuse of
discretion the Commissioner's refusal to abate interest. Judge Garwood reasoned that the grant of
jurisdiction to the Tax Court in § 6404(h) was not exclusive.
XI. WITHHOLDING AND EXCISE TAXES
A. Employment Taxes
1. Is there a Circular 230 issue lurking here? Veterinary Surgical Consultants,
P.C. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-48 (2/26/03). An S corporation failed to treat its sole
shareholder/president/sole employee as an employee for employment tax purposes. The Tax Court (Judge
Cohen) denied § 530 relief because the corporation had no reasonable basis for disregarding the explicit
rules of § 3112(d)(1) and Reg. §§ 31.3121(d)-1(b) and 31.3306(i)-1(e), treating corporate officers as
employees. For the same result for earlier years, see Veterinary Surgical Consultants, P.C. v.
Commissioner, 117 T.C. 141 (2001).
0 The taxpayer was a client of Joseph M Grey, a tax practitioner
who suffered a similar fate with respect to his own S Corporation in Joseph M Grey Public Accountant,
P.C. v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 121 (2002).
* On the same day the Tax Court handed down five almost identical
cases involving other clients of Joseph M Grey: Mike Graham Trucking, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2003-49 (2/26/03); Superior Proside, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-50 (2/26/03); Specialty
Transport & Delivery Services, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-51 (2/26/03); Nu-Look Design.
Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-52 (2/26/03); Water-Pure Systems, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2003-53 (2/26/03).
2. "Nothing in the language or legislative history of section 530 leads us to the
conclusion that denial of section 530 relief was meant to be an additional penalty for the failure to
timely file information returns .... ." Medical Emergency Care Associates, S.C. v. Commissioner, 120
T.C. No. 15 (5/19/03). The taxpayer provided hospitals with emergency room physicians and treated
those physicians as independent contractors. The taxpayer did not treat the physicians as employees for
any period, filed all tax returns treating the physicians as independent contractors, and had a reasonable
basis for not treating the physicians as employees. For the year in question however, the taxpayer filed
the information returns after the due date (but before the audit). The Commissioner denied § 530 relief
because the taxpayer failed to timely file Forms 1096 and 1099. Rev. Proc. 85-18, 1985-1 C.B. 518 states
that the IRS will not grant § 530 relief unless all Forms 1099 have been timely filed. Judge Nims refused
to follow Rev. Proc. 85-18 and granted relief, holding that the late filing of information returns did not
preclude the taxpayer from obtaining relief. "Nothing in the language or legislative history of section 530
leads us to the conclusion that denial of section 530 relief was meant to be an additional penalty for the
failure to timely file information returns, particularly under the circumstances in this case." Because the
court was "unable to ascertain the thoroughness of the agency's consideration or the validity of its
reasoning' it would not "defer to its requirement of timely filing as a prerequisite to section 530 relief...
3. Both the taxpayer and the Commissioner argued against Tax Court
jurisdiction, but they were both wrong. Charlotte's Office Boutique v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. No. 6
(8/4/03). The Commissioner asserted a deficiency for unreported employment taxes and additions to tax
for 1995 through 1998, and the taxpayer petitioned the Tax Court under § 7436(a) for a determination of
employment status. Thereafter, the taxpayer conceded that the person whose status was in question for
1996 through 1998 was an employee, and the parties agreed that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction over
those years because the taxpayer did not dispute the employment status during those years. The
Commissioner argued that the Tax Court's jurisdiction under § 7436(a) extends only to cases in which a
taxpayer asserts that an individual performing services for the taxpayer is a nonemployee and the
Commissioner has determined that the individual is an employee. The Tax Court (Judge Laro) held that
the agreement of the parties as to jurisdiction is not dispositive. Section 7436(a) confers not only
jurisdiction to determine whether an individual providing services is an employee, but also whether an
employer, is entitled to relief under § 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978, and the correct amounts of
employment taxes. The court went on to find that purported royalties were wages, that § 530 relief was
not available, and that penalties were warranted.
B. Self-employment
C. Excise Taxes
XII. TAX LEGISLATION
A. Enacted
1. The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 ("JGTRRA" or
the "2003 Act"), Pub. L. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752 was signed by President Bush on 5/28/03.
0 The 2003 Act accelerated the effective dates of a number of the
income tax provisions enacted in the Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2001 (the "2001
Act"), most significantly, the reduction of the upper level income tax rates. The 2003 Act also decreased
corporate and other business taxes through preferential depreciation deductions, and significantly reduced
the tax rate on long-term capital gains. Finally, and most dramatically, the 2003 Act significantly reduced
the tax rate on dividends received on corporate stock, taxing such dividends at the same preferential low
rates that apply to long-term capital gains. Many of the changes in the 2003 Act are scheduled to sunset after
three or four years, and those that are not scheduled for an earlier sunset, will sunset on 12/31/10, like all of
the changes in the 2001 Act.
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SELECTED RECENT FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS
Questions to The Honorable Mary Ann Cohen, Judge, United States Tax Court, asked by
Professor Ira B. Shepard at the William & Mary Tax Conference, November 21, 2003
A. lI.A. 1. at page 4 (Milenbach): In light of the difference between the Tax Court and
the Ninth Circuit in interpreting California law, could you comment on how federal courts
determine state law.
B. III.E. 1. at pages 19-20 and footnote: Could you comment about the Tax Court's
decision in the second Ames case that resulted in the government being whipsawed.
C. VI.D.2. at page 32: Don't you think it was inequitable that the S corporation's
creditors got the benefit of selling assets at a gain while sticking Mr. Mourad [the sole
shareholder] with the tax on the gain?
D. VIII.D.2. at page 54 (Dixon): Could you please comment on the different
approaches taken by the Tax Court and the Ninth Circuit?
E X.C. 1. at page 61 (Takaba): Could you comment on the practice of imposing costs
on attorneys who make arguments that seem frivolous to the Tax Court Judge.
F. X.C.2. at page 61 (Gladden): Could you comment on the Tax Court's practice
under the § 7430(c) "qualified offer" provisions.
G X.H.7. at pages 67-68 (Griffin): Could you comment on what happens
procedurally on the remand of the Eighth Circuit's decision to the Tax Court. This case dealt with
the shift of the burden of proof under § 7491. Do you think the Eighth Circuit has opened the
door for taxpayers to give uncontradicted self-serving testimony and prevail unless the
Commissioner puts on affirmative evidence?
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